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FOCUS • Art and Aesthetic Experience ALESSANDRO BERTINETTO • Introduction 




Art and Aesthetic Experience 
Since XVIII century philosophers from different philosophical traditions (English 
empiricism and French Enlightenment, German classical philosophy, positivism, Italian 
neo-idealism, phenomenology, pragmatism, existentialism, hermeneutics, analytical 
philosophy, etc.) have addressed the issue of aesthetic experience, questioning its 
structures, its specific properties, its importance and relevance to the perception, the 
understanding and the evaluation of art as well as to human relationship with nature 
and technique. 
Some of them, starting with Kant, investigated the specific quality and the supposed 
autonomy of aesthetics; other ones argued for its relevance to the learning experience 
as well as to the moral and the political experience, extending its scope beyond artistic 
production and enjoyment; someone else highlighted above all the value of this 
experience for artistic practices, articulating aspects and dynamics of aesthetic 
experience especially in relation to the ontological properties characterizing these 
practices and trying to answer to aesthetic and theoretical problems that emerged with 
certain kinds of avant-garde art, in which the Kantian notion of aesthetic experience 
seems to be taken out of the game; finally, some analytic philosophers (in particular 
George Dickie and Nöel Carroll), in disagreement with the idea of the autonomous 
nature of aesthetic experience, recently considered this concept as a “myth”, while –
especially in the German area– other philosophers (Rüdiger Bubner, Albrecht Wellmer, 
Christoph Menke, just to name some of them) defended, on the basis of Hegel’s 
philosophy of art, the fundamental reflexivity of aesthetic experience and its crucial 
significance for human experience as a whole, also because of its potential of disruption 
and transgression of ordinary everyday experience. 
* I wish to thank my PhD Students at the Universities of Udine and Trieste, Alberto de Piccoli and
Lorenzo Leonardo Pizzichemi, who gave me unvaluable help during the editing process, as well as the 
editorial board of CoSMo and, in particular, Alberto Del Bono, Chiara De Nardi, Alice Gardoncini, 
Roberto Merlo and Daniela Nelva for their generous willingness to help during the formatting process. 
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Hence, aesthetic experience and its connection with old and new artistic practices 
are a classic topic of philosophical thought, that interestingly concerns the ordinary life 
of people. Since opinions and arguments about it diverge, this issue deserves to be 
further investigated, in order to understand the reasons behind the different positions, 
if not to attempt an improbable conciliation. 
It is precisely with this spirit that in April 2014 the Department of Human Studies of 
the University of Udine, togheter with SIE – Società Italiana di Estetica, Ministerio de 
Ciencia e Innovación (Spain), CIM – Centro Interuniversitario di Morfologia 
“Francesco Moiso”, Comune di Udine, Udine Musei, Doctoral Program in History of 
Societies, Institutions and Thought (Udine/Trieste), and ARCI Udine, organized a 
workshop entitled Art and Aesthetic Experience.1 Its aim was to gather researchers from 
different countries (USA, Germany, Portugal, Spain, and Italy), who showed various 
scholarly and critical approaches to philosophical aesthetics and philosophy of art. 
The main purpose of the papers and of the discussants’ replicas delivered at the 
Workshop was to articulate –through the dialogue between some of the protagonists of 
the international contemporary philosophical scene– different ways of conceiving the 
connection between art and aesthetic experience, by investigating whether and how the 
notion of aesthetic experience can (still) be effective for the philosophical definition of 
art or at least of some artistic practices. As it has been shown by the lively and fruitful 
discussions that followed each session, the Workshop was indeed very successfull.  
The current issue of CoSMo. Comparative Studies in Modernism bears witness to this 
excellent achievement. Apart from a couple of exceptions,2 all the Workshop’s papers 
and replicas (now in the form of full articles) are collected here. Moreover, this volume 
also contains the article authored by Augustine Dumont, who could not attend the 
meeting in Udine for personal reasons, and the essay written together by Jèssica Jaques 
and the famous chef-artist Ferran Adrià. I am particularly grateful to Mr. Adrià, who has 
been kind enough to give the journal such a precious personal research contribution, 
which enriches the section “Percorsi”, devoted to the topic of Gustatory Aesthetics, 
today more than ever riding high thanks to EXPO 2015, whose core theme is “Feeding 
the Planet, Energy for Life”. 
The articles in this issue of CoSMo explore possible ways to understand the specific 
qualities of aesthetics, its areas of application, its relationship with the practices of 
artistic production, aesthetic enjoyment, and critical interpretation. They also discuss 
the complex relationship between the reflection on aesthetic experience and its quality 
and, on the one hand, the problems raised by contemporary art (which often seems to 
require a kind of non-aesthetic experience of understanding and appreciation) and, 
                                                           
1 I am very grateful to all mentioned institutions that supported this workshop. 
2 Dorothea Katharina Ritter’s and Simone Furlani’s talks. 
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secondly, the emergence of new potential areas of aesthetic enjoyment (like cooking 
and food appreciation). 
In the historico-philosophical essay that opens the section FOCUS and introduces 
the topic (“The Lost Experience of Art”), Federico Vercellone argues that our modern 
aesthetic experience of artworks has lost the synesthetic and erotic dimension that 
characterized the aesthetic object as provided with the beauty – defined by Alexander 
Baumagrten perfectio sensitiva –, that is able to make us appreciate the completeness of 
the world. The Hegelian “death of art” is therefore an integral part of that process of 
rationalization and fragmentation of aesthetic experience that, from Batteux to Adorno, 
assigned different artistic practices to the individual senses, de-realizing the art object 
and causing all art to lose the ability to involve us entirely. Hence, Vercellone concludes 
that: 
 
On one hand modern art is forced to dissociate from life, admitting and declaring its fictitious, 
unreal status, making modern aesthetics reveal its platonic roots, validating an art which is 
inexorably embedded in the sphere of illusory mimesis and ineffective experience. On the other 
hand, and as a consequence of this, the systematic consideration of the single arts reflects the 
abstract spider’s web of the world it is part of. 
 
This, Vercellone elaborates, reflects how the different spheres of our lives become 
more and more abstract, “giving rise to what Max Weber called the ‘disenchantment of 
the world’”. 
In his article, “Aesthetic precariousness”, Gerard Vilar integrates Vercellone’s point 
of view by focussing upon another crucial aspect of the aesthetics of the contemporary 
world: its precariousness. He writes: 
 
as a specific condition of contemporary art and aesthetics in late capitalist culture […, 
precariousness] is a disorder that creates a new order for artworks and practices, for kinds of publics 
and audiences, and for aesthetic judgement and art criticism. [As such precariousness] is an 
essential trait of what Jacques Rancière calls ‘aesthetic regime’ of art. 
 
Precariousness affects the ontological status of contemporary art as well as the 
existential condition of artists. Thanks to some concrete examples, Vilar explains how 
contemporary art, also understood as artistic research – a field that today is riding on the 
crest of a wave (see Badura et al. 2015) – can make us think about precariousness as a 
crucial aspect of our contemporary world. A a matter of fact,  
 
the aesthetics of precariousness, this art of the precarious, is a very real and appropriate manner of 
producing political art today, a place to think and rethink aspects of our world, our culture and life, 
as well as a place of comprehension, of something that is more ambiguous and even beyond 
knowledge. 
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Precarious, however, are today also the discourse and the enjoyment of art. Art 
suffers in this way the same fate as philosophy, which is also dispersed in the 
multiplicity of the possible truths in the market of thought. Following Robert Groys 
(Groys 2010), Vilar calls the precarious condition of contemporary art “weak 
universalism”: art is universally present in our everyday life; the reason for this, 
however, is that everything, even the most ordinary image, can be artisticised, becoming 
a “device for aesthetic reflection”, by means not of being shown in a museum as 
untouchable original artwork, but of being offered to the universal aesthetic 
contemplation in the blogs of each one of us. 
The concept of precariousness developed by Vilar is related to Heidegger’s notion 
of Ereignis in Alberto Martinengo’s article “Dall’aletheia al topos. Ontologia della 
precarietà in M. Heidegger e G. Vilar” (“From aletheia to topos. Ontology of 
precariousness in M. Heidegger and G. Vilar”). On the basis of Heidegger’s topology, 
Martinengo, following Vattimo and Malpas, shows that in the essay “Der Ursprung des 
Kunstwerkes” (1936) Heidegger had already conceived of art as a “device of stability 
and even habitability”, whilst later, in the essay “Kunst und Raum” (1969), he dealt 
with art potential to make room. A monumentalistic view of art ensues from this, which 
Martinengo reconnects to the practice of installation and to the precariousness that 
characterizes it ontologically, in the sense explained by Vilar. For “the monument is a 
kind of event that produces new forms of social bonds, at least in the sense of the birth 
of new meeting spaces.” Today, however, the very concept of the monument undergoes 
a kind of deconstruction. Martinengo writes in regard to this: “The monument is no 
longer an object that aspires to be permanent [...], but is a product with a ‘best-before 
date’”. Yet, although precariousness disassembles the artwork as an object of aesthetic 
contemplation, it is the harbinger of a “social performativity” able to re-signify the 
monument, in topological as well as in political sense, as a meeting place: art becomes a 
“performed theory”. As such it can, even better than philosophy, account for the 
precariousness that characterizes our relationship with the truth.  
In general, this commitment of art to truth or truths characterizes much of the 
avant-garde art. As Matilde Carrasco (“Aesthetics and the Meaning of Artworks”) 
writes, in XX. Century  
 
the idea of an art made to engage the mind of the viewer rather than his eye or emotions extended 
and conceptualism, in this global sense, became the basis of all-encompassing contemporary artistic 
practices, particularly in visual art. 
 
In this way, art turned its attention to cognitive and moral values beyond formal and 
expressive properties. Hence, one has to respect precisely the conceptual distinction 
between aesthetic and artistic properties and values. Carrasco’s argument starts from 
Arthur Danto’s late turn to an “aesthetics of meaning” and from the notion of 
“embodied meaning” (one of the main themes of the current debate in philosophy of 
art) and discusses the concepts of “aesthetic value” and “artistic value”, in reference to 
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the main protagonists of contemporary analytic aesthetics (McFee, McIver Lopes, 
Walton, Stecker, Goldman, Budd, and Levinson). Her point is that “aesthetic value 
doesn’t exhaust artistic value. But in the aesthetic experience of artworks our sensuous, 
cognitive, and affective faculties are simultaneously addressed, and often challenged”. 
In this regard, the question arises once again: “What is aesthetic experience?” 
Jerrold Levinson, one of the philosophers called into question by Carrasco, opened his 
article with this question in “Towards a minimalist conception of aesthetic experience”. 
Levinson debunks George Dickie’s criticism to the concepts of aesthetic experience and 
aesthetic attitude and argues that the aesthetic attitude at the basis of the aesthetic 
experience is a certain kind of disposition to perception and attention. He argues that to 
adopt a minimalist conception in aesthetics –“one according to which aesthetic 
experience is just experience in which there is perception or cognition of aesthetic 
and/or formal properties of some object”– is theoretically disadvantageous. In fact, 
only a non-minimalist account of aesthetic experience can safeguard the insight that 
aesthetic experience is rewarding and valuable. Such non-minimalist account allows in 
other words to understand adequately the appreciative and evaluative dimension of 
aesthetic experience. But what is then the aesthetic appreciation? By discussing 
Iseminger’s position on the matter, Levinson suggests that such appreciation involves 
an active approval of the perception process and that indeed “an aesthetic state of mind, 
in which one appreciates or values-for-its-own-sake some embedded perceptual-
imaginative experience, is […] an aesthetic experience as well”. The thesis defended by 
Levinson is therefore the following:  
 
Aesthetic experience is experience involving aesthetic perception of some object, grounded in 
aesthetic attention to the object, and in which there is a positive hedonic, affective or evaluative 
response to the perception itself or the content of that perception. 
 
As such, aesthetic experience shares some important qualities of –but significantly 
differs from– other experiences, like the sexual experience, the mystical experience, and 
the pharmacological experience of taking drugs. Morevoer, and most importantly, this 
view of aesthetic experience makes us understand the deep significance of our interest 
in art. 
The positions articulated by Levinson are extensively and critically discussed by 
Elisa Caldarola in her “Comments on Jerrold Levinson’s Toward a Non-Minimalist 
Conception of Aesthetic Experience”. In particular, Caldarola points out that Levinson’s 
view of aesthetic experience is not entirely satisfactory, because it does not grasp two 
questions raised by Carroll’s account. First, it seems unable to explain how one can 
have aesthetic experiences of conceptual art. Second, it cannot give an account of how 
to have aesthetic experiences through memory or testimony. In Levinson’s view, 
Caldarola suggests, these experiences can be understood only as indirect aesthetic 
experiences. But some other points are even more puzzling: among these, the only 
positive characterization of the response associated with aesthetic experience and a 
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swing in the theoretical characterization of disinterested attention as an ingredient of 
aesthetic experience. Moreover, “it remains an open question whether the perception of 
aesthetic properties is necessary to aesthetic experience” and whether aesthetic 
experience of bad art is possible. 
Some of the issues highlighted by Caldarola and Levinson are also addressed by 
Georg Bertram’s article “Aesthetic Experience as an Aspect of Interpretive Activities”. 
In reference to Kant, Bertram argues that aesthetic experience is characterized by two 
contrasting aspects: an aspect in which the subject is passive and an aspect in which the 
subject is active. In other words, “aesthetic experiences are experiences in which the 
objects experienced play the primary role and […] are experiences in which a subject is 
confronted with itself”. But, “how is it possible that a subject can reflect on itself if it is 
merely passive?”. This is the “conundrum of aesthetic experience”: Bertram’s thesis, in 
part obtained by referring to philosophers such as, for example, Gadamer and Adorno 
(and further developed in Bertram 2014), is that this is possible by means of conceiving 
aesthetic experience in a practical way. In fact, “aesthetic experiences are based in forms 
of practice that the subject performs in encountering works of art”. These practices are 
generally interpretive in nature: they concern the different ways (not only linguistic, but 
also, eg., physical and emotional) in which subjects are confronted with objects and 
events (artworks and performances) that have self-referential nature. In this sense, 
defending the interpretative character of aesthetic experience, Bertram understands it 
“in terms of the way the object affects the activities of recipients”, thus resuming 
explicitly Levinson’s non-minimalist setting. This solves several problems of traditional 
theories of aesthetic experience, from Schopenhauer to Martin Seel. 
In his paper “Being tied to what, and why? On the objective side of (Bertram’s 
notion of) aesthetic experience” Filippo Focosi terms the conception developed by 
Bertram “relational”, because it “states that an experience is aesthetic if it is the 
experience of a distinctive kind of relation between an object and a subject”. 
Appreciating especially “the emphasis that Bertram puts on the ‘positive’ side of 
passivity”, and in particular the importance he assignes to the active user’s 
understanding of the constituent elements of the works of art, he observes some 
similarities between Bertram’s approach and the thought of some of the protagonists of 
the history of aesthetics, including: Monroe Beardsley, John Dewey, Luigi Pareyson, 
and Peter Lamarque. In any case, Focosi argues in favor of an object-oriented notion of 
aesthetic experience, based on the distinction between aesthetic form –“the organic 
interconnectedness of parts/elements of an artwork, including its semantic or 
expressive components”– and expressive form –“the organic interconnectedness of the 
semantic and expressive properties of an artwork as considered also for what they are, 
i.e., as embodying a distinctive (representational, symbolic or emotional) content”. His 
view is that “aesthetic experience requires the recipient’s active responsiveness to the 
object configuration. But it demands also that the work on which our attention is 
directed is capable of eliciting and supporting our interest”, in virtue of its formal and 
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semantic properties. According to Focosi, this is precisely what certain manifestations 
of contemporary art, such as the much-praised performances of Marina Abramovic, 
“The Artist is Present”, lack. 
Regarding “present”, but also past and future, it can be observed that one of the less 
discussed issues about the active response to art concerns its temporality, i.e its 
duration. The question at issue is not just to understand how an aesthetic transaction 
manipulates our sense of time, but also what is the proper duration of an aesthetic 
experience of an artwork. Victor Moura’s paper “Timing the Aesthetic Experience” 
deals with this issue, rarely considered by scholars (with some exceptions, like Noël 
Carroll’s philosophical research on cinema: cf. Carroll 1996). But how much time does 
each painting require in order to be appreciated? Is the time required a deliberate part 
of the work? How much do other factors – such as the fact that one is having this 
experience with others, as it often happens when we are at a concert, or technological 
innovations that allow, for example, to stop listening to a registered symphony – affect 
this time? How is the spatial arrangement of a work (for instance an architectonic 
work) interrelated with the temporality of perception? In what sense does the 
temporality of aesthetic experience differ from ordinary experience? How do the 
temporal characteristics of aesthetic experience affect the distinction, established by 
Lessing, between arts of space and arts of time? Integrating philosophical analysis with 
empirical and scientific information and with a wide range of examples from art history, 
Moura makes us reflect on a crucial –although often neglected– issue for understanding 
the ontology of art as well as the phenomenology of aesthetic experience. 
Augustin Dumont’s article, “La duplicità del simbolismo nella pittura romantica 
tedesca. Da Runge a Friedrich passando per Tieck” (“The Duality of Symbolism in 
German Romantic Painting. From Runge to Friedrich through Tieck”) broadens the 
range of this issue of CoSMo with a specific study on painting criticism in German 
Romanticism. Dumont’s thesis is that by Friedrich as well as by Runge,  
 
the pictorial language is expressed through the mediation of the symbol, but in some respects also 
the tale. The difference is that the symbolism is meant to be self-reflective and self-criticism in the 
case where the second trend aimed at closing the horizon of sense favoring clearly the allegory. 
Friedrich belongs to the first trend, Runge to the second. 
 
The main question Dumont is concerned with is, of course, the way romantic art, in 
this case painting, in constant dialogue with the great literature (Tieck, Wackenroder, 
Schlegel, Kleist ...) and with the great philosophical reflection of that time (in particular 
Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Schopenhauer) thought to express the absolute, in a 
cultural context where the aesthetic experience was considered, in many ways, one with 
the experience of the tragic and with the mystical experience. Painting (and art in 
general) is not intended as mimetic, but as reflexive. However, this does not prevent 
artists and philosophers from paying specific attention to means and materials of 
artistic production (also for their symbolic value), the research on which made 
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enormous progress in the Romantic era (as shown by the large amount of essays and 
books regarding sounds and colors produced in this period). Hence, the vocation of art 
is philosophical and in this sense Dumont embarks on an intellectual journey full of 
historical, artistic and philosophical references, which make the readers understand that 
some of the most important views of the current debate in the philosophy of art – think 
for example about Danto’s thesis of the philosophical transformation of art – have their 
roots in a time far more remote than the one which saw the flowering of artistic avant-
garde: I am referring to Romanticism, of course. 
The section “Percorsi” of this issue of CoSMo is devoted to a field of aesthetic 
studies that today is very relevant: gustatory aesthetics. On the one hand, aesthetic 
experience deals also with our everyday life – as it is shown by the flourishing of 
research concerning everyday aesthetics. On the other hand, practices like cooking can 
now acquire the art status. As a matter of fact, cooking obtains this status, for example 
with a master of creative cuisine such as Ferran Adrià, the creator of the restaurant El 
Bulli. Thanks to his creation of dishes which are considered artworks in their own right, 
a few years ago Adrià was invited to the art exhibition Documenta in Kassel as one of the 
main great protagonists of contemporary art. Adrià presents here, along with Jèssica 
Jaques, an outstanding contribution entitled “For an Applied Philosophy of 
Gastronomy”, in which he argues that food is now becoming a source of philosophical 
ideas, “a discursive generator of new ways of thinking”. Also through the narration of 
the history of culinary thought as well as of the biography of the great chef-artist-
philosopher, the article develops the view that cooking can be a kind of “applied 
philosophy”. In regards to this Adrià elaborates a theory of creativity simbolically 
exemplified by his “creative pyramid”, which refers explicitly to Plato’s allegory of the 
line. The organization of the epistemological, poietic, ontological (etc.) issues on which 
he elaborates resumes the Aby Warburg’s Atlas model. In this conceptual context the 
artistic-creative scope of culinary practice becomes philosophical by means of becoming 
artistic research and educational project (paideia). 
On her part, in her own article (“The Main Issues on Gustatory Aesthetics”), Jèssica 
Jaques provides an informed philosophical background of gustatory aesthetics. Jaques 
defends that aesthetics does not only deal with nature, on the one hand, and art, on the 
other hand. As a philosophical theory of a particular kind of human experience, it deals 
with phenomena and human practices that are kinds of borderline cases between 
everyday life practices, technology, traditional forms of art, and new artistic ways of 
expression. In this vein, Jaques explores gustatatory aesthetics as experience of, and 
reflection on, practices that pose “new challenges to the old term taste”. According to 
her, the reasons why gustatory aesthetics poses these challenges are tied to the 
connection between artification and de-artification of human practices as well as to the 
rise of performance as an important way of having aesthetic experiences. The aesthetic 
experience we have with food is an intense experience that involves all the senses. It is 
characterized by the involvement of the body and is ephemeral, because the object of 
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the experience is consummated during the experience and in order to have the 
experience. Hence, the experience as well as the art of food is a performative experience, 
and due to some of its features –such as the ephemerality of the work, the performative 
and interactive character of the experience, and the involvement of the receiver’s body– 
it is an aesthetic experience that has some of the typical traits of the artistic movements 
that, searching for new forms of aesthetic experiences and being more free from social 
and cultural constraints, wanted to overcome art as an institution. 
In the Museum of Modern Art “Casa Cavazzini”, a cultural institution which is very 
important for the city of Udine, two events took place that were integral parts of the 
workshop. The duo Mirio Cosottini (trumpet) and Enrico Malatesta (percussion) 
offered a performance of improvised music, and this was indeed a moment of intense 
authentic aesthetic experience for everybody. Moreover, before this performance, in 
Casa Cavazzini also the presentation / discussion of a book on deartization authored by 
Gerard Vilar (Vilar 2010) took place. The book was discussed by Federico Vercellone, 
Simone Furlani, Matilde Carrasco, as well as by myself. Since my contribution to this 
discussion already appeared (in Italian) in Bertinetto 2014, the section “Letture” of this 
issue of CoSMo is covered by a second valuable contribution written by Matilde 
Carrasco. Reading Vilar’s important book, the Spanish scholar concludes consistently, 
and excellently, the deep and illuminating reflections proposed in the whole current 
issue of CoSMo. She leads us inside Vilar’s book and, through it, inside the great debates 
of art theory and art criticism of the avant-garde and post-avant-garde eras. Referring to 
the theses of Kuspit, Bürger and Foster, as well as to philosophical positions like the 
ones of Hegel, Nietzsche, Danto and many other philosophers, Vilar’s book discusses 
the paradoxes of an art that did not want to be art anymore in order to gain more 
influence upon human existence, but, in so doing, it became another one of the many 
consumer goods, losing in this way all its subversive power. Vilar’s point is incisive, 
because, as Carrasco writes, Vilar 
 
defends artistic autonomy understood as the capacity of art for ongoing re-definition and re-
invention as the best way of fighting the forces of neutralization, aestheticization and weakening.  
 
The thesis developed by Carrasco, in her reading of Vilar’s essay, is that the avant-
garde as well as the transgressive power of art are not dead, but the reflexive and critical 
potential of art, understood as “a privileged mode of thinking about the world” depends 
upon a regeneration of the “aesthetic dimension of art.”  
We hope that –at least at a conceptual level– we have contributed to this 
regeneration –a regeneration artists themselves are now appealing to (see for example 
Pagliasso 2015)– in this issue of CoSMo, entirely devoted to the various facets and 
dimensions of aesthetic experience, as well as to its controversial and complex 
relationship with the arts… from XVIII century to 2015, from painting to cooking. 
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FEDERICO VERCELLONE 









Aesthetics is a contradictory science. It sets out to achieve an oxymoron, namely to 
render perfect what by nature is imperfect. Baumgarten’s conception of the term was in 
fact based on reaching the perfectio of the cognitio sensitiva. For Baumgarten it was an 
epistemological question. Yet it is easy to see the powerful allusion behind it: well 
before the Romantics and Schelling appeared, aesthetics seemed to promise a plenitudo 
realitatis, a fullness of being. Those who pursue beauty aim for synaesthetic perfection 
when regarding an object, which offers itself up to the senses with all its fragrance, 
entirety and perceptive fullness. The object is not, from this point of view, an aesthetic 
object in the modern sense of the term, namely something that gives us pleasure to look 
at, but rather acts as an intermediary that coalesces our sensations and enables us to 
apprehend the fullness of the world. When we perceive something beautiful we 
appreciate the completeness of the world. Beauty shows us how full and complete the 
forms of the world are by showing us the characteristics of our perception of the object, 
a perception which involves all the senses. At a closer look, the object perceived is 
identified as beautiful because it enables us to perceive it synaesthetically, using all of 
our sensory organs. 
The result of this process is a contradictory form of knowledge that is both “clear 
and confused”, as opposed to the “clear and distinct” nature of conceptual knowledge. 
In short, it is a type of knowledge that regards form. This kind of knowledge involves a 
simultaneous apprehension of the object, in contrast to conceptual knowledge, which 
offers an analytical, sequential knowledge of the object: a form of knowledge that 
interrupts the synthetic unity of the object, or what we could call its “aesthetic unity”. 
The aesthetic nature is therefore evidently connected to the overall apprehension of the 
object, the fact that we apprehend all of it at once. In this context the object is 
something that imposes itself. And it is equipped with a self-reflexive structure that 
constantly transcends itself, continually denying what we thought it was. It is 
paradoxical, but this beauty immediately emerges as a modern beauty, an astounding, 
sublime event. It is a sublime beauty because it always takes us beyond what we already 
are and have. And this is the premise of aesthetics that inevitably has to reckon with the 
limits of the observer and his or her viewpoint. Not to mention the ever-transcendent 
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nature of the object. To frame it in contemporary terms, the aesthetic approach is one 
that takes or should take account of the neuronal make-up of the beholder, his or her 
physical presence, and it is also aware that the images we have in mind are created 
above all by ourselves (see Breidbach 2013). But we can go further: it strongly claims 
that its form of knowledge is universally valid, as Kant predicted, even though it 
depends on an experience that is only subjective. 
Let us think for example of the attitude that might be taken by someone looking at a 
Greek vase in an important museum. The observer forms a complete perception of the 
object, based on the formal aspect that shows through the case where it is kept to 
safeguard its contemplative function – as distinct from its usage – and on analytical 
knowledge of the object. This complete perception enables us to arrive at a 
representation that opens in the direction of something that is not what we had in mind 
or had always thought. We are directed towards new experiences that do not coincide 
with our previous schemas, and we are heading in a direction we perceive as new and 
that is therefore vague and uncertain. 
The perfectio sensitiva is therefore bound up with a perceptive perfection that has an 
undeniably erotic element. This is something that also recalls Goethe’s early 
morphological theories. Which do not, however, coincide with what later occurred. 
Our experience of beauty, and therefore also artistic beauty, is basically an experience of 
sympathy in which the individual not only contemplates the object but also abandons 
him or herself almost devotedly to it, so much so that it is difficult to describe it purely 
as an “object”. While, exactly as in an erotic experience, it is never possible to say exactly 
which senses are involved, because the more it is suffused with senses which are not 
necessarily “in place”, the richer the experience proves to be. In the act of love it really is 
possible to see with your sense of touch, touch with your eyes and so on… this evokes 
Goethe’s vision once more, as broad as it is rich in captivating ambiguities.  
On the other hand – also thanks to aesthetic practices acquired and transmitted in 
this form by the philosophic theory of art – we are accustomed to perceiving objects by 
referring to qualia, genuine abstractions. In this direction the perceptions produced are 
incomplete, in general pertaining to only one of the senses, in line with a system of 
correspondences by means of which colour is assigned purely to the sight, sound to the 
hearing etc. The initial theories of aesthetics appear to promise something which is 
fundamentally different. Through the idea or ideal of perfectio sensitiva we are directed 
towards a synaesthetic experience in which each sense is connected to the others, with 
the aim of capturing the perceivable fullness of the object, and, as a consequence, the 
world. 
We should therefore examine the dawn of aesthetics with Alexander Gottlieb 
Baumgarten, in Germany in the mid eighteenth century. As is known, at the start of his 
work Baumgarten describes aesthetics as a sort of possible synthesis, albeit still 
premature, of the entire universe of knowledge: 
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A e s t h e t i c a (theoria liberalium artium, gnoseologia inferior, ars pulchre cogitandi, ars analogi 
rationis,) est scientia cognitionis sensitivae (Baumgarten 1970: 1) 
 
This definition is as significant as it is concise. In our eyes it also appears profoundly 
strategic. Firstly it should be observed that this definition draws together two spheres 
destined to become progressively autonomous, namely the sphere of positive, 
philosophical and scientific knowledge, and that of the object of Aestheticus. We should 
then note an element that might appear disorienting to us, namely that we are dealing 
with an intuition that is already a form of knowledge. More specifically we are dealing 
with the knowledge of image, where the genitive is construed as both objective and 
subjective: a perception that has an intrinsic force of reasoning (Baumgarten 1970: § 
26), of a universal nature (Baumgarten 1970: § 27), in such a way that even what we 
would now call a scientific device cannot be without «omni venustati cognitionis» 
(Baumgarten 1970: § 42, 17). Against a background of this kind, here summarised very 
concisely, aesthetic knowledge is analogous to rational knowledge, «analogon 
rationis». 
The advent of aesthetics thus coincided with a new form of knowledge that drew the 
totality of its meaning from perception. We will later examine how. But we can say that 
we are dealing with a perceptive utopia that takes us from the fullness of perception to 
the fullness of the world. If erotic perception is the form of perception in which the eye 
too comes to “hear”, we could say that the advent of aesthetics heralded an erotic utopia 
regarding the perception of the object as a “loving” totality with its own meaning. From 
this point of view a merely partial perception of the object, received through only one of 
the senses, would be a sort of failure, an incomplete, non-transparent opening onto a 
world, in other words: incomprehensible. 
But if perception splinters, following the autonomous, basically schizophrenic 
directions of the five senses, this is because the world itself can no longer be 
apprehended as a whole with its own meaning. The relationship between the 
perception entrusted to the five senses and the question of the meaning of things is, in 
this context, anything but irrelevant. Thanks to this divided, abstract perception, the 
world itself has lost meaning, becoming opaque and increasingly similar to the dense, 
impenetrable surface described by Sartre in Nausea. The transition described using 
Sartre’s metaphor, is undoubtedly a very lengthy one. But if we wish to examine this in 
the long run, we can see that the rationalization of the world appropriates the aesthetic 
sphere and the objects that belong to it, as we can see in the end result of this process: 
Hegel’s diagnosis regarding the “end of art” (see Vercellone 2013). This means that for 
Hegel the universal is no longer anchored to the perceivable; for us that the rational 
world has detached from what we perceive with our senses, and that reality has become 
a little less consistent and perhaps a little more schizophrenic, separating into its qualia. 
Seen in this way there is no doubt that we are dealing with a progressive 
rationalization of the aesthetic, as opposed to Baumgarten’s original vision of an 
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aestheticization of logic. This naturally has powerful consequences both with regard to 
reality, or in any case, the idea we have of it, and with regard to logic. It is not a case of 
denial but a dilation of the limits of rationality. It is in the very arena of aesthetics that 
rationality realises its limits, and also senses the necessity to go beyond itself. It is not 
difficult to read this destiny in the developments of eighteenth and nineteenth century 
aesthetics, which opened a path that continues to this day.  
Along this path, art echoes the perceptive fragmentation that characterises this 
“normal” relationship with the world. In accordance with this, from Batteux to Hegel, 
and from the latter to Adorno we are faced with aesthetic theories that base the system 
of the arts, and therefore the aesthetic experience, on the related senses: painting is a 
question of light and colour, music of hearing and so on.  
This path manifested itself in the works of Charles Batteux and went on to form the 
main direction in modern aesthetic theory, which, not coincidentally, culminated in the 
nineteenth century philosophy of art, regardless of all the discussions on the watershed 
that separates the two. 
It has often been insisted, so much so that the distinction has become outdated and 
obsolete, that eighteenth century aesthetics is based on subjective sentiment, inspired 
by rationalism, while in the nineteenth century a genuine philosophy of art formed.1 In 
actual fact the distinction ends up concealing the profound unity of a dimension that 
came into being by comparing perception and concept, image and reality to the 
constant detriment of the first two terms of the question. 
And resulting in the abstraction that is known as aesthetic experience. This is what is 
expressed in Les beaux arts reduits à un même principe by Charles Batteux, where the 
principle of imitation is authoritatively identified as the aesthetic ideal and code for 
reference to the object. Artistic imitation, which Batteux regards as the work of genius, 
is naturally the imitation of something. It might seem banal, but this self-evident 
statement conceals a radical shift. The objective genitive imposes a traumatic turning 
point which reveals the recesses of idealizing imitation. A singular paradox arises by 
means of which imitation both idealises its object and ruptures its sensory unity 
according to the art in question, using means of expression that address one single 
sense or another. In this way, namely in so far as the imitation refers to a creative 
medium that relates to one of the senses, the idealised pretence also and always 
becomes a rationalizing de-realization of the object represented: 
 
Quelle est donc la fonction des arts? C’est de transporter les traits qui sont dans la nature, & de les 
présenter dans des objets à qui ils ne sont point naturels. C’est ainsi que le ciseau du statuaire 
montre un héros dans un bloc de marbre. Le peintre par ses couleurs, fait sortir de la toile tous les 
objets visibles. Le musicien par des sons artificiels fait gronder l’orage, tandis que tout est calme; et 
le poëte enfin par son invention et par l’harmonie de ses vers, remplit notre esprit d’images feintes 
                                                           
1 See Baeumler 1926; Szondi 1974; Franzini 2002. 
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et notre cœur de sentimens factices,souvent plus charmans que s’ils étoient vrais & naturels. D’où je 
conclus, que les arts, dans ce qui est proprement art, ne sont que des imitations, des ressemblances 
qui ne sont point la nature, mais qui paroissent l’être; & qu’ainsi la matière des beaux arts n’est 
point le vrai, mais seulement le vrai-semblable. Cette conséquence est assez importante pour être 
développée & prouvée sur le champ par l’application. 
 
Qu’est-ce que la peinture? Une imitation des objets visibles. Elle n’a rien de réel, rien de vrai, tout 
est phantôme chez elle, & sa perfection ne dépend que de sa ressemblance avec la réalité.[…] De 
tout ce que nous venons de dire, il résulte, que la poësie ne subsiste que par l’imitation. Il en est de 
même de la peinture, de la danse, de la musique: rien n’est réel dans leurs ouvrages: tout y est 
imaginé, feint, copié, artificiel. C’est ce qui fait leur caractère essentiel par opposition à la nature 
(Batteux 1746: 13-14; 22) 
 
The evolution of the philosophy of perception, which characterised the origins of 
aesthetics in the eighteenth century, into the nineteenth century philosophy of art did 
not merely mark a historic schism repeatedly emphasized in the classic historiography 
of aesthetics (see Baeumler 1926). There is an underlying common thread connecting 
the two eras, according to which aesthetic consciousness is a purely contemplative 
consciousness, which produces a purely “aesthetic” experience. The previous 
considerations apprise us of the fact that the aesthetic consciousness is a contemplative 
consciousness not in terms of positive prerogatives, but in so far as it is unable to really 
access the object in its entirety. And this takes place on the basis of the premises that 
shape its formation. In other words it derives from the fragmentation of the overall 
perception of the object into its components in the aesthetic experience. The perceptum 
gets divided into qualia, evoking the model of scientific examination. 
It is in this direction that the definitive primacy of the aesthetic experience came 
into being. In the same direction lies the path towards aestheticism as an experience of a 
weak form of art that has no efficacy on reality. In this process the perception of the 
object contradictorily and paradoxically coincides with the abstraction of and from the 
object itself. And in this context imitation appears as the basis of the rationalistic 
formalization of the object. The maturing of aesthetic knowledge therefore seems to 
proceed hand in hand with that of the scientific method, which defines the object on 
the basis of its qualia, interrupting what could temporarily be described as its integrity 
or, in more learned terms, its living unity. This is replaced by the analytic unity of the 
object that cannot be acquired through perception, but only post hoc. 
Now let us return to the correspondence between the five senses and the individual 
arts. Batteux leaves us in no doubt that things are moving in precisely that direction: 
 
On peut diviser la nature par rapport aux beaux arts en deux parties: l’une qu’on saisit par les yeux, 
et l’autre, par le ministère des oreilles: car les autres sens sont stériles pour les beaux arts. La 
première partie est l’objet de la peinture qui représente sur un plan tout ce qui est visible. Elle est 
celui de la sculpture qui le représente en relief; & enfin celui de l’art du geste qui est une branche 
des deux autres arts que je viens de nommer, & qui n’en différe, dans ce qu’il embrasse, que parce 
que le sujet à qui on attache les gestes dans la danse est naturel & vivant, au lieu que la toile du 
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peintre et le marbre du sculpteur ne le sont point. La seconde partie est l’objet de la musique 
considérée seule & comme un chant; en second lieu de la poësie qui employe la parole, mais la 
parole mesurée & calculée dans tous ses tons. Ainsi la peinture imite la belle nature par les couleurs, 
la sculpture par les reliefs, la danse par les mouvemens et par les attitudes du corps. La musique 
l’imite par les sons inarticulés, et la poësie enfin par la parole mesurée. Voilà les caractères distinctifs 
des arts principaux (Batteux 1746: 37-39). 
 
The presence of the object in its perceivable entirety is therefore distanced, as is also 
evident from the fact that the senses that perceive it close up are excluded from the 
aesthetic experience. It is no coincidence, from this point of view, that the sense of 
touch and the sense of smell, which enable us to interact with an object close to us, are 
not considered at all. Perhaps only Herder in Plastik, who attributes the perception of 
sculpture to the touch, appears to remember the all-inclusive nature of the aesthetic 
experience.2 This notion was re-launched, like a utopian vision, with the idea of the 
total work of art. The great systems of German idealism took up the idea of the partial 
perception of the object in relation to the different senses. This heralded the advent of 
aesthetics as the experience of an object to be considered only in terms of its artistic 
worth, fatally connected to Hegel’s idea of the “end” or “death of art”. 
The process taking shape here will naturally lead to having to make a virtue out of 
necessity. It thus occurs that an evident limitation connected to the artistic medium 
comes to represent a functional, strategic characteristic of the art in question. Naturally 
the consequences regarding the conception of the image that derives from this 
limitation are also of great interest. Indeed, because we are dealing with a limited 
medium, not capable of evoking the entirety of the reality reproduced, its products are a 
mere pretence. Art therefore acquires its universally acknowledged status of self-
declared pure appearance. And if it did not announce its own unreality, the aesthetic 
experience would become a hallucinatory one. This rekindles an ancient fear that 
appeared in the competition between Zeuxis and Parrhasius described by Pliny the 
Elder, in which the two painters sought to produce the most realistic image.3 In other 
words, the best illusion. 
From this point of view the perceived world is thus presented as a faithful mirror of 
the strategic equilibriums of the ego. A universe of images capable of integrating all the 
elements of sensory perception would generate a deviation, a misleading delusion that 
would distort the nature of the perceived world, even calling our very identities into 
question. And given that the ego cannot exist without an axiological framework, the 
moral universe would also be upturned, almost as a consequence. Overwhelmed by 
illusionism, by the transformation of the perceived world into image, the ego would be 
                                                           
2 See Herder 1993. About the hierarchy of senses in aesthetica consideratiuon see Korsmeyer 1999: in 
particular 11-38. 
3 See Pliny the Elder 79-77 a.C.: XXXV, 65-66. 
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completely disorientated and enter into a nihilistic crisis (see Vercellone 2009: 3-30). 
In actual fact on closer inspection all of this depends on the ontological status 
attributed to reality and pretence as well as their reciprocal dividing line. Crossing that 
line represents a threat and a challenge to the subjective identity. 
It goes without saying that we are dealing with issues that are both unexpected and 
unsettling. It really does beg the question of why issues concerning the ontology of the 
image should affect the unconscious and the preconscious to the point of inducing a 
state of paralysing terror. 
We might be led to think – and this is our ballon d’essai – that we are in the presence 
of spectres that have plagued the entire history of the western world. Or rather with the 
very essence of a spectre, in so far as this is a revenant, a soul returned from death that 
has crossed back over the Styx. It is a deep-rooted question that is summarised by Hegel 
in The Phenomenology of Spirit, which states that the most important thing is “das Tote 
festzuhalten”. Challenging this premise would mean eradicating the solid foundations 
of our knowledge. Thus it is that in The Science of Logic rationality triumphs over death 
with the victory of the living concept, while in the Introduction to The Phenomenology of 
Spirit the absolute spirit celebrates the living jubilation of the absolute spirit with 
infinite, joyful connection of its intertwined members. 
Awakening the mortuum would therefore mean challenging the principle by means 
of which what is real has a stable status that is the basis of its knowability. Introducing 
an element of mutability into this arena implicates putting knowledge, science itself, its 
stability and the immutability of its laws, at risk. What is dead must therefore at all costs 
be something that has acquired a definitive status that cannot be modified. Let us 
explore this hypothesis, because if it is legitimate it has important consequences. On 
this basis we must admit that only things that are real are effective, and therefore the 
idea that a “quasi-thing” like an image can exert any kind of influence on the world,4 act 
or dictate action, would mean admitting that it can behave like a subject, giving it the 
unsettling semblance of a spectre. 
This says a lot about the new configuration of aesthetics that came into being in the 
nineteenth century as the philosophy of art. Let’s frame the question in these terms: a 
“stable” ontology of the discrete reality, what Heidegger describes as the “metaphysics 
of presence” is necessarily accompanied by an “aesthetic” consciousness and experience 
of the image that deprives the latter of any kind of virtuality, making it sterile as it were: 
pure appearance without any kind of influence on its surroundings, destined from the 
start to be kept in a museum. This also means that if there is any kind of confusion 
regarding its ontological status, the image can break free from its limits and produce 
some kind of “real” effect. Which would necessarily be perverse. To avoid this cognitive 
catastrophe that could threaten the status of our whole world in its essence and 
                                                           
4 See Bredekamp 2010; Griffero 2013. 
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substance, it is therefore necessary to bring forth the aesthetic consciousness. These 
were probably the machinations behind Kant’s idea that beauty is something that gives 
universal, disinterested pleasure. This formula delivers up a form of beauty that is 
exempt from all practical concerns, to be stored away safely in a museum devoted to the 
protection of appearance. With the idea of aesthetic experience – the hidden oxymoron 
that is the idea of aesthetic object and “aesthetic” experience – where we are dealing 
with a res that is not in any case an object, there is therefore a problem regarding one 
fundamental structure of the self comprehension of knowledge. In this context the 
artistic object, aesthetically characterised as a non-thing, a simple objectified 
appearance, only represents the surfacing, the sign, of a much deeper, perhaps even 
atavistic process. To sum up: the advent of the aesthetic consciousness and experience 
thus derives from, highlights and generates a dual abstraction. On one hand modern art 
is forced to dissociate from life, admitting and declaring its fictitious, unreal status, 
making modern aesthetics reveal its platonic roots, validating an art which is inexorably 
embedded in the sphere of illusory mimesis and ineffective experience (see Danto 
1997).  
On the other hand, and as a consequence of this, the systematic consideration of the 
single arts reflects the abstract spider’s web of the world it is part of. The gaze 
formulated in the laboratory of aesthetics basically reflects and prefigures what takes 
place in the so-called real world. It scientifically splits the complete aura of the 
perceived world, splintering it into unconnected perceptive units which are thus 
meaningless in the Kantian sense. Aesthetics as the philosophy of art thus bears the idea 
alluded to by Hegel and developed by Croce, of a “death of art” in the modern universe. 
It is a symbolic death due to the development of a reasoning that separates the different 
spheres of our existence, distancing them from the “world of life” and rendering them 
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GERARD VILAR 









The condition of precariousness is an expanding and deepening phenomenon in the 
today’s world. Since 2008, and particularly in a Europe hit by the economical and 
political crisis, precariousness has been settling down in the heart of our societies with 
the intention of sticking around and becoming structural. It is widely known that 
precariousness is affecting many of our economic activities, but also our cultural 
practices and forms of life. We could then ask ourselves, in which ways art and the 
experience of art are connected to this new condition of precariousness and what kind 
of consequences it is bringing about. How do the new processes of precarization affect 
art, as well as its production and reception? Precariousness, however, is nothing new. It 
is a defining category of our culture, a modernity where all that is solid melts into air. 
Baudelaire had already defined aesthetic modernity in terms of a precarious search “of 
the transitory, the fugitive, the contingent”. But in the last decades, precariousness and 
precarity have been intensifying their presence in our capitalist, postmodern societies. 
As a result, precariousness has become a central feature distinctive of most 
contemporary artworks and art practices from the point of view of their ontology and 
reception. Undoubtedly, precariousness is not a new characteristic of art in general. 
Time destroys even pyramids and takes away meanings and values of surviving pieces. 
Performative arts were always perfectly ephemeral before the invention of recording 
technologies of sound and image. But even now, a record is a mere document, not the 
work itself. Nonetheless, the precarious condition of contemporary art is a specific 
property of our time and culture, not generalizable to previous times and other cultures. 
For the latter, concepts as fragility or vulnerability would be more appropriate, 
connected as they are with notions like contingence, transience and brittleness, which 
make general distinctions of cultural artefacts and even life. “Aesthetic precariousness” 
will be defined as a specific condition of contemporary art and aesthetics in late 
capitalist culture, a condition that has been deploying for more than a century, but has 
being exacerbated after the end of avant-gardes and intensified our post-global culture. 
Let’s try to be descriptive. Precariousness is not necessarily a disorder in the sense of an 
illness. It is a disorder that creates a new order for artworks and practices, for kinds of 
publics and audiences, and for aesthetic judgement and art criticism. Some 
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contemporary philosophers such as Jacques Rancière or Christoph Menke have been 
rethinking and reconceptualising that precarious condition that makes contemporary 
aesthetics and art distinct. In such a way, precariousness is an essential trait of what 
Jacques Rancière calls “aesthetic regime” of art.1 I shall try to summarize three relevant 
aspects of the “aesthetic precariousness”: 1) art as a precarious expression of that 
condition; 2) art as a precarious medium of reflection on that precarious condition; and 
3) art-discourses (i.e., contemporary art criticism and philosophy) as precarious ways 
of discourse. 
 
1. Art as expression of precariousness 
 
It was Hegel who formulated the thesis that art, in a parallel way to philosophy, is an 
expression of its own time as well as a medium to comprehend it in a sensible way. If 
something distinguishes philosophy, art and discourses concerning art in the present 
day is their precarious condition. The category of precariousness defines our time and 
culture and goes beyond economic significance. Precariousness has little to do with our 
ontological condition of contingency, of contingent beings; it should also be 
distinguished from our human condition of vulnerable social animals. Our existence is 
contingent subdued as it is to the randomness of fate. Our dependency on society to 
provide for our needs and anyone or anything’s capacity to hurt us or put an end to our 
lives shows our vulnerable condition. Contingency and vulnerability are dimensions of 
our lives, which if slightly reduced, will never perish or disappear. Precariousness as 
understood here is something of a different nature. It is a product born in its entirety 
from capitalism, an economic order which shapes social relationships and cultural 
practices, including of course, art. The lives of our hunter-gatherer ancestors, masters 
and slaves, lords and serfs, were indeed contingent and vulnerable. Only the life of 
workers from modernity, in the capitalistic regime of social relations, can be precarious. 
I highlight “can” because capitalism has the tendency of encouraging precarization of all 
relations and social practices, but not necessarily. Over the last century, the 
precarization of productive relations has been successfully combated in many countries, 
including the artistic production. The struggle of the labour movement, left-winged 
political movements and the development of the Welfare State in some areas of the 
planet represented a force of containment from the precarization characterizing 
capitalism. But now we find ourselves at a step beyond the natural tendency of 
capitalism to extend precariousness to segments of society that are not actually 
indispensable for the system to continue reproducing itself on a bigger and bigger scale. 
Precariousness consists in turning that which is relatively secure and reliable into 
something of unstable nature, from work to art, from technologies to meaning, from 
                                                           
1 See Rancière 2004 and 2013. 
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values to truths. Marx had pointed out that with capitalism everything that is solid is 
dissolved into thin air. Art, which among other things is an expression of culture, 
reflects even better than fashion the mentioned logic behind capitalism, a logic which 
feeds, through its negativity, the need to conserve in some way everything which we are 
losing through precarization.  
Precariousness is manifested in the ontology of art. Ontology is not here intended as 
a pompous term through which we can slip through some kind of art metaphysics. It is 
intended as a reference of the way and means of existence of art works, in terms of their 
material and cultural condition and their physical and communicative dimension. Since 
the ready-mades of Duchamp the ontological precariousness of the art properties is 
something well known and I am not going to dwell on the material and physical 
precariousness of contemporary art. Another defining characteristic of art is its 
condition of merchandize resulting from a capitalistic order. Precariousness obviously 
affects economy of art. Those that are not very familiar with the art world only become 
aware when they read or hear scandals published in the media on transgressive artworks 
which offend good conscience and are disrespectful to certain values and beliefs; or 
react with dismay to the news of the stratospheric prices of some artworks, or even the 
extravagant jet-set world in which some artists are immersed in. But this is only the 
superficial glitter of a world whose reality is actually very disparate. The majority of 
artists in the world are poor or live in modest conditions. The art world is actually much 
smaller than what is believed and the funding from public and private institutions which 
tends to be subject to interference by political powers,2 is utterly less than that which is 
dedicated to sports. Since the start of the crisis in 2008 until today, except in some 
countries, the art world has suffered severe consequences similarly to cultural and non-
cultural sectors. In some countries such as Spain, catastrophic consequences have 
resulted from the crisis and many try to elevate them as a life lesson for political action 
and thinking.3 It is extremely difficult to know the extent of what is currently happening 
in Spain and the transcendence of its consequences. As in other social and cultural 
sectors, we will only be able to know this with rigor after several years.4  
However it is, art is before all else expression of this new precariousness. Let me 
begin with an example from the 55th Venice Biennale celebrated in 2013. In the 
Catalan pavilion, a piece called 25% is exhibited. It consists in a collective work which is 
developed from an idea of Francesc Torres working along the film maker Mercedes 
Álvarez and curated by Jordi Batlló, as well as the collaboration of eight unemployed 
from Barcelona and MACBA. It is a collective creation which is presented as a device to 
reflect on the appalling unemployment situation in Spain. In a reasoned process, eight 
                                                           
2 In reference to Catalonia, see Marzo 2013. 
3 There is growing literature concerning this topic. Merely as exemplification, Lorey 2012; the dossier of 
Museo Reina Sofía (2012: 3-11); or the monographic issue of ONCURATING.org (2013). 
4 In any case, certain documents are being published. For example, the latest report by CoNCA (2013). 
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citizens were selected, young and elderly, men and women, with multiple social 
backgrounds, origins and professions all representing the army of the unemployed. 
Torres and Álvarez accompanied them on various days and documented their everyday 
by means of cameras and videotapes. They were asked to choose a personal object and 
were invited to MACBA, where they selected an artwork which they felt was the most 
representative of themselves. The chosen artworks – pieces by Hans Haacke, 
Perejaume, Carles Pazos, Allan Sekula, Jorge Oteiza, Esther Ferrer, Federico Guzmán 
and Jaume Xifra, all present in the installation of the Biennale- were complemented 
with reflections of the reasons of their choice, making the installation a singular one and 
resulting in a collective ensemble of exceptional force, one of radical contemporaneity. 
Contemporary art is a useful device to think of contemporaneity, and nothing defines 
ours as much as the precariousness which progressively transforms the lives of millions 
of citizens around the world.  
25% is genuine work of artistic research by means of which the participants can 
learn a great deal of things and which proposes some minutes of reflection on the issue 
of unemployment to the spectator who is strolling around the pavilion contemplating 
videos, photographs, personal objects and artworks of consecrated artists. 25% does not 
however offer any theoretical description of unemployment or of the eight 
unemployed. Perhaps art critics, historians, sociologists or the general public could 
reach a theoretical conclusion as a categorical place of reflection or thinking when it is 
produced. A consequence which I believe results from experiencing the production of 
25% is the refusal of the claim and belief that the majority of citizens are reluctant to 
contemporary art, as the reactions of the seven unemployed who had never visited the 
MACBA show. This installation shows that any citizen, if he or she has the opportunity, 
can find a place to interpret and think of his or her present. In order to reach this 
conclusion, myself and others have had to apply concepts and formulate statements 
which are not inherent in the piece. This means that works of art are devices for 
reflection, opportunities to think and not knowledge per se, as social sciences are. A 
work of art shows but does not say. As a means of knowledge, art is today very 
precarious. There are works of art which are comical, strange, surprising, which 
entertain us or are pleasurable, but 25% deals with a topic which is not at all humorous 
– on the contrary, many spectators have perhaps been invited to sad and lugubrious 
reflections, and others may have been impressed by the capacity of resistance and 
adaptation of those whose lives have been radically altered due to job loss and the 
changes that this imposes on living conditions and existential expectations. But, if a 
work of art is so precarious from the point of view of its cognitive and emotional effects, 
why should we then need art at all? My response would be that precisely in this 
condition of precariousness of the actual piece can we comprehend the truth of a 
current phenomenon. Art is not about theoretical truths or theory. It is about other 
types of truths and ways of comprehending. The sort of comprehension which we are 
dealing with is created by means of disturbances in one’s knowledge and sensibility.  
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Let’s stop for a moment and ponder over the mentioned artistic project in order to 
evaluate its merit. Can the work of Francesc Torres be considered a device which draws 
us to a closer comprehension of what a jobless life means, stimulating empathy, 
solidarity, and a critical spirit from citizenship? Does it eventually convert the public 
into more responsible and sensible citizens? I believe these would be some of the 
relevant questions for an artistic project as this one, aimed not so much at the cognitive 
elements of the installations but rather focusing on the effects on the spectator’s 
thinking and reflection. All these effects are however precarious and the discomfort 
they brings us makes us see precariousness as a characteristic of contemporary society.  
To complement the example given, another piece of work from the Spanish pavilion 
in the same biennale could be mentioned, an installation by an artist from Zaragoza, 
Lara Almárcegui, and commissary Octavio Zaya. The artist loaded the pavilion with 
rubble from a construction site: a load of bricks, cement, dirt, glass etc., all perfectly 
triturated. They are all material from demolitions that could be used for recycling. The 
piece is called Construction material from the Spanish Pavilion and its significance is 
based on introducing into the same building, built in 1922 by the architect Javier de 
Luque, mounts of the same quantity of material which was employed to build it. 
Almárcegui has linked her work to a second project based on the Venetian island Sacca 
San Mattia, near the island of Murano, which was formed by means of rubble from 
construction sites and the glass industry. It looks as if neither the artist nor the 
commissary, perhaps because of their distanced residences – she lives in Holland and 
he lives in New York – imagined the possible and logical interpretations of many, who 
interpreted it as a practically literal metaphor of the critical Spanish situation following 
the real estate bubble deflation, and as such resulting in a project of perplexing 
obviousness bordering banality and costing no less than 800,000 euros. Indeed, 
Almárcegui’s installation did not fulfil any of the ends which the artist had intended, but 
has served as a device for reflection on Spain’s endemic malaise, including certain 
precarious intelligence of the state apparatus – in this case the agencies of the Ministry 
of Foreign affairs which were in charge – regarding issues of culture agency marked by 
complete fatuousness.  
 
2. Art as a precarious medium of reflection 
 
Art, as we have seen in our examples, is not only a sort of mirror of a world of 
increasing economic precarity and existential precariousness, but also a way to think 
about these realities. Hence, by art I mean a differentiated medium, which is side by 
side with the social sciences or philosophy, each a means to think about aspects of the 
world. Art as a differentiated medium can be distinguished from the social sciences in 
the sense that it does not produces knowledge in a strong sense, but instead consists in 
the production of devices for undetermined, reflective thought, generally functioning 
through the disturbance of our way of thinking and sensibility. In opposition, the social 
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sciences produce theoretical discourses, and in such a way offer direct knowledge. 
These devices referred to as works of art can carry an important role in the research of 
phenomena as well as in the production of knowledge, and thus artistic research can be 
considered a legitimate form of investigation. If we take on this notion of art, then we 
must agree on its potentiality as a medium not only to reflect but also to think about 
and look into the phenomenon of precariousness, which is developing around the 
world. It is of such possibility, which I intend to look into now: art as a medium for a 
critical comprehension of precariousness.  
For a while now, many artists have made a note of these realities. Art works which 
address these realities in a particularly interesting way, are those of Thomas 
Hirschhorn, a Swiss artist based in Paris and whose installations have been awarded 
with worldwide recognition for at least a decade. Such recognition is due to his 
installations produced with precarious material, and the highly philosophically aware 
nature of his artwork, based on classics like Spinoza, Bataille or Deleuze, and regularly 
collaborating with philosophers such as Markus Steinweg. For over a decade, this artist 
has placed the notion of precariousness at the center of his artwork, in both the sense of 
the actual work being precarious in its materiality and in the sense that it speaks about 
and shows precariousness. I will only mention two of his artworks which are on art and 
philosophy (and of course, politics).  
The first project that I would like to mention is the Gramsci-Monument that was 
exposed last summer in Forest Houses neighborhood, in the Bronx, New York City.5 It 
is a project requested by the Dia Art Foundation, whose objective is, according to the 
artist, fourfold: first of all, to establish a new notion of monument, in the sense of an 
artwork in the public space; secondly, to demonstrate the power that art has to 
encourage and provoke encounters as well as its power against the neutralization of 
culture and consumption; thirdly, to create an event, a place of encounter/occurrence 
that opens up a space for new perspectives; and lastly, to rethink Gramsci today. With 
those purposes in mind, Hirschhorn constructed a precarious installation in May 2013 
which consisted of a platform, an archive, an Internet corner, a space for workshops, a 
common room, a library and exhibition space, a Gramsci bar, a radio station, banners 
and a newspaper, and was dismantled at the end of September. For 77 days, every day a 
different philosophical conference was delivered by Markus Steinweg, as well as other 
activities which generated a precarious community around the monument and different 
sorts of cooperative and participative encounters.  
Hirschhorn’s second project to be overviewed, Musée Précaire Albinet, was prior in 
time. It consists of a project produced at the request of Laboratoires d’Aubervilliers 
which reflects on the precariousness of art. It was built between November 2002 and 
                                                           
5 The project consulted on the projects’ website up to December 31, 2013, which, due to its ephemeral 
character disappeared on the last day of the year: http://gramsci-monument.com/index.html. 
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spring of 2004, and exhibited between March 29 and June 18 2004, in a Parisian 
housing project with its very same name. Unbuilt land was used to construct a series of 
spaces which housed an exhibition room, a conference hall and a bar. Precarious 
materials were used and neighborhood inhabitants participated in the construction, 
some of whom were also hired. For a period of eight weeks, artworks selected from the 
Paris Museum of Modern Art, the Fond National d’Art Contemporain, and from the 
Centre Pompidou were exhibited, such as works by Marcel Duchamp, Kasimir 
Malevtich, Piet Mondrian, Salvador Dalí, Joseph Beuys, Andy Warhol, Le Corbusier 
and Fernand Léger. These artworks were activated on the basis of conferences, debates, 
creative writing workshops, children’s workshops, outings and collective meals. This 
project was founded on the love of art and the conviction that individual encounters 
with artworks concern every individual and thus can change their lives. The project was 
the result of the desire to share this conviction with people who, due to social, 
economic, and cultural reasons do not have access to art. In such a way, the 
displacement of works of art into a housing project demonstrates the fact that art is an 
issue that can interest and concern any individual, if he or she is given the opportunity, 
as we were able to detect in Francesc Torres’ work, 25%. Following the principle of 
feeling the presence of the artworks, events were developed on a daily basis being thus 
incorporated in the neighborhood’s everyday life: a new exhibition, public 
inaugurations, collective meals; conferences were delivered by art historians, debates 
on sociopolitical issues, practical workshops for children, writing workshops led by 
writers, and cultural outings all organized on the basis of each exhibition. This project 
gathered more than forty inhabitants of the neighborhood, paid to participate in the 
construction and operation of the museum, and a considerably detailed training 
scheme was carried out for about fifteen people, between the ages of 18 and 25, who 
were regularly part of the museum’s activities and had responsibilities in the running of 
the Precarious Museum.6  
Ultimately, Hirschhorn’s artworks appear as defiant to our understanding, a 
challenge to our capacity of comprehension. Aesthetic precariousness is emanated 
through the sense and meaning of the work, and also in the material, disposition and 
composition. The aesthetics of precariousness, this art of the precarious, is a very real 
and appropriate manner of producing political art today, a place to think and rethink 
aspects of our world, our culture and life, as well as a place of comprehension, of 
something that is more ambiguous and even beyond knowledge. Hirschhorn’s artworks 
tend to supply the participant with stimuli tools and clues for every individual to 
elaborate within their own personal experience, work through the proposal in a 
                                                           
6 Information about this project can be obtained on the Laboratoires’ website: 
http://leslaboratoires.org/, accessed March 11, 2015. See a reflection on the project by Haidu (2009: 
215-237). 
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reflective way and thus tailor their own judgment of it. Hischhorn’s artworks in this 
sense boost critical thinking for those who are willing to take up the challenge. His 
works provoke sensitivity to such an extent that it is difficult to avoid the disturbances 
of sensibility lead to disturbances in knowledge.  
 
3. Precariousness in discourses of art  
 
I’ll dedicate the last part of this essay to the concern of the precariousness of 
discourses. Some might doubt the importance of precariousness of art discourses when 
what is really important is art. If artworks are devices for boosting thought, and thus for 
the induction of certain type of knowledge, the discourses that unfold are thus of 
secondary importance. However, this is an erroneous consideration, as today, when we 
talk about contemporary art, artworks usually are nothing if lacking in discourse, if 
unaccompanied by its reasons, to the extent that often we would not see them as art.  
It could be said that artworks are products of particular artistic practices. Sometimes 
they are in the format of an artifact, such as paintings, installations, photographs or 
videos; other times, as in the case of performances, we are not dealing with any artifact 
but the artwork consists in ephemeral actions and effects. A peculiar aspect of the art in 
the present day contrasting with the art of the past is that it is highly dependent on its 
reasons, that is, a discourse that accompanies it.7 Art has always had some sort of 
accompanying discourse in a written or oral form In this sense ancient art is 
indistinguishable from art today. The nature and the status of this accompanying 
discourse however, has changed greatly over time, as well as the concepts and 
functionality of art itself, particularly from the XVIII century, which Rancière has 
referred as the “aesthetic regime” of art. An essential aspect of the history of modernity 
is the gradual precarization of the relationship between society, art, and discourse, 
particularly in the last century, to the point that what is most distinctive of art today is 
its precarious condition of existence. Among other things, this is made apparent by the 
growing presence of contemporary philosophy in the contemporary discourses in 
artistic phenomena – and in the artistic practices too. I’ll try to explain myself.  
Art discourses form a complex field of language interplay. Distinguishable by blurry 
barriers and frontiers, they share certain continuity with one another. Discourses 
ranging from positivist theory until philosophy, they stroll along diverse forms of 
critical theory and theory of art. The continuity of these discourses is exposed not only 
through its object of study, the artwork and the complex institutional machinery that 
they are contained by, but also because they all share some sort of implied or explicit 
philosophy. It might seem rather exaggerated to say that without philosophy there 
would not be a history of art, theory or criticism. But the fact that almost any text on 
                                                           
7 See Vilar 2005. 
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contemporary art is stuffed or covered with citations by Benjamin, Foucault, Deleuze or 
Rancière, tells us that we are witnessing a discourse that is strongly intellectualized. In 
this type of intellectualized discourse the concept covers most of what is important 
while the aesthetic dimension is actually secondary, making its appreciation dependent 
on a familiar context that has to be understood. Since 1900, art has gradually been 
transforming itself into performed theory, which is what any piece is today, that is, a 
discourse or an idea in the form of an installation, video, dance or music piece or film. 
But which type of performed theory is a work of art? Two centuries ago, when Hegel 
established one of the first great narratives of art within his philosophical system, he had 
already realized that among certain tendencies which lead to the dissolution of 
Christian-bourgeois art – which he referred to as romantic – a growing reflective 
character of artistic practices could be detected which he considered were meant to end 
with the transformation of art defined as a form of truth in a transfigured form. Hegel 
was and was not right. He was in terms of the strength of his own concept –
metaphysical – of art and philosophy as forms of the truth in capitals; he was not right 
from our understandig – postmetaphysical – of the same concepts. Truth is no longer 
the business of art but neither philosophy’s. The conceptualization of art has gradually 
transformed itself becoming more dependent on philosophy, while at the same time 
transforming itself into a cultural phenomenon characterized by its precariousness and 
accidentality, as Hegel argued. The differences between a painting by Jacques-Louis 
David and an installation by Jeremy Deller or Antoni Muntadas are not only noticeable 
in the means used and the meanings which are developed, but also in their place and 
cultural status. Art today no longer incarnates great religious truths nor is a means 
towards the progress of humanity, nor it is defined by its place outside popular culture, 
the cultural industry and entertainment society as it was in the avant-garde period. In a 
time were merchandize has triumphed, the autonomous art which Adorno defended 
and Benjamin’s redeeming art are no longer possible. Today, the concepts of popular 
and elitist art no longer have sense. The old society of the spectacle has succumbed to 
the apparition of internet and social networks. The process of democratization of art 
has made a new leap with the turn of the century. Instead of a few artists producing 
artworks and texts for the majority as in high modernism, today jederman is ein Künstler 
(we are all artists) as Joseph Beuys anticipated. Because also everybody is a critic, 
millions of works and texts are generated today for select circles of people, 
acquaintances and friends who are concerned with the theme in question and dedicate 
the limited available time contemplating and reading them. Art today is not for elites 
but for fortuitous and changing minorities. So, where do we stand on this matter? If the 
visibility of art is virtual and dedicated only to a minority, what is the point of art today? 
These are the same questions that were raised in the first period of modernity: “why 
poets in times of destitution?”, asked Hölderlin at the beginning of the XIX century. 
Want it or not, anybody who ponders over these inevitable questions will find their feet 
sunk in philosophy or will be driven to find these answers with the aid of philosophy. 
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Philosophy today, however, unlike other better times, cannot offer art nor its thinkers, a 
solid and safe umbrella. On the contrary, philosophy today is as others, an enterprise 
which is tormented by precariousness and is far away from the truth, in the same way 
that art is. Philosophy, which at a time aspired to find real truth, has also been subdued 
into a process of precariousness from the times of the Enlightenment, to the point that, 
after Wittgenstein and Heidegger – and except with analytic scholasticism – philosophy 
has become a creative and illuminating practice, rather than a problem-solving one. 
Philosophical problems and concerns have no real solutions, because if they have 
solution then they are scientific, not philosophical ones. Philosophical problems only 
formulate themselves in productive or rather sterile ways in the light of new historical 
constellations.8 The philosophical market today offers as much choice as a regular 
supermarket does. Choosing a philosophy is more complex and difficult than the choice 
a rational consumer has to make, because of all the philosophies which have claims to 
truth, which one is the true one? Even if one of them was, how could we know? For a 
while now, philosophical knowledge today has become much more precarious that in 
past times. In such a way, the task of thinking contemporary art is that of thinking about 
precariousness in a precarious way. How is that even possible? How should we think 
about art that is alive? Perhaps art can tell us weak but universal truths of the 
contemporary world, but can we think and say truths about contemporary art? Doesn’t 
this question reflect the romantic claim of loading art with a too heavy transcendence? 
Aren’t we still fighting against that romantic concept of art?  
The only possible way to think of the precarious in a precarious way is to embrace 
this condition, not avoid it or try to fight it, thus accepting the inevitable tensions and 
even contradictions which this could imply. This is not so easy. Far from negligible, but 
embraced by the majority, there is a tendency of discourses on art today which turn to 
philosophy in search of illuminating and theoretically productive concepts, and also to 
shelter themselves within an authority which grants legitimacy and correction, also 
epistemic that is, in search of shelter in truth, as an escape from the inevitable 
precariousness of discourse. Resembling those who in the past looked for legitimacy for 
artistic practices in meta-narratives, today Benjamin, Deleuze and Rancière are resorted 
to as legitimizing authorities. But the substitution of Althusser with Guattari or Nancy, 
often places the discourse about art in a mistaken place which is more characteristic of 
the past. Fortunately, some contemporary thinkers are more difficult to utilize as if they 
were archaic authorities. Such is the case of Boris Groys, an intelligent post-marxist 
with a growing reputation in the world of contemporary art, which has referred to the 
precarious condition of contemporary art and discourse as weak universalism.9 There 
                                                           
8 Philosophy can not be a discourse oriented to solve philosophical problems without being primarily a 
creative activity, a writing that invents and reinvents its own vocabulary and its own arguments.  
9 See Groys 2010. 
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still exists a connection between art and discourse with truth, but it has to go through 
precariousness: contemporary art has the ability to show the transitory character of 
today’s world, as well as its lack of time of fullness, and this lacking can transcend even 
with a weak and minimum gesture, which is the typical contemporary gesture of 
transfiguring that which is known and familiar, the commonplace, or anything really 
into art, as an artistic symbol which we are not able to distinguish from the real object 
which belongs to the everyday, and such situation gives us an opportunity to think 
critically of some aspect of the world and ourselves. The weak universalism of art and its 
theory today, however, depend on the fact the distinction between art and life, the 
distinction between the artistic and the everyday experienced being maintained. 
Otherwise, this peculiar way of thinking which we denominate art would disappear in 
the fluxes of life, of the commonplace; it would dissolve itself as a mere cultural practice 
among other things. There is no guarantee of this not happening. The denominated 
end of art is one that is a constant threat to contemporary artists, but is surely far from 
being fulfilled. On the contrary, as many theorists have pointed out, there are many 
signs, which invite us to consider that the extension of the concept of art makes it very 
present in ordinary and everyday life. This can be called artification, a process in which 
things not considered as art, like Hirschhorn projects, end up being considered as 
such.10 One needs to be careful with the use of such term, as it can lead to different 
interpretations – as the beautification or aestheticization – as operation of converting 
anything into a device for aesthetic reflection in the sense that Duchamp, Cage, Kaprow 
and Kosuth did, as well as an infinite list of performers, dancers, cooks, and in general 
any citizen with their cameras, blogs and social networks. If we are on the right track, if 
this theory is correct in contrast with the death of art, what we have here is the triumph 
of artification of multiple spheres of everyday life. While in the past one had to look for 
art in certain places which were controlled by an elite of experts and powerful people – 
as museums or private collections – today we can find art anywhere, we are all artists 
and art theorists. Universalism of art is not then the universalism of avant-gardes, a 
strong universalism which created a lot of the a priori of our regime of visuality, but is 
rather a weak universalism of photographs that come or could come from a family 
album or a mini-narrative that I have posted on my blog. This universalism is 
precarious, but let’s not cheat ourselves, weak and precarious is also the status of the 
artworks of the well-known, be it William Kentridge or Marina Abramovic just as they 
are the philosophical discourses on art of Jacques Rancière or Boris Groys.  
 
 
                                                           
10 About “artification” (artification, Verkunstung) see the publication dedicated to this topic in CA 
(2012). From the point of view of a sociologist, see Heinich and Shapiro 2012. 
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ALBERTO MARTINENGO 
DALL’ALETHEIA AL TOPOS 









In una sorta di doppia Verwindung – o, più sommessamente, di auto-revisione e 
auto-superamento – i trentatré anni che separano il saggio su L’origine dell’opera d’arte 
(1936) e L’arte e lo spazio (1969) contengono alcuni tra i più significativi “sentieri 
interrotti” del pensiero di Martin Heidegger. Ciò non è vero soltanto – e banalmente – 
per i percorsi filosofici che muovono dalla Kehre e che trovano una prima definizione 
proprio nel saggio sull’opera d’arte del 1936: itinerari che, come è noto, prendono 
spesso la forma di tentativi asistematici e incompiuti. La presenza di interruzioni e di 
false piste è ancora più evidente nel caso specifico delle riflessioni di natura estetica, che 
in questi due saggi trovano – con qualche approssimazione – il proprio punto di 
partenza e la propria conclusione. 
Di una sorta di auto-distorcimento all’interno della riflessione heideggeriana 
sull’arte parla, per esempio, Gianni Vattimo, nel suo saggio Ornamento monumento 
(1982). Proprio in riferimento a L’arte e lo spazio, Vattimo enfatizza infatti l’attenzione, 
da parte di Heidegger, a dispositivi di natura topologica che influiscono sulla ricezione 
dell’oggetto artistico. Si tratta di una vera dislocazione dell’artistico in un terreno altro, 
che problematizza la fruizione muovendo dal rapporto tra l’oggetto e ciò che lo 
accompagna, tra il centro e la periferia della configurazione topologica aperta 
dall’oggetto stesso. Il rapporto tra l’arte e la verità, che è il vero filo conduttore 
dell’estetica heideggeriana, finisce qui – spiega Vattimo – per realizzarsi “nella forma 
della perifericità”, cioè è un “accadere dell’essere” che si caratterizza come “un evento 
inapparente e marginale, di sfondo”.1 
Nelle pagine che seguono, mostreremo in che senso il modello di Heidegger possa 
essere ricondotto a un’evoluzione coerente, attraverso il confronto con autori che 
hanno dialogato, più o meno apertamente, con la sua posizione. Lo faremo, in 
particolare, tenendo presenti tratti della riflessione recente di Gerard Vilar, che paiono 
rispondere proprio a questi sentieri interrotti. 
                                                           
1 Vattimo 1982: 94-95. 
 FOCUS • Art and Aesthetic Experience 
 




CoSMo   Comparative Studies in Modernism n. 6 (Spring) • 2015 
40 
 
1. Ontologia e topologia 
 
Per ricapitolare quale partita si giochi nella riflessione di Heidegger sull’arte è utile 
mettere tra parentesi – almeno in chiave euristica – l’andamento carsico che essa 
assume dal saggio sull’Origine dell’opera d’arte in poi: concentriamoci dunque sul 
percorso dell’estetica heideggeriana, più che sulla sua scomparsa e ricomparsa 
nell’orizzonte dei temi dell’autore. Come è noto, il testo heideggeriano del 1936 lavora, 
fin dal titolo, sull’ambiguità dell’espressione “origine della”: la sua vera posta non è 
infatti la determinazione di ciò che dà origine all’opera d’arte; al contrario per 
Heidegger si tratta di pensare la portata inaugurale dell’opera, la sua dimensione 
istitutiva. Più esattamente, la domanda verte su ciò in base a cui l’opera d’arte può dirsi 
origine di qualche cosa: “È dunque possibile che l’arte costituisca un’origine? Dove e in 
qual modo sussiste l’arte?”2 La risposta sta nell’idea che l’arte si collochi al livello 
dell’“apertura dell’ente nel suo essere”, cioè del “farsi evento della verità”:3 un evento 
che restituisce in forma concreta il conflitto mai esauribile tra mondo e terra. 
 
1.1. La Kehre come svolta topologica 
 
Se richiamiamo qui questi passaggi molto familiari nella ricezione di Heidegger, non 
è per ripeterne la storia e la centralità, né per ricordare il ruolo amplissimo che da 
questo saggio in poi Heidegger riserverà alle nozioni di physis4 e, appunto, di aletheia.5 Il 
punto che ci interessa è un altro e ha a che fare con la doppia dimensione, temporale e 
topologica, che da qui in poi avrebbe accompagnato il discorso di Heidegger. Detto in 
termini diversi, l’estetica heideggeriana consente di cogliere meglio di altri momenti del 
suo pensiero questa doppia costellazione categoriale – tempo e luogo – che avrebbe 
governato la sua riflessione filosofica complessiva. Insomma, se “Ereignis” è la vera 
parola-chiave di Heidegger dagli anni ’30, essa è certo una metafora dell’essere come 
tempo e storia, come temporalizzazione e storicizzazione dei concetti fondamentali 
della metafisica; tuttavia l’Ereignis suscita una seconda metaforica, fatta di nozioni 
connotate topologicamente – dalla Lichtung al Geviert, per richiamare le principali – che 
già nell’Origine dell’opera d’arte inizia a profilarsi. 
Il ruolo della topologia nel saggio del 1936 è chiarito, tra gli altri, da Jeff Malpas. 
Malpas è oggi uno degli autori-chiave per costruire un percorso attorno alla riflessione 
heideggeriana su questi temi: a partire da Place and Experience (1999), dove egli 
                                                           
2 Heidegger 1950: 3.  
3 Ivi: 23. 
4 Ivi: 27-28. 
5 Ivi: 35-36. 
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tratteggia come insufficiente – o, al massimo, embrionale – la nozione di luogo in Essere 
e tempo;6 passando per La topologia di Heidegger (2006), in cui Malpas ricostruisce in 
modo dettagliato il graduale venire in chiaro delle questioni topologiche, in particolare 
negli anni della Kehre;7 e giungendo infine a Heidegger and the Thinking of Place (2012), 
che dedica proprio il capitolo conclusivo al tema dell’arte come opera.8 
Il saggio sull’Origine dell’opera d’arte – assieme a Dell’essenza del fondamento (1929) 
e a Dell’essenza della verità (1930) – assume un ruolo decisivo in questo contesto. 
Potremmo dire che si tratta del testo nel quale l’embrionalità della nozione di luogo 
rinvenibile in Essere e tempo prende finalmente una forma riconoscibile. Nella lettura di 
Malpas, se l’intento di Essere e tempo è la “volontà di articolare l’idea fondamentale del 
nostro essere nel mondo come tema del nostro essere ‘situati’”,9 il fallimento del 
progetto del 1927 si deve proprio all’“incapacità di elaborare in maniera adeguata i 
concetti spaziali e topologici che entrano necessariamente in gioco in quest’opera”, 
concetti che appunto “sono connessi al problema originario della situatività”.10 Letti in 
una prospettiva diversa da quella di Essere e tempo, i concetti di progetto, di senso e di 
comprensione avrebbero insomma potuto mettere capo a un’interpretazione 
dell’esistenza più radicalmente connotata come l’ambito all’interno del quale si 
manifestano gli enti.11 
Sforzarsi di pensare il Dasein come un topos, come il luogo della verità dell’essere: 
questa è dunque la via alternativa che, in una specie di lettura à rebours, getta una nuova 
luce sull’analitica esistenziale.12 Ed è una luce che, per inciso, integra perfettamente ciò 
che Heidegger argomenta nel § 44 di Essere e tempo rispetto alla verità come luogo 
dell’asserzione. Tutto ciò traccia una linea di continuità segreta con il saggio sull’opera 
                                                           
6 Malpas 1999: 32-43. 
7 Cfr. Malpas 2006: capp. IV-V. 
8 Cfr. Malpas 2012: cap. 12. Una rassegna, anche soltanto abbozzata, delle interpretazioni topologiche 
di Heidegger sarebbe naturalmente sconfinata: essa dovrebbe andare dai contributi di Otto Pöggeler 
(1969) a quelli di Reiner Schürmann (1982), fino agli esiti più recenti (la topologia di Vincenzo Vitiello 
in Italia; oppure, ancora oltre, studi aggiornati come quello di Martin Nitsche [2011] su Heidegger e 
Merleau-Ponty). 
9 Malpas 2006: 253. 
10 Malpas 2006: 272. La tesi di Malpas sul fallimento di Essere e tempo e sulla Kehre è molto articolata. La 
sua originalità nel panorama della ricezione contemporanea sta appunto nella connessione che 
istituisce tra i limiti dell’analitica esistenziale, la svolta anti-umanista e il topological turn. Il primato della 
temporalità, su cui l’analitica esistenziale si fonda, consente – e ha prodotto de facto – ampi 
fraintendimenti di stampo soggettivistico (Malpas 2006: 274-275). Di contro, la scelta a favore della 
topologia segna il recupero di “una forma di ‘non-soggettivismo’, che è connaturato nel suo pensiero da 
prima del 1919 – e che incorpora l’idea di un nostro coinvolgimento fattico ‘nel mondo’, che viene 
prima sia della soggettività che dell’oggettività” (Malpas 2006: 276-277). Su questi aspetti, cfr. anche 
più oltre, Malpas 2006: 353-356. 
11 Ivi: 287-288. 
12 Malpas 2006: 303. 
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d’arte, dove l’interesse topologico si trova, per così dire, esaltato nel riferimento alla 
lotta tra mondo e terra: un conflitto in cui la terra fonda e dunque radica l’opera d’arte. 
Il che non è vero soltanto nel senso che l’opera, in quanto oggetto, è collocata da 
qualche parte; bensì, più radicalmente, nel senso per cui l’arte si ridefinisce come un 
dispositivo di stabilità e addirittura di abitabilità.13 
Il paradigma heideggeriano del tempio non esprime altro che questa 
determinazione, in particolare nei noti passi sulla presenza del Dio nell’edificio sacro:  
 
Questo esser-presente di Dio è in se stesso il dispiegamento e la delimitazione d’una regione 
sacrale. Ma il tempio e la sua regione non si perdono nell’indefinito. Il tempio, in quanto opera, 
dispone e raccoglie intorno a sé l’unità di quelle vie e di quei rapporti in cui nascita e morte, 
infelicità e fortuna, vittoria e sconfitta, sopravvivenza e rovina delineano la forma e il corso 
dell’essere umano nel suo destino. L’ampiezza dell’apertura di questi rapporti è il mondo di questo 
popolo storico.14  
 
Questi passaggi così discussi dicono appunto la delimitazione, la disposizione, il 
raccogliere intorno a sé, l’unità di una comunità storica: fuori dal lessico heideggeriano, 
che qui non enfatizza ancora la nozione di Ort, ne dicono appunto il luogo; non un 
mero posto in cui gli enti occupano una porzione di spazio – precisa Malpas – bensì il 
luogo dell’esistenza e dei significati.15 Perciò egli può concludere che “l’arte, e quindi 
anche la verità, opera attraverso il rivelarsi concreto di un paesaggio o di un mondo 
specifico che viene svelato grazie al fatto che l’opera ‘sta’ concretamente in quel 
contesto”.16 
 
1.2. L’abitabilità dello spazio 
 
Comunque la si pensi rispetto a questi tratti dell’interpretazione topologica del 
saggio sull’Origine dell’opera d’arte, è un fatto che la nozione di luogo assumerà 
un’importanza crescente dopo gli anni ’30. Tanto che, come si sa, sarà Heidegger stesso 
a delineare ex post l’esigenza di una topologia dell’essere.17 Ma nell’evoluzione 
                                                           
13 Malpas richiama correttamente l’articolata analisi di Edward Casey sulla topologia. The Fate of the 
Place: A Philosophical History (Casey 1997), è il suo riferimento principale; ma non si possono 
dimenticare le indagini condotte in Getting Back into Place: Toward a Renewed Understanding of the 
Place-World (Casey 1993), e gli studi più recenti sull’arte e la rappresentazione dei luoghi: Casey 2002; 
Casey 2005. 
14 Heidegger 1950: 27. 
15 Malpas 2006: 353. 
16 Ivi: 374. 
17 I due riferimenti principali sono naturalmente a Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens (1947), in Heidegger 
1976; e al Seminario di Le Thor 1969, in Heidegger 1992, in cui si propone di sostituire la nozione di 
senso dell’essere con l’espressione “Topologie des Seyns”. 
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dell’estetica heideggeriana il vero pendant del discorso sull’origine dell’opera si trova 
proprio nel saggio su L’arte e lo spazio, dove non va dimenticato che il discorso sull’arte 
è principalmente un’analisi attorno al suo esser-cosa. Solo in tal senso, infatti, si 
comprende la centralità della topologia. Nell’articolata fenomenologia dello spazio, che 
il saggio compie nelle prime pagine, la tematica topologica emerge proprio in quella 
relazione che Heidegger definisce “fare-spazio” (das Räumen): “Il fare-spazio è, pensato 
in ciò che gli è proprio, libera donazione di luoghi [Freigabe der Orte] in cui i destini 
degli uomini che vi abitano si realizzano nella felicità del possesso di una patria o 
nell’infelicità dell’esserne privi […]. Fare-spazio conferisce la località [Ortschaft] che 
appresta di volta in volta un abitare”.18 Tanto che, conclude Heidegger, “il gioco di 
rapporti di arte e spazio dovrebbe essere pensato a partire dall’esperienza di luogo e 
contrada”.19 
Insomma, se nel 1936 Heidegger poteva ancora parlare della messa in opera della 
verità, qui invece l’epilogo è profondamente materiale, quasi fisico. La scultura, per 
esempio, è definita come “il farsi corpo della verità dell’Essere nella sua opera 
instaurante luoghi”.20 Posto dunque che pensare l’evoluzione dell’estetica 
heideggeriana nei termini di un’auto-revisione appaia convincente, alcune cose 
meritano di essere enfatizzate. La principale è proprio questa: il valore inaugurale 
dell’arte, che si conferma come un filo rosso lungo più di trent’anni, prende qui una 
concretezza inattesa. Ancora una volta, lo spiega bene Jeff Malpas, in passaggio che 
merita di essere riportato per intero: 
 
La collocazione di un singolo oggetto nel mezzo di un piano altrimenti piatto e vuoto configura 
immediatamente quel piano intorno all’oggetto – lo spazio ora non appare più come un singolo 
“spazio” indifferenziato, ma come ciò “in cui” è collocato l’oggetto, e che si costituisce come un 
insieme di spazi differenti che stanno in relazione all’oggetto.21 
 
Questa riconfigurazione dello spazio a partire dalla collocazione di un’opera è il dato 
più fedelmente topologico: è un fare-spazio che, nelle categorie di Heidegger, 
corrisponde al predominare del “luogo che raccoglie”. Anche per questa ragione lo 
Heidegger più maturo articola, quasi ossessivamente, un’intera metaforica dell’abitare: 
essa si gioca tutta sull’elevazione della nozione di luogo a dispositivo entro il quale si 
traduce la messa in opera che è ancora in questione nell’Origine dell’opera d’arte. E con 
ciò Heidegger ha interamente riscritto il fenomeno artistico in termini topologici. 
                                                           
18 Heidegger 1969: 24-25. 
19 Ivi: 28-29. 
20 Ivi: 32-33. 
21 Malpas 2006: 427. 
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2. Monumentalità e precarietà 
 
L’evoluzione che abbiamo tratteggiato – dalla messa in opera all’arte come topos – è 
una linea fondamentale della Kehre heideggeriana. Essa coinvolge, come è ovvio, la 
nozione stessa di aletheia, di cui il saggio del 1936 forniva una prima 
problematizzazione (l’arte come messa in opera della verità, appunto) e che ora si 
colloca sotto la categoria di luogo (il topos è esso stesso una modalità del disvelamento). 
Ma nel caso specifico dell’estetica, tale evoluzione segna la centralità di un concetto 
che, sebbene non appartenga al lessico heideggeriano, è di primaria evidenza in questo 
discorso: la nozione di contesto. In questa chiave, la prospettiva suggerita da Vattimo 
appare convincente e – anzi – potrebbe essere ulteriormente esemplificata.  
Per Vattimo l’enfasi posta sulla nozione di contesto è funzionale a comprendere le 
ragioni alla base dell’auto-distorcimento dell’estetica heideggeriana, oltre che a 
misurarne le conseguenze sotto il profilo della fruizione artistica. In questa direzione, 
infatti, Vattimo legge le tracce di un radicale riscatto per l’estetica dell’ornamento e per 
l’arte monumentale: ovvero per quei fenomeni che, sfuggendo alla connotazione 
inaugurale che animava la concezione dell’arte nel saggio del 1936, sono tuttavia 
accomunati dalla capacità di riconfigurare lo spazio. Alla luce del testo su L’arte e lo 
spazio – così potremmo sintetizzare la tesi di Vattimo – l’apertura implicata nella messa 
in opera della verità non significa solo l’inaugurare e il fondare, ma soprattutto il 
dilatare, il lasciar libero, l’accadere di uno spazio autentico.22 Di più: essa contiene tutti i 
tratti del tematizzare, del collocare23 – in questo senso, aggiungeremmo, dell’abitare. 
Proprio su queste basi, a Vattimo sembra di poter concludere per un 
capovolgimento dell’estetica della fondazione enunciata all’epoca della Kehre: nel 
saggio del 1969, la vera essenza dell’opera sta nel suo “essere di sfondo”, più che nella 
sua capacità di produrre tematizzazioni.24 In tal senso, la parola-chiave ci pare appunto 
quella di contesto: se l’opera crea contesti è perché non attira l’attenzione su di sé, ma 
perché ospita, delimita, crea topoi. Con le parole di Hans-Georg Gadamer, giustamente 
ricordate da Vattimo, la spazialità dell’opera “è insieme arte che dà forma allo spazio e 
arte che fa posto […]: essa attrae su di sé l’attenzione dell’osservatore, soddisfa il suo 
gusto, e d’altra parte lo rimanda anche al di là di sé stessa, verso quel più vasto contesto 
vitale che accompagna”.25 E se in Gadamer per tale via si guadagna una riabilitazione 
dell’estetica dell’ornamento e della decorazione, Vattimo approda invece alla 
conservazione della portata fondativa dell’opera, ma in una forma radicalmente 
indebolita e sfuggente: il darsi dell’oggetto artistico diviene “un evento inapparente e 
                                                           
22 Vattimo 1982: 91-92. 
23 Ivi: 94. 
24 Ibidem. 
25 Gadamer 1960: 195. 
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marginale, di sfondo”;26 non però nel senso dell’irrilevanza ma – attraverso il 
riferimento a un orizzonte vitale – nella forma di una monumentalità “che contribuisce 
a costituire lo sfondo della nostra esperienza, ma di per sé, per lo più, resta oggetto di 
una percezione distratta”.27 
 
2.1. La precarietà estetica 
 
Come si riflette tutto ciò nell’analisi del fatto artistico oggi? Le strade sono 
numerose e la stessa nozione di topologia è un’etichetta tra le altre che rinnovano gli 
snodi concettuali di un discorso il quale – almeno dalle riflessioni novecentesche sulla 
fruizione distratta in poi – ha teso a enfatizzare la collocazione dell’arte dentro lo spazio 
pubblico. Sotto questo profilo, sono decisamente fruttuose le analisi di Gerard Vilar, dai 
contributi raccolti in El desorden estético (2000) fino alle riflessioni più recenti sulla 
Desartización (2010). Sebbene il confronto con la topologia heideggeriana non prenda 
mai la forma di una trattazione a sé stante, Vilar si pone de facto lungo una linea che 
proprio allo Heidegger topologico deve la sua origine: l’attenzione all’“arte che fa 
posto” – secondo le determinazioni che abbiamo visto enfatizzate in Malpas (così come 
in Vattimo e Gadamer) – disegna senza dubbio un dialogo ideale, ove non esplicito, 
con l’intentio dell’ultimo Heidegger. 
Per i temi che ci interessano qui, il saggio sulla Aesthetic Precariousness rappresenta 
una buona ricapitolazione e un aggiornamento importante della posizione di Vilar: una 
ricapitolazione che, come è nel suo stile, non si sottrae al confronto con la produzione 
concreta e con temi di più chiara pertinenza critico-artistica. Ma, al tempo stesso, lo 
sguardo di Vilar si fa doppio, nel senso che coniuga quest’attenzione verso la pratica 
artistica con la costruzione di linee di continuità con l’ambito più classico dell’estetica. 
Gli aspetti più rilevanti della precarietà estetica, nel modo in cui Gerard Vilar li 
definisce, condividono in prima istanza un riferimento chiaro a Hegel, in particolare alla 
sua tesi sulla fine dell’arte. Per dirla subito e nel modo più esplicito, la precarietà sembra 
essere quel tipo di vita, o di sopravvivenza, che l’arte mostra di avere oggi, due secoli 
dopo la celebre sentenza hegeliana: una sentenza che – è utile ricordarlo – denuncia 
l’inattualità dell’arte, l’impossibilità di garantire il darsi di un contesto nel quale 
l’artistico può giocare il ruolo di fondamento di un’epoca. Come scrive Vilar, “la 
concettualizzazione ha gradualmente trasformato l’arte rendendola qualcosa di sempre 
più dipendente dalla filosofia e trasformandola al tempo stesso in un fenomeno 
culturale caratterizzato dalla sua precarietà e accidentalità”.28 In altre parole, si può dire 
che Vilar tracci un bilancio della tesi di Hegel, non tanto nel senso di ricostruire la storia 
                                                           
26 Vattimo 1982: 94. 
27 Vattimo 1982: 95.  
28 Vilar 2015: 35. 
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dei suoi molteplici effetti, quanto piuttosto nell’intenzione di applicarla direttamente 
all’esperienza artistica contemporanea.  
Il concetto di precarietà è il medium di tale applicazione; ed esso implica una sorta di 
slittamento dall’inattualità dell’arte alle nuove forme d’essere dell’artistico, al di fuori 
dei suoi confini tradizionali. Con ciò, il modo in cui la pratica artistica e la riflessione 
filosofica entrano in dialogo produce una sorta di double bind, su cui è utile soffermarsi: 
in esso infatti non è soltanto l’arte, ma la stessa riflessione a essere messa in questione.  
Per comprendere questo doppio livello, alcune precisazioni sono necessarie. Da una 
parte, l’idea che l’arte possa essere messa a tema da un’ontologia della precarietà è 
indubitabile – e questo ha un precedente importante nell’uso che già Heidegger e 
Gadamer fanno della nozione di ontologia. Tuttavia, nella prospettiva di Vilar la 
precarietà è appunto un dispositivo generale, che va al di là dei confini dell’artistico. È 
ciò che egli chiarisce, per esempio, riferendosi al Gramsci-Monument di Thomas 
Hirschhorn. Si tratta infatti di un’installazione che dà forma a una specifica concezione 
dell’artistico, secondo la quale il monumento è ciò che inaugura esplicitamente una 
spazialità, una nuova configurazione topologica, per dirla con lo Heidegger di Malpas: in 
tale prospettiva, il monumento è una sorta di evento che produce nuove forme del 
legame sociale, almeno nel senso della nascita di nuovi spazi di incontro (un archivio, 
un Internet point, una biblioteca, un Gramsci bar ecc.). Di più: il Gramsci-Monument di 
New York è uno spazio pubblico nuovo, in un senso radicale, un topos che si articola a 
partire dal monumento stesso. In questa prospettiva, la nozione di monumento subisce 
un vero e proprio processo di decostruzione: il monumento non è più un oggetto che 
aspira a essere permanente nel corso dei secoli, bensì è un prodotto con una “data di 
scadenza”, destinata a tenerlo in vita soltanto per alcuni mesi – in questo caso, da 
maggio a settembre 2013. Tuttavia, la decostruzione della monumentalità non è 
l’ultima parola di Hirschhorn: i significati sociali che il Gramsci-Monument assume non 
sono affatto un residuo della monumentalità dentro il contesto post-hegeliano; sono 
bensì il risultato di un processo di risemantizzazione dopo la fine dell’arte. Se la 
precarietà è un dispositivo che smantella l’opera d’arte, esso presenta al contempo una 
seconda faccia – almeno nel senso di mutarne il significato e la durata – che coinvolge la 
sua performatività sociale, sebbene in un contesto altro. Perciò possiamo dire che, 
privato delle sue caratteristiche di mantenimento nel tempo, il monumento si 
risemantizza come fattore topologico. 
Il punto di svolta della prospettiva di Vilar sta proprio nell’attribuzione di tratti di 
performatività a un dispositivo monumentale, tanto da porlo sotto la categoria – 
apparentemente ossimorica – di performance monumentale. Con quest’espressione, 
attraverso la quale proponiamo di “urbanizzare” la nozione heideggeriana di evento, si 
deve intendere l’idea che l’arte monumentale diventi il medium di un progetto politico 
vero e proprio: non solo nel senso della risemantizzazione topologica di cui si è detto, 
ma anche nel senso di un luogo che promuove l’analisi critica delle costruzioni sociali 
contemporanee. Da qui il riferimento di Hirschhorn alla volontà di “ripensare 
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Gramsci”, promuovere convegni e incontri culturali ecc.29 Scrive Vilar: “Le opere d’arte 
di Hirschhorn intendono sottoporre il partecipante a stimoli, strumenti e soluzioni che 
ognuno elabora all’interno della propria esperienza personale, mette al lavoro attraverso 
la proposta [dell’artista] in forma riflessiva e, per tale via, ne costruisce un giudizio”.30 
Insomma, i convegni programmati quotidianamente al Gramsci-Monument – ma la 
stessa cosa si dovrebbe dire dei dibattiti ospitati dall’altra installazione di Hirschhorn, il 
Musée Précaire Albinet di Parigi – sono la manifestazione più diretta di un’intenzione 
originaria che è tout court politica. In altri termini, il Gramsci-Monument e il Musée 
Précaire Albinet avrebbero funzionato come installazioni d’arte contemporanea anche in 
assenza di una programmazione culturale quotidiana; ma il coinvolgimento critico dei 
cittadini si attiva solo attraverso questa sovrapposizione tra l’artistico e il politico. In tal 
modo, interviene una sorta di alterazione dell’ontologia dell’opera d’arte che genera una 
deviazione nella fruizione dello spazio pubblico e, con ciò, apre la strada a un percorso 
critico condiviso all’interno dello spazio pubblico. Questa alterazione, che da una parte 
si pone volutamente in continuità con lo Hegel della fine dell’arte, dall’altra trova nel 
dibattito novecentesco il suo dispositivo risemantizzante: e lo fa – per lo più 
implicitamente – attraverso il ricorso a categorie che a quella lignée Heidegger-
Gadamer-Malpas appartengono di diritto. 
 
2.2. La “performance teorica” 
 
Sotto il profilo dell’intenzionalità artistica, le cose appaiono piuttosto chiare. 
Conseguenze più radicali devono invece essere tratte dal punto di vista strettamente 
filosofico. La prima e più importante consiste nell’idea secondo cui l’arte diventa tout 
court un medium per la comprensione – nello specifico, “per una comprensione critica 
della precarietà”.31 Una tesi del genere è filosoficamente piuttosto impegnativa. Essa 
infatti implica che, nel semplice slittamento da un’ontologia dell’oggetto artistico a 
un’ontologia della performance (dell’evento-monumento considerato come 
performance), l’arte diventi un dispositivo della riflessione: un “luogo per pensare e 
ripensare aspetti del nostro mondo” o per “promuovere il pensiero critico”.32 
Vilar estremizza ulteriormente la tesi, argomentando che sarebbe sbagliato 
derubricare questo “coinvolgimento di un certo tipo di conoscenza” come un effetto 
secondario della precarietà artistica. Al contrario, ciò che l’arte contemporanea mostra è 
l’impossibilità di separare l’opera d’arte dal discorso su di essa – nella misura in cui l’arte 
non sarebbe nulla se non fosse accompagnata da ciò che dà ragione della sua esistenza.  
                                                           
29 Ivi: 32. 
30 Ivi: 33-34. 
31 Ivi: 32. 
32 Ivi: 33-34. 
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Il rapporto tra logos e arte – che, tra l’altro, accompagna le riflessioni di Vilar nel 
volume su Las razones del arte (2005) – ha a che fare, nel caso specifico dell’arte 
moderna e contemporanea, con il ben noto fenomeno dell’“esplosione dei manifesti”, 
dalle avanguardie in poi: cioè la presa in carico, da parte degli artisti stessi, della 
necessità di riflettere sull’arte, non riservando questa prerogativa ai critici, agli storici o 
ai filosofi. Se quest’insieme di fenomeni è ampiamente scontato nel dibattito estetico, 
Gerard Vilar perviene tuttavia a due conclusioni rilevanti, che è utile isolare: (a) l’idea 
che l’arte sia una forma di “teoria performata”; (b) l’esclusione di qualsiasi riferimento 
alla verità in quest’intreccio tra arte e teoria. Ora, è del tutto evidente che, nel modo in 
cui Vilar le argomenta, tali affermazioni rivestono una sorta di funzione meta-teorica: in 
altre parole, non si tratta soltanto di tesi che concernono l’arte moderna e 
contemporanea, ma estendono la loro pretesa di validità anche sulla filosofia. Portando 
la posizione di Vilar un poco oltre le sue legittime conclusioni, si può infatti affermare 
che non soltanto l’opera d’arte è una “teoria performata” ma anche, di converso, che la 
teoria è un’“opera di performance”. Perciò Vilar può affermare a buon diritto che “la 
verità non è più un affare dell’arte, ma nemmeno della filosofia”.33 È insomma la 
filosofia stessa – al pari dell’arte – a considerarsi “un’impresa che è tormentata dalla 
precarietà, lontana dalla verità”.34 Tale processo di precarizzazione (di dissoluzione, nei 
termini che sarebbero di Vattimo) è cominciato con l’illuminismo e ha fatto della 
filosofia una “pratica creativa”, che costruisce consenso in forme precarie e cangianti.35 
Questo è il punto di distanza più profonda tra la posizione di Vilar e la sentenza 
hegeliana sulla fine dell’arte. Al tempo stesso, esso appare come il momento di 
maggiore vicinanza al Nietzsche della “Nostra ultima gratitudine verso l’arte”: quella 
gratitudine che, come è noto, gli consente di affermare che “se non avessimo consentito 
alle arti ed escogitato questa specie di culto del non vero, la cognizione dell’universale 
non verità e menzogna che ci è oggi fornita dalla scienza – il riconoscimento 
dell’illusione e dell’errore come condizioni dell’esistenza conoscitiva e sensibile – non 
sarebbe affatto sopportabile”.36 Una sfida che l’arte del XX secolo è stata in grado di 
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33 Ivi: 35. 
34 Ivi: 36. 
35 Ivi: 36-37 
36 Nietzsche 1881-1887: af. 109. 
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The relationships between aesthetics and the meaning of artworks have been 
revisited since the historical artworld of the 60’s avant-garde pushed them apart. At that 
time artists rejected the aesthetic definition of art, rejected taste and aesthetic quality, 
and aimed to produce an art not to be aesthetically pleasing, but drawing attention to its 
meaning, in relation to its context, lacking any formal interest. The idea of an art made 
to engage the mind of the viewer rather than his eye or emotions extended and 
conceptualism, in this global sense, became the basis of all-encompassing 
contemporary artistic practices, particularly in visual art. Based on this emphasis on 
meaning and context, the conceptual divorce between content and form, art and the 
aesthetic was complete. However, recently some theoretical attempts are trying to 
reinvigorate the identification between the artistic and the aesthetic. This has to do 
largely with new conceptions of aesthetic experience and value, which often broaden 
these notions including attention not only to formal and expressive properties but also 
to art-historical, cognitive and moral properties, pertaining more to the nature of the 
meaning of artworks. This move seems to blur the distinction between aesthetic value 
and other sorts of artistic value. In this article, I review some of these new accounts and 
recent discussions in order to defend that while aesthetic value should be conceived in a 
broad way, it won’t necessarily absorb any other values an artwork can posses. Being the 
result of a certain sort of experience where form and content are not distinguished, 
aesthetic value in art would include any meaning brought to or gained from an artwork, 
but artworks’ significance goes beyond aesthetic experience and so, the artistic and the 
aesthetic should be kept conceptually differentiated and should not be identified.  
 
                                                           
* This article is part of my research done with the financial support of MICINN (FFI2011-23362) and 
Fundación Séneca (08694/PHCS/08). A first version was presented at the Workshop Art and Aesthetic 
Experience, Università degli Studi di Udine, 8-9 April 2014, and benefited greatly from the discussion 
with Simone Furlani and the many questions and comments by the attendants to whom I would like to 
express my gratitude. 
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1. Putting Aesthetics and Artistic Meaning Back Together 
 
Without subscribing to such renewed identification between the aesthetic and the 
artistic at all, the “aesthetic turn” of the late Arthur Danto1 is nonetheless particularly 
revealing of the trendy new look at their relationship. Danto is famous for having joined 
that anti-aesthetic mainstream of the 60s’ and 70s’ avant-garde, a historical time that –
as he confessed–urged for him to find a definition of art away from aesthetics. His 
classic argument from indiscernibles, according to which the properties available to 
perception undermined the difference between art and non-art, inspired the claim that 
aesthetics was irrelevant to what made something art. Years later Danto wondered 
though if it was the time “to return to aesthetics with an enhanced understanding” 
(Arthur Danto 2003: 58-59). This new understanding would be based, on the one 
hand, on the pluralism of aesthetic qualities, since there is no reason for artists to 
confine themselves to beauty or such other of the aesthetic qualities that evoke visual 
pleasure and, on the other hand, on the constitutive or “internal” role that those plural 
aesthetic properties can play in the meaning of artworks.2 If these qualities are bound 
up with a work’s content, they would be “internal” to the work, and if they are irrelevant 
to the meaning, they would be “external”, being the task of critical scrutiny the 
explanation of these different kinds of relationships. This can be summarized by what 
Danto describes as his “effort to break away from the Kant-Greenberg aesthetic of form, 
and instead develop an aesthetics of meaning” (Danto 2007: 126). In spite of the turn, 
Danto never added aesthetic qualities to the conditions for something to be considered 
an artwork, namely, that art is about something and hence possesses meaning and that 
an artwork embodies its meaning, which is what art criticism addresses. In Danto’s 
thought, aesthetics, which sometimes can contribute to the meaning of the works, 
remains external and contingent to art’s definition since aboutness and embodiment 
are still the two features characteristic of artworks (Danto 2003: 128). Aesthetic 
qualities are not necessary features of artworks after all. 
However, Danto’s critics have often pointed out that the concept of artworks as 
“embodied meanings” refer both to their meanings and how the concrete embodiments 
are carried out in such a way that it wouldn’t be so easy to separate one thing from the 
other.3 This would question too a distinction between internal and external aesthetic 
qualities of the work. The notion of an internal aesthetics, as intended to play a role in 
                                                           
1 I am using the expression coined by Costello 2008. For the scope of this turn, see also Carrasco-
Barranco 2013.  
2 Danto 2007: 121-129. Later extended to the diverse aesthetic qualities, the internal/external 
distinction was first formulated in relation to beauty. See Danto 2003: 81-102. 
3 See for instance Seel 1998: 102-111; Gilmore 2005: 150-151; Pérez-Carreño 2005: 229; Costello 
2008: 252. 
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conveying a work’s meaning, is clearly artistic. Danto stressed the great difference in 
kind between aesthetic response to art and non-artistic aesthetic response coherently 
with the difference also stressed between mere objects and artworks, which hold 
aboutness or meaning (Danto 1981: chap.4). An aesthetic quality is internal “if it is part 
of the meaning of a work” and that in fact “requires a distinction along the lines of that 
between a work and an object” (Danto 2005: 192). For Danto, the work W is 
composed by the material object O and the meaning M, where O has an indeterminate 
number of physical features, and only a subset of which belong to W. And 
interpretation is part of what holds meaning and object together as a work. Thus, 
external aesthetic qualities will be meaningless. But the point is that the work of art, as 
an embodied meaning, must have an aesthetic dimension internal to its meaning, and 
unlikely to be seen as only incidental to it.  
Following Danto, Graham McFee argues that embodying meaning is certainly an 
idea that makes sense for artworks, noting also that meaning features are essentially 
intended (“meant”) and not naturally occurring, and that would explain why different 
embodiments carry out different aboutness or meanings (McFee 2011: 4, 11-12, 13). 
McFee thinks that an artwork always has some specific embodiment in which “the 
witnessable work consists”, and holds this thesis even against those who think that it is 
not crucial for certain artworks –say, Conceptual art or Readymades–. “For the 
meaning of [an] artwork is made concrete in the work itself, where only that 
concretization counts as bearing that meaning”.4 Artworks are not “paraphrasable”, and 
direct confrontation with them would be always needed. McFee claims then that the 
details of the embodiment always have an importance, bearing on the work’s meaning. 
According to him, artworks bear meaning in a “distinctive”, namely, “artistic” fashion. 
Then, one can accept Danto’s conditions on identifying art (the necessity of 
background knowledge of art history and theory that “the eye cannot descry”) while 
retaining an aesthetic theory of art that acknowledges the transformative effect of art-
status for specific properties of the relevant objects.5 Like many others, McFee objects 
to Danto for construing aesthetic qualities narrowly in a sensuous and purely 
perceptual way, when a “perceptual feature” as a feature accessible with no background 
information is false. Nonetheless, in McFee’s account, the contrast between the artistic 
and the (merely) aesthetic is crucial for the correct appreciation of art. According to 
McFee, art-status is in fact transfigurational, where objects indistinguishable to visual 
inspection turn out to be different things, acquiring different properties in connection to 
the audience for them. That the object before us is an artwork is crucial for its 
appreciation – Mc Fee’s argument continues– and one must locate it in the history and 
                                                           
4 McFee 2011: 96-97. Recently, other philosophers have also defended that even the stronger versions 
of conceptual art seem connected with the way the works are (aesthetically) presented. See, for 
instance, Costello 2007: 92-115. 
5 Ivi: 7. See also Costello 2008: 250. 
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traditions of artmaking and artappreciating in that artform or category (McFee 2011: 2-
3). Therefore, the artwork will be misperceived when identified in an inappropriate 
category, or seen as a “merely aesthetic” object. Here, again in a similar vein to Danto’s, 
Mc Fee emphasizes the contrast between art and other objects that can be aesthetically 
appreciated and consequently the distinction between artistic properties from their 
“non-art cousins” (McFee 2011: 4). Such contrast is needed to explain artistic value, 
different from the (merely aesthetic) value of an object, and why aesthetic properties 
amount to something very different when applied to artworks from those uses applied 
outside art. Hence, this strong contrast leads McFee to conclude against the “unity of 
the aesthetic” thesis, “where one set of properties, aesthetic properties …is shared by 
artworks and other things”, and to reject “the idea of artworks having artistic and 
aesthetic properties”, where for artworks all those properties seem to belong to a single 
aesthetic-artistic class (McFee 2011: 10).  
To sum up, departing from admitting Danto’s aboutness and embodiment as 
characteristic features of artworks, McFee emphasizes the dependency of artistic 
meaning on its aesthetic embodiment. (Aesthetic)artistic qualities are internal or 
constitutive of the work‘s meaning. His “thesis about the embodiment of artistic 
meaning, and its consequent uniqueness to that embodiment,” stresses also the need for 
the direct confrontation with the works and implies “that no explanation could be 
equivalent to ‘the’ meaning” (McFee 2011: 52). Aesthetics and artistic meaning, far 
from being divorced, seem now to be back together. Moreover, following McFee, under 
the contrast between artistic and the merely aesthetic properties, artistic and aesthetic 
value of works would be coextensive for which it will be a way of identifying the artistic 
and the aesthetic after all.  
 
2. Is Artistic Value Plural? 
 
McFee considers the distinction between the artistic and the (merely)aesthetic 
crucial for the correct appreciation of art as art. Recently, Dominic McIver Lopes has 
also defended the thesis that claims that the aesthetic properties an artwork exhibits 
depend upon the artistic category in which we appreciate it, since he also thinks that 
artworks would not be aesthetically appreciated under the category of “artwork”, but 
under more specific art form or art genre categories.6 Lopes’ proposal is then “to 
develop particular theories of aesthetic value as realized by specific art kinds (as well as 
and other artefacts and bits of nature)” (McIver Lopes 2011: 535) . Besides, for Lopes, 
this is the way to think about aesthetic value as it is characteristically realized by works 
of art, being also the distinctive artistic value; many other values that artworks can bear 
                                                           
6 Lopes’ account, as well as Mc Fee’s, is inspired by Kendall Walton’s discussion of categories of art in 
Walton 1970: 334-67. 
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would not be proper artistic values, values of art as art. The importance of the 
distinction relies in making clear artistic criticism’s own limits. Because, as Lopes notes 
too, in order to distinguish art criticism from other evaluative discourse, we should be 
able to distinguish evaluations of art as art from other evaluations, notably, art-
historical, cognitive or moral evaluations. Only by distinguishing mere value in art from 
artistic value is there room for genuine disagreement about whether an artwork’s moral 
or cognitive value is an artistic value (Walton 1970: 524-526). No doubt artworks can 
be valuable in other ways and there can be a certain amount of interaction between 
non-artistic values that artworks possess and (aesthetic) artistic value. But this does not 
mean that any of these other values are artistic ones.  
However, this perspective raises the question about whether the qualification of 
aesthetic value as the only artistic one, as well as its distinction from other values, can be 
made without developing a general account of aesthetic value but by just employing a 
view of it merely orientated by the artistic category of the object in question. Without 
denying that a correct appreciation of art depends on perceiving the object before us as 
an artwork and in the appropriate artistic category (where the requisite critical 
vocabulary for art of that type applies), like McFee and Lopes argue, we also need to 
explain in which sense our evaluation is considered in every case “aesthetic”. This will 
make real sense of the term and will help explain too in which way aesthetic value 
would be distinct from other values, notably, art historical, cognitive or moral value.  
Robert Stecker makes this point when, arguing against Lopes, he reminds us that 
aesthetic value is the value of a certain sort of experience and the objects of that 
experience; a kind of value that we find in art, but not only in art because “it is 
everywhere” and should be then defined in its own right.7 Besides, Stecker thinks that, 
while aesthetic value is an independent and underived kind of value, artistic value 
comprises a diverse set of values and it is derived from the interaction of these more 
basic values.8 Thus, Stecker contests the identification between the artistic and the 
aesthetic, defending the existence of non-aesthetic artistic value for which such 
identification makes no room, and frames the discussion about the limits of artistic 
critical discourse and the possible interaction between aesthetic and other values in the 
context of a pluralistic theory of artistic value. But given that the inventory of specific 
values of specific works of art is virtually endless, we shouldn’t trivialize the notion of 
artistic value by including any value artworks can bear. Therefore, Stecker offers a test 
for identifying legitimate artistic value that goes like this: if one needs to understand the 
                                                           
7 Stecker 2012: 361. Taking into account the appreciation of the object as art, nature or everyday life, 
doesn’t mean avoiding clarifying what makes a response aesthetic developing a general account which 
should be also neutral about the relative importance or priority of art and nature within the field of the 
aesthetic. In this respect, see also, Budd 2005:13-14. 
8 In the sense artistic value is for Stecker “heteronymous”; an account developed in Stecker 2013: chap. 
2.  
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work to appreciate its being valuable in that way, it is an artistic value and, if not, it is not 
(Stecker 2005: 240 ). 
Artistic values, or values of art as art, are those derived from a correct understanding 
of the works. Stecker has in mind a sort of understanding that derives primarily from 
interpreting artworks and, in particular, “interpreting them for work meaning” (Stecker 
2012: 357). Clearly, such understanding is not required to appreciate adventitious 
valuable properties of artworks, such as financial value. Instead, Stecker claims, it will be 
a matter of discovering what the artist has done in a work, usually as a result of 
intending to do that. Then, applying the test, if an artwork has arthistorical, cognitive or 
ethical value that is part of its artistic value, one needs to understand the work to 
appreciate this value. They would not be mere adventitious values in art and would 
“remain artistic values because imbuing the work with such a value is part of the artist’s 
project in making the work, and appreciating the value requires understanding the 
work” (Stecker 2012: 360). However, Stecker leaves open the exact nature of 
interpretation relevant to understanding a work, aware of alternative views about work 
meaning as well as views about interpretation that make the central aim of 
interpretation the appreciation of a work. Nonetheless, the sense of understanding 
indicated is specifically related to another plausible route to discovering artistic value 
since this derives from the multiple aims that artworks fulfil. As a second test, Stecker 
affirms that artistic value is derived “from works existing within art institutions or 
practices when appreciated as members of those practices”, and it’s functional, resting 
in the capacity of artworks to bestow benefits on their audiences. Both tests will be then 
complementary and in fact, they would converge in a single one. On the one hand, 
understanding an artwork’s (intended) meaning correctly involves framing it in its 
historical context as part of artistic practices. And on the other hand, the non-
essentialist account of art as a changing historical practice comprising a variable set of 
forms and genres offered also by Stecker involves a sort of understanding that would 
imply the reasons and circumstances that would make intelligible calling something 
“art”, including people’s expectations, exceeding the mere sociological frame offered by 
the institutional theory of art (Stecker 2012: 361).  
Therefore, following Stecker, since we don’t evaluate artworks as art just for 
aesthetic value but for other things too, artistic value comprises a diverse set of values. 
And so, for him, artistic value “may include aesthetic value”, but it is not identical to it 
(Stecker 2012: 355). Aesthetic value comes from a certain sort of experience and 
aesthetic theory of art “does not do justice to the variety of ways in which we engage 
with artworks and with art’s engagement with the world” (Stecker 2012: 356). 
Moreover, since many artworks would have hardly any or no aesthetic value at all, 
something else must account for their artistic value. This is why Stecker concludes that 
in spite of the recent theoretical attempts to reinvigorate an aesthetic conception of 
artistic value, the legacy left by the appearance of the conceptualist practices of various 
avant-garde movements decades ago still constitutes strong evidence against those 
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theories. In fact, Stecker claims that this premise does a better job proving the existence 
of artistic value as distinct from and irreducible to aesthetic value than Danto’s 
argument from indiscernibles, challenged now for a long time for construing aesthetic 
qualities narrowly in a sensuous and purely perceptual way. As we noted from McFee’s 
objections, the context and the knowledge of the observer affect importantly our 
cognitive and affective responses to objects, so two indiscernible objects in a “purely 
perceptual” way would differ in their respective (response-dependent) aesthetic 
qualities when experienced in completely different ways. Stecker also endorses a broader 
view and defines aesthetic experience as the experience of “attending in a 
discriminating manner to forms, qualities or meaningful features of things, attending to 
these for their own sake or for the sake of a payoff intrinsic to this very experience” 
(Stecker 2005: 52-53). On the other hand, artworks are valued as objects of 
interpretation and appreciation according to their multiple and not only nor necessarily 
aesthetic aims. So, in conclusion, according to Stecker, aesthetic value is the value of 
such experiences and of those objects that have the capacity to provide them. But as we 
shouldn’t trivialize the notion of the artistic by including any sort of value artworks can 
bear, and for that Stecker offers a test, we should not trivialize either the notion of the 
aesthetic by including any sort of artistic value. Here, by focusing on a general 
definition of aesthetic value, instead of developing category-dependent theories of it, 
Stecker’s account should help too, making the right distinctions between different 
artistic values.  
 
3. The Broad View of Aesthetic Experience 
 
Like Stecker’s, many other current views of aesthetic experience distinguish a mere 
perceptual from a broader and more adequate account of aesthetic value which 
basically tells us that aesthetic properties are not appreciated in the natural response to 
the physical features of objects but instead, aesthetic value lies in the experience of the 
objects, which can be radically altered by the context and the information of the 
observer. Besides, in the experience, thoughts and emotions are implied along with 
sensations, covering not only immediately perceptible properties but also relational, 
representational, symbolic and emotional properties as they are realized in the item.  
Stecker says that aesthetic experience derives from attending to forms, qualities and 
meanings of things, but what makes the experience aesthetic is the special kind of 
engagement with the object required in which the object is valued for its own sake. He 
makes clear that it is not a mere question of content, but a matter of qualifying the sort 
of response aesthetic qualities depend on, which, for Stecker, involves the interest we 
take, the appreciation we feel, or the value we find in them.9 When noticing aesthetic 
                                                           
9 Ivi: 58. For a content-oriented definition of aesthetic experience see Carroll 2006: 69-97. 
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features, one typically has an appreciative response, different from other cases of 
response-dependent properties, such as colour properties, or the properties we can 
identify in a poem, when knowledge, say, to pass an exam, is the only pleasure we get 
from the experience. If we go on recognizing that the metaphors are witty or the images 
poignant, we’ll be then noticing aesthetic properties (Stecker 2005: 59-60). In this vein, 
Alan Goldman has insisted in not describing aesthetic experience simply as intrinsically 
valuable experience but in focusing on that special kind of engagement with the 
appearance or the form of the object required for being so valued, which would involve 
perceptive and cognitive activity as well as affection, operating in tandem and informing 
one another (Goldman 2006: 334). Such experience can also be valued for its 
instrumental benefits, which can be many, and many other experiences can be valued 
for their own sake, but aesthetic appreciation engages simultaneously our perception, 
imagination, thought, and feeling; such an engagement of our mental faculties with the 
form of the object will be the unique mark of aesthetic experience. As a result, Goldman 
claims that the virtual world of the work becomes the object of our attention. Having in 
mind great artworks as paradigmatic, he also emphasizes that we loose ourselves 
absorbed by that world leading to an intense and meaningful experience as a result. 
Stecker has objected that conclusion and he is right when arguing that not all aesthetic 
experiences (in nature and everyday life but also in art) are of such intensity and 
totality. However, others more interested in identifying and understanding the nature 
of the aesthetic away from the art-centred tradition, have also described aesthetic 
experience fundamentally, and whatever its object might be, as the common 
engagement of our mental faculties.10 Hence, without going as far as Goldman’s selfless 
absorption, we can establish that a satisfactory condition for a response to be aesthetic 
is that it be “directed to experience properties of an item in perception, thought and 
imagination, understood in an all-embracing sense.”(Budd 2005: 14). 
On the other hand, this doesn’t mean that aesthetic experiences are always 
pleasurable or positive, and even when we find them valuable, some other kinds of 
enjoyment or satisfaction rather than pleasure are often involved.11 It is the case of 
many artworks that shock, disturb or disgust us, but they still do us some good and hold 
aesthetic value because we value the experience of engaging with them in the way just 
                                                           
10 Jean-Marie Schaeffer defines aesthetic experience as a feedback relation between a cognitive and an 
affective component in such a way that the first is valued according to the (in)satisfaction it causes. 
Schaeffer 2005: 35. On the other hand, when in fact Goldman confesses to have in mind the aesthetic 
experience of art as paradigmatic for his account, he also leaves open the possibility of holding the most 
prominent features of the conception of aesthetic experience, as he has described them, in the 
expansion of the notion to other areas, where diverse contents or objects would differentiate experience 
in art from all other kinds. Goldman 2013: 332. Certainly though, the idea of selfless absorption seems 
here to be part of the problem for him to follow this path. 
11 Stecker 2005: 56-58. See also Levinson 1996: 23, and Goldman 2004: 102.  
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described. We can get satisfaction from the experience of perceptually repellent works 
of art that assault our senses, shock us affectively, and challenge our intellects, where 
pleasant qualities are not always a guarantee of aesthetic value (Goldman 2006: 337). 
Thus, there is no single affective tone and no single emotion always present in aesthetic 
evaluation. The notion of aesthetic experience is certainly impoverished not only by 
thinking of it in purely sensory terms, but also by equating the payoff of valuable 
aesthetic experience with pleasure and pleasant sensations usually derived from the 
passive contemplation of beauty as the only aesthetic property.  
Finally, being engaged with artworks’ virtual world will certainly carry out certain 
detachment. Aesthetic value as derived from engagement with objects for their own 
sake is traditionally labelled ‘disinterested’. For Kant, this kind of pleasure was the key 
for claiming the universality of aesthetic judgment, and especially for the autonomy of 
aesthetic experience. Since then, the concept of ‘disinterest’ has assumed formalist 
connotations which, when defining art, reduces the value of art itself isolating aesthetic 
experience from any reference to the world at large and from any interest in practical 
issues. However, that sort of isolation is not necessarily connected to the basic idea of 
aesthetic value as the value afforded by the attention intentionally directed at an object 
as represented with certain properties: the aesthetic object. And particularly dealing 
with artworks, focusing on the object disengaged from purely personal concerns 
doesn’t mean excluding the circumstances of the viewer. Quite the opposite, situating a 
work in its “specific creative context” is required since proper aesthetic experience of art 
is informed.12 In any case, the variety of aesthetic properties is related to what an 
artwork represents, expresses or suggests. The ‘form’ of the work in which aesthetic 
attention focuses can be described in a very wide sense including attention to 
representational properties, historical context, referential or symbolic content along 
with sensuous, formal and expressive properties. Under this broader view, ‘form’ means 
any way a work embodies or presents its content. The moral, cognitive, religious, and so 
on content of the work is more of the nature of what is embodied. But aesthetic 
experience is concerned with how artworks’ meanings are embodied and, so aesthetic 
value is concerned with the special relation between form and content. As Goldman has 
put it, the distinction between form and content would not be a distinction found in the 
experience of artworks, but emerging only later in analysis.13 The point is that under 
this broad view of aesthetic experience it wouldn’t be consistent to exclude from 
aesthetic value those other artistic values.  
According to the broad view, the acquisition of truths, moral insights or political 
lessons, even the historical importance, are an integral and inseparable aspect of our full 
experience of or engagement with the works. Conveyed in particular embodiments, any 
                                                           
12 See Levinson 1996: 16-17. 
13 The question is addressed in Goldman 2013: 330. 
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meaning brought to or gained from an artwork seems to be part of their aesthetic value 
and would not be separable from the other acknowledged aspects of the appreciative 
experience of artworks as it occurs. As a result, we’ll respond to the interaction of the 
various properties of the object also inseparable in experience from our fresh emotional 
reactions to them. In a broad conception of aesthetic experience, there seems to be a 
risk of other values being absorbed into aesthetic value. At this point, “the question is 
whether there is any justification or point to separating out cognitive and moral 
engagement and insight from aesthetic experience so as to leave a residue of artistic 
value beyond the aesthetic” (Goldman 2013: 330). 
 
4. Valuing Art 
 
Stecker holds a broad view of aesthetic experience. However, according to him, 
even when aesthetic experience derives from attending to forms, qualities and meanings 
of artworks, aesthetic value is not only distinct from other artistic values, but also there 
can be art with no aesthetic value at all. He appealed to anti-aesthetic or anti-art 
movements, as works that were originally made to challenge a variety of assumptions 
about art, and later to redirect the focus of art from aesthetic matters to ideas of various 
kinds. But some of those assumptions had to do with a purely non-cognitive perceptual 
view of the aesthetic confined also to beauty or such other of the aesthetic qualities that 
evoke pleasure, like Danto also recognized after his “aesthetic turn”. In fact, Stecker sees 
too that “it would be oversimplistic to claim that no works made within these 
movements have aesthetic value,” (Stecker 2012: 355) but nonetheless in many it 
would be very modest or even completely absent. He asks us to consider, for example, 
Sherri Levine’s photographs of Walker Evans’s photographs. Stecker argues that, in a 
way, they do have aesthetic value since they inherit the aesthetic value of the object 
photographed. But that can hardly explain their value as art, which their cognitive value 
(based on the fact that they have an unexpected subject matter, namely, other 
photographs) does primarily explain. Their realization refocuses our attention on 
properties, including aesthetic properties, but also social and art historical ones, that 
their subjects have as photographs (Stecker 2005: 233-234). Stecker affirms that 
Levine’s photographs also have art-historical value in marking an important stage in the 
development of appropriated art, which also contributes to its value as art. Stecker 
doesn’t think, although he confesses too not being sure about it, that the value of 
Levine’s work lies in a new set of aesthetic properties but in those other non-aesthetic 
artistic values. 
However, the idea of non-aesthetic art and art where aesthetic value is completely 
absent can be challenged, and also whether Levine’s photographs and Walker Evans’s 
photographs share the same aesthetic value, since their aesthetic properties would be 
different indeed. Going back to McFee’s view, artworks bear meaning in a distinctive 
(aesthetic)artistic fashion. Thus, artistic meaning is conveyed in a (aesthetic)form. The 
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meaning is the content or aboutness of the work as it is particularly embodied. Artistic 
meanings are then of particular works, with particular embodiments. The two sets of 
photographs are different works and their meanings are also different. One must grasp 
them in the direct encounter or experience from their respective embodiments, which 
are indiscernible only from a mere perceptual point of view not from an informed 
artistic point of view. The experience, per se aesthetic not artistic, would engage us on 
different levels, both cognitive and affective. On a broad view, aesthetics and meaning 
seem inseparable since form is the vehicle through which we reach content in the 
experience of the work. So, the aesthetic value of Levine’s photos won’t be the same as 
Evans’ since both direct our attention differently to make their respective points. 
Because we respond to them differently, Stecker would be right in claiming the more 
modest aesthetic value of the former. But, in any case, that will depend on the capability 
of Levine’s work, as content embodied in a form, to engage us, for instance, shedding 
light on some aspects of our perception, opening up a set of imaginative associations, 
arousing thought. Every artwork, even the more austere ones, can be then evaluated 
from an aesthetic point of view, referred to the specific ways in which their meanings 
are conveyed.14 Nevertheless, this is not saying that all artworks provide rich aesthetic 
experiences, neither that aesthetic value exhausts artistic value. 
In spite of McFee’s treatment of aesthetic qualities in art just as the “artistic” ones, 
he uses a distinction that explains the existence of non-aesthetic artistic value. When 
meaning “meaning”, McFee wants to distinguish it from “significance”. Quoting Hirsch 
and Levinson, he explains that meaning “is what the signs represent”, their content, 
while significance “names a relationship between that meaning and a person, or a 
conception, or a situation, or indeed anything imaginable.”(Mc Fee 2011: 31). Artistic 
value, functional as Stecker conceives it, is a matter of significance. However, artistic 
value doesn’t include any impact of the work on the audience or the society. It is 
derived from an understanding of the works for works meaning. Once we encounter 
artworks correctly (as objects of interpretation and appreciation framed in artistic 
practices) experiencing their forms, qualities and meanings, we reap art’s benefits. They 
come from the aesthetic experience itself, valuable for its own sake, but other things too 
can be taken away from that experience, “controlled by the meaning of the work”.15 
Stecker is right when claiming that there can be works with very modest aesthetic value, 
and consequently, other values are to blame for their artistic value. Historical 
importance, cognitive and moral value constitute aesthetic value when mobilized in the 
aesthetic experience of an artwork but they are per se non-aesthetic values, and still 
properly artistic when expressing some other way in which we engage with art. There 
                                                           
14 Cf. Costello’s analysis of Art & Language’s Index 01 (1972) in Costello 2008: 261-262. 
15 As R. A. Sharpe puts it :“Here is a major difference between those responses to a work of art which are 
peculiar to me or even to my culture and those which are controlled by the meaning of the work, in so 
far as that is recoverable”, quoted by Ivi: 135. 
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are those other ways indeed. It is possible that one enjoys finding important 
connections between artworks, locating them in a historical narrative, and assessing the 
historical importance of certain works paving the way to new movements without that 
being part of an aesthetic experience. Or we can value a work for communicating 
certain didactic or political messages even when they haven’t been developed in any 
interesting way in our aesthetic engagement with the object. Art has and has had 
multiple aims and functions hence, when we recognize certain purposes in our 
responses to the artwork’s meaning, we concede to them significance for the work’s 
artistic value. Consequently, since critical scrutiny must concern the artwork itself, 
other perspectives than aesthetic evaluation can legitimately take part in it.  
Those who defend aesthetic value as the value of art qua art often claim that 
aesthetic function is the proper function of artworks, sometimes it is also claimed that it 
is unique to art. But I have argued that this is not so since we experience aesthetically 
other objects and not only artworks, and we also engage with artworks in other non-
aesthetic ways. However, being always present, it seems to me that aesthetic function 
plays a special role in our encounter with art. This is also because “aesthetics may itself 
explain why we have art in the first place”, as Danto acknowledged.16 Aesthetic value 
doesn’t exhaust artistic value. But in the aesthetic experience of artworks our sensuous, 
cognitive, and affective faculties are simultaneously addressed, and often challenged. 
This way in which our thoughts connect with feelings helps to explain mainly what after 
all makes art so significant for human life, even for those more reluctant to accept that 
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Every conception of aesthetic experience has to deal with two antagonistic aspects 
that are inherent to the very notion itself. I will try to outline these two aspects by 
referring to Kant’s explanation of aesthetic experience, which is paradigmatic in this 
regard (as it is in many regards). On the one hand, Kant conceives of aesthetic 
experiences as an experience in which the subject is passive. According to Kant, the 
object affects the subject in a specific way, namely by giving rise to a free play between 
the imagination and the understanding (Kant 1999: §9). On the other hand, Kant 
claims that the way the subject is affected is relevant to the subject itself. To experience 
a free play of imagination and understanding is to experience that cognition is possible, 
for cognition presupposes that imagination and understanding work together.1 In 
Kant’s view, aesthetic experiences are experiences of the possibility of cognition and are 
hence valuable for the subject experiencing them. I may articulate the antagonism 
between these two aspects that I have conceived of with Kant by asking the question: 
How is it possible that a subject can learn something about itself through an experience 
in which it is ultimately passive? 
Since not all of us are Kantians and since Kant’s explanations rely on 
presuppositions that we may not all share, it is necessary to articulate these two aspects 
in a more abstract way. I propose to conceive the first aspect as follows: 
(Primacy of the object) Aesthetic experiences are experiences in which the objects 
experienced play the primary role.2 
The second aspect takes the following shape: 
(Self-reflection of the subject) Aesthetic experiences are experiences in which a 
subject is confronted with itself. They reflect the subject in a specific way. 
                                                           
1 According to Kant, the free play bestows the subject with “cognition in general” (Erkenntnis 
überhaupt); Kant 1999: § 9. 
2 The concept “primacy of the object” has been coined by Adorno. Adorno 2002: 258. 
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These two aspects conflict with one another. This conflict can be articulated as 
follows: 
(The conundrum of aesthetic experience) How can an experience fundamentally 
rooted in an object have the effect that a subject is confronted with itself? How is it 
possible that a subject can reflect on itself if it is merely passive? Let’s call this conflict 
the conundrum of aesthetic experience.3 
In what follows I will argue that the conundrum of aesthetic experience can be 
solved if we conceive of aesthetic experiences in a practical way. Aesthetic experiences 
are based in forms of practice that the subject performs in encountering works of art. 
My claim seems to contradict a basic conviction about aesthetic experience that I have 
already brought into play: It seems to contradict the idea that a basic feature of 
aesthetic experience is that it interrupts ordinary, everyday practices. I don’t intend that 
my claim contradicts the idea that there is a significant discontinuity between ordinary 
practices, on the one hand, and aesthetic practices, on the other. But, in my view, it is 
important to challenge a presupposition often uncritically made when explaining the 
discontinuity in question, namely, the presupposition that activities of a subject are 
always activities by which the subject is determining something.4 If we want to grasp the 
specificity of aesthetic experiences, it is necessary to account for activities in which the 
subject is both active, insofar as it is engaging in a specific practice, and passive, insofar 
as it follows the structures of an object. The task is to explain a particular form of 
practice of the subject. This is precisely what I would like to do in my paper. I will try to 
develop the concept of activity we need to explain aesthetic experiences in three steps. 
Firstly, I try to explain in which way works of art are objects that prompt specific 
activities (part 1). Secondly, I shortly elaborate on the activities in question (part 2). 
Thirdly and lastly, I introduce the notion of aesthetic experience by articulating a 
central characteristic of the activities recipients perform in dealing with artworks (part 
3). 
 
1. Works of Art as Objects That Prompt Specific Activities 
 
Artworks can be characterized as objects in which different elements stand in 
various relations to other elements. In every artwork, we may discern relevant aspects 
such as rhythm, constellations of colour, bodily posture or expressed words. Such 
elements have a special value in how the artwork confronts those who deal with it. But 
the elements do not stand on their own. They are embedded in a structure which is 
                                                           
3 This conundrum may be a reason for philosophies of art to be critical about the very concept of 
aesthetic experience; for a criticism see, for instance, Carroll 2012: 165-177. 
4 This presupposition has most clearly been articulated by Theodor W. Adorno. Adorno / Horkheimer 
2002. 
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realized by the artwork itself. So we may begin with the following conception of an 
artwork: 
(Artwork) An artwork determines the value of the elements that are of special 
meaning within it in its own autonomous, independent way. We have to conceive of 
what characterizes each artwork in relation to the dynamic that it unfolds between its 
elements. And that is to say that we have to conceive of the artwork on the basis of its 
own self-referential constitution. 
A further explanation of this conception can begin by departing from the relations 
between elements within the work: relations between words, between harmonies, 
between colours, between bodily postures, between different objects in an installation, 
and so forth. Such relations pervade artworks in the configuration of their elements. 
These relations have a nature that promises to clarify a good deal: they unfold their own 
mode of meaning. They contrast, establish boundaries between each other, repeat, 
form transitions, and much more. Relations within an artwork are configured in a way 
specific to each work. 
Thus, we can grasp many, if not all artworks as being a structural connection 
between different elements, hence between words, tones or colours. What characterizes 
such connections is the fact individual elements gain their profile and value from the 
way they are related to one another: the identity of an element is defined in the artwork 
through the relations it has to other elements. This is also true in cases where the 
artwork is made up of elements that exist in some respect independently of it. Let us 
take the example of a poem. A poem is, in most cases, made up of words within a 
natural language, and hence in some respects reaches back to existing elements. But 
they get transformed in the poem. They do not merely have the meaning assigned to 
them in ordinary language, but rather take on new meanings. 
For this reason, recipients of artworks always have to interpretively reveal the 
meaning of the elements. They cannot simply refer back to the meanings they know, 
but instead have to understand the elements out of the relations internal to the given 
poem. Something analogous applies for colours in painting or tones and harmonies in 
music. Even if we can say in a certain respect that these elements have an existence 
outside of individual works, they nevertheless receive a different, novel value in each 
individual artwork. Someone who wants to understand them has to do so internal to 
the relations developed in the respective work (whereby it is obviously the case that this 
understanding also depends on artistic conventions, allusions to other artworks, etc.). 
An artwork is made up not of elements that exist independently of it. Rather, it gives its 
elements value in and through their reciprocal relations, relations that it first sets into 
motion as an artwork. 
However, the dynamic structure of the artwork described up to now does not 
simply exist for itself. Added to this dynamic, there also belong practices that recipients 
develop in encountering artworks. The configuration of artworks is set up in a precise 
way in relation to these practices. Through their self-relational constitution, they pose a 
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challenge to the practices of recipients. If this challenge should ever take effect, then 
recipients have to enter into the artwork and allow themselves to be confronted by its 
self-relational dynamic. The self-relational dynamic of the artwork is in this sense to be 
taken as a moment of an interaction with the recipient, as a moment within the 
interactive relation that constitutes it. The artwork demands to be reenacted and is in 
its dynamic constitutively bound up with this reenactment. It demands practices by 
which recipients articulate the structures of the artwork. 
The challenge realized by artworks thus has a mainly practical character: A recipient 
considers the relations within a picture by looking. This leads to specific modes of 
looking that are oriented toward the self-referentially established relations within the 
artwork. To put it in a general way: 
(Practices of the recipient) The recipient has to develop forms of practice that are 
guided by the self-referentially established relations within an artwork. 
In this respect, we can say that artworks demand a certain mode of behavior. Using 
one of the central concepts from Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory, we can characterize this 
behavior as mimetic.5 A behavior that appropriates things differently is mimetic. We 
would understand such a mimetic behavior falsely if we think of it as being mainly 
passive (as Adorno sometimes suggests). Recipients have to become active in order to 
be guided by the artwork, such that aesthetic practices always have two sides: on the 
one hand, they reflect the fact that a dynamic departs from the artwork, which 
recipients then follow; on the other hand, we are always dealing with new activities 
internal to these practices, and thus with new approaches and interventions from the 
recipient. Gadamer writes of this by claiming that a recipient always has to be a fellow 
player (Mitspieler): she has to take up the ball that is passed to her by an artwork and 
pass it back (Gadamer 1987: 23). 
In encountering artworks, recipients are always just as productive as artists 
themselves, namely, in the way they develop their own activities of reception. If it does 
not give rise to some activity in the subject, then the artwork’s configuration cannot 
unfold any effect at all. This is especially true of artworks whose configuration is 
unfamiliar to the recipients. Let us take the example of a painting that is new for 
someone contemplating it. In such a case, this person will have to develop her visual 
activities further. If she does not become active in her seeing, she will not be able to 
follow the painting.6 This activity always consists in the recipient bringing forth her own 
impulses in dealing with the artwork, for example by choosing a specific point of 
departure or bringing up conflicting points within the constellation of the work or 
comparing the work to established ways of dealing with it. The recipient’s own impulses 
                                                           
5 See, for instance, Adorno 2002: 53. 
6 The claim that visual art teaches the recipients to develop their visual activities in a new way has most 
prominently been advanced by Maurice Merleau-Ponty; see Merleau-Ponty 1993: 121-149. 
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also have a special relevance, since it is by way of them that the recipient acts within the 
framework of a history of receptions. 
 
2. Interpretive Activities 
 
Now that the dynamic context characteristic of art stands before us, we can 
illuminate those activities that are unfolded by recipients in a more precise way. I 
characterize them as interpretive activities, since they lead to a practical understanding 
of the configuration of a work. For example, when new colour combinations or 
materials are deployed in a painting, we see the interpretive aspect of the activities of 
perception. Recipients have to adapt themselves to specific colours and ways of 
painting, so that they do not simply see colours and combinations of colours that 
vaguely make them feel something, but are rather compelled to unfold their own 
activities of seeing. Such activities involve creativity; that is, experimental ways of 
interacting, new approaches, and so on. In this sense, receptive activities are to be 
grasped as interpretive practices. To put it generally: 
(Interpretive activity) An interpretive activity in relation to a work of art is an activity 
that retraces a configuration of elements in the artwork in such a way as to articulate 
this configuration. 
I am characterizing the process of dealing with an artwork as articulation because in 
such a process it is a matter of orienting one’s own activity towards the relations 
contained in the artwork. Speaking of interpretive activities remains, however, too 
general. We will have to consider more precisely what practices enable recipients of 
artworks to articulate the constellations of elements in specific artworks. Which 
activities are involved? That is, which activities can we conceive of as being interpretive 
activities? I will approach this question by superficially distinguishing four types of 
receptive activity in a schematic manner: bodily, perceptive, emotional and symbolic: 
(a) In explaining interpretation, bodily activities usually get left out. Nevertheless, in 
dealing with many artworks, they play a central role. They typically come to bear in the 
reception of music, but also in works of architecture and plastic arts. 
(b) Unlike bodily activities, we often pay attention to the role of perception in 
dealing with artworks. However, such accounts usually do not pay proper attention to 
the active quality of perceptions. 
(c) Another form of activity has increasingly become an object of theoretical 
exploration in recent times. Recipients find themselves constantly challenged 
emotionally in the process of dealing with artworks, especially with narrative artworks. 
(d) As stated, we usually consider symbolic, especially linguistic activities as 
interpretations, although we often run the risk of losing sight of the articulating aspect 
of these activities. Recipients often follow artworks through linguistic articulation, or in 
the case of music, through singing along or other forms of vocal articulation. 
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With all such activities, recipients articulate the constellations unfolded in artworks. 
In any event, we are dealing with practices that recipients develop in the face of 
challenges posed by artworks. Since it would burst the confines of this paper to analyze 
each of the mentioned kinds of practice, I will only aim at making the functional 
similarity of these practices comprehensible, since this is often overlooked in 
discussions on aesthetics. We primarily consider interpretation as an articulation in 
words, and we grasp this as a distanced cognitive way of dealing with the artwork. Such 
an understanding may be common, but it is problematic in a double sense: first, a 
linguistic interpretation of an artwork is not necessarily a distanced, cognitive way of 
dealing with the work, since an interpretation can only succeed if a recipient enters into 
the configuration of the work with her linguistic interpretation, that is, only if she 
follows this configuration despite the fact that her activities and perspectives are 
independent of the artwork itself. Second, such a linguistic articulation is only one 
among those forms of practice that articulate an artwork interpretively. In order to gain 
a full notion of these practices, we have to consider linguistic interpretation in 
connection with other practices. 
 
3. Aesthetic Experience 
 
The conception of interpretive activities developed thus far gives us a clue of how to 
conceive of aesthetic experiences. Aesthetic experiences must not be thought of as 
experiences which result out of the affection an object causes in a subject. Aesthetic 
experiences have to be explained in terms of the way the object affects the activities of 
recipients – it has to be explained in terms of what these activities have in common.7 It 
is characteristic of the activities recipients perform in encountering works of art that 
these activities are guided by the constellations of the artworks themselves. 
Nevertheless, the activities are activities of the recipients. But they are guided in their 
activities. This is to say: They experience a specific form of dependence on the object. 
But this is not precise enough, since it does not capture the dimension of activity on the 
recipient’s side. So we have to say: The recipients experience a sort of dependence in 
(their) independence. In their activities, subjects are independent. But if their activities 
are guided by an object, the result is an experience of dependence in independence. 
The dependence I am talking about is often misconceived as aimlessness. Someone 
who has an aesthetic experience is fundamentally oriented towards the constellation of 
an object or an event. In this sense, we may say that the experience is caused by the 
object. This is the reason that the course of the experience is not foreseeable for those 
who have it. The continuity of their activities is oriented by the configuration of the 
                                                           
7 This conception of aesthetic experience is non-minimalistic in the sense defended by Jerrold 
Levinson; see Levinson 2015. 
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object, which makes it appear as if the activities were aimless. But if we look closer, the 
impression of aimlessness vanishes. Because of the dependence of the recipients’ 
activities, their goals are not determined on their own, but are set by the object. This 
causes the impression that the recipients – despite their own activity – follow an 
indeterminate movement. But this is not the sole impression they get. They will often 
also have the impression of posing questions to themselves and to the object, of 
understanding something, and of making an assessment of the artwork, etc. These 
different impressions have to be explained at once, and this is possible if we account for 
the impression of an indeterminate movement in terms of the dependence of the 
activities of the recipients. This allows us to say that the activities are determinate as 
well. 
Before saying something about how this explanation of aesthetic experience may 
help us to overcome some standard problems and presuppositions in the explanation of 
aesthetic experience, I will first return to the conundrum of aesthetic experience with 
which I started. It is now possible to solve this conundrum, because we have gained an 
explanation of aesthetic experience that combines two aspects. Put schematically: the 
aspect of dependence and the aspect of independence. By saying that recipients of an 
artwork experience the dependence of their activities on the constellation of the 
artwork, we explain the way in which the object is primary in aesthetic experiences. But 
this primacy can only take place if the recipients unfold their own activities. And these 
activities allow us to address the second aspect of aesthetic experience: the experience 
as being the reflection of a subject. The activities of the recipient are the basis upon 
which the very primacy of the object over those activities makes possible the self-
reflection of the subject in aesthetic experience. The subject is reflected in its activities. 
Thus, the conundrum is removed by an insight which I may articulate as follows: 
(No conundrum claim) The passivity of the subject in aesthetic experiences takes 
place only if the subject is active on her own part. Dealing with a challenging object 
reflects the subject in her activities. 
To sharpen the specificity of aesthetic experience, it is helpful to rely on the concept 
of experience which Hegel (Hegel 1977: 55) and Gadamer have developed. In his 
interpretation of Hegel, Gadamer has claimed that experiences always have a negative 
aspect (Gadamer 1990: 353f ). The paradigmatic case of an experience is thus an 
experience which someone makes – not an experience which someone has. If one 
makes an experience, convictions are revised or transformed. If convictions are negated, 
new convictions are formed. To make an experience, it is thus necessary to put one’s 
convictions at stake. Whoever encapsulates himself with his convictions is not able to 
make experiences. He is doomed to stay by the same old opinions. One has to be active 
and put one’s convictions at risk to make experiences. 
This holds for aesthetic experiences as well. Aesthetic experiences are bound up 
with activities that someone enacts. With the activities developed in dealing with a work 
of art, he puts some of his forms of practice at stake. This is just what the concept of 
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“dependence in independence” says. Through their activities, recipients follow the 
constellations of works of art and allow themselves to be guided by these constellations. 
The activities are thus challenged in an incalculable way. 
On the basis of these reflections, it is possible to deal with problems which are 
widespread in many explanations of aesthetic experience. These problems have a 
common structure, which is related to the conundrum of aesthetic experience, namely a 
structure which results out of a tendency to conceive of aesthetic experience as an 
indeterminate happening. This tendency is the reason that the explanations in question 
have problems in accounting for the determinate aspects of aesthetic experiences. By 
“determinate aspects”, I mean for instance that a colour is identified, that a musical 
theme is recognized, that the subject matter of the artwork is grasped, and so on. So, 
aesthetic experiences have to be understood as combining indeterminate and 
determinate aspects. And this is what lots of positions miss. I will shortly discuss three 
arguments: first the explanation of the specificity of aesthetic experiences in general, 
second the conception of aesthetic as implying self-loss, and third the conception of 
aesthetic experiences as contemplative experiences. 
(a) Many explanations of aesthetic experience presuppose that aesthetic 
experiences gain their specificity insofar as they are experiences of something specific. 
Lots of philosophies of aesthetic experience hold that we have to explain the specificity 
which comes into play with aesthetic experiences. They presuppose that aesthetic 
experiences are about something which is specific or refer to something which is 
specific. A good example is the position of Martin Seel, who argues that aesthetic 
experiences are experiences of appearings – not of appearances (Seel 2005). The basic 
idea of explanations of this kind is to specify aesthetic experiences by saying that these 
experiences are about or refer to something which is indeterminate. Roughly stated: 
Aesthetic experiences are experiences of the indeterminate. 
But such explanations are problematic, for they account neither for the 
determinateness and plurality of works of art, nor for the activities by which recipients 
deal with them. They make it look like aesthetic experiences just have the specificity of 
being indeterminate. But aesthetic experiences have determinate aspects and are bound 
up with different practices, media, materials, and so on. Thus, an account of aesthetic 
experience has to combine both the indeterminacy and the determinacy and plurality of 
art. I think that this is what my account provides. If we say that aesthetic experiences are 
experiences of a dependence in independence and hence intrinsically connected with 
interpretive activities, we explain the indeterminacy of aesthetic experiences in terms of 
dependence, and thus explain them in a way that allows us to combine this 
indeterminacy with the determinacy and plurality of interpretive activities. Aesthetic 
experience is understood as a dimension that is realized in very different activities. 
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(b) A common thought of some philosophies of art going back at least to 
Schopenhauer is that aesthetic experiences have to be conceived as experiences of self-
loss.8 To give an idea of this conception, one can say: In dealing with art, the structures 
of subjectivity are dispersed. But such an explanation is not capable of giving an 
adequate account of the way in which recipients of artworks put some of their practices 
and thereby themselves at stake. To put oneself at stake does not mean a loss of self – a 
loss of self would only be realized if what could be put at stake ceased to exist and hence 
could not be put at stake any more. If aesthetic experiences are explained as implying 
self-loss, it is not possible to explain why recipients have to be active in their dealings 
with works of art. What it means that recipients put themselves at stake by being active 
in their dealings with works of art has to be explained differently. They let themselves 
be altered in their activities – they risk being altered in their very subjectivity. 
(c) On the basis of the foregoing reflections, it is possible to assess another idea 
widespread in aesthetics, namely the idea that aesthetic experiences are contemplative 
experiences. As for many things, Kant has paved the way for our understanding of the 
idea in question. The free play of the faculties, that is, of the understanding and the 
imagination, is a contemplative play. We may highlight the contemplative character of 
it by saying that an object is conceptually traversed in an indefinite way. Through this 
traversal, no fixed, determinate concept is formulated. It is possible to free Kant’s 
explanation from the idealistic approach which Kant holds and understand the free play 
in terms of practices. Someone who makes aesthetic experiences moves over an 
indeterminate amount of details of an object. As Martin Seel has it: Someone who 
makes aesthetic experiences perceives the object “in the momentary plentitude of its 
appearances” (Seel 2005: 46). One goes through an indeterminate amount of aspects of 
the object, in a movement which is not directed towards a goal but which, to say it with 
Kant, “strengthens and reproduces itself” (Kant 1999: §12 ). 
An explanation on these lines is always confronted with the general problem which I 
have highlighted, namely to make intelligible how aesthetic experiences can be 
conceived as determinate. If aesthetic experiences are grasped as being contemplative, 
it is problematic to account for their determinate aspects. How can aesthetic 
experiences be determinate if they are fundamentally indeterminate? Someone who 
begins his analysis with the concept of contemplation only has the possibility to 
retrospectively add some aspects to a concept of aesthetic experience which is itself not 
capable of accounting for them. 
But we have learned how to avoid an explanation like this: Aesthetic experiences are 
bound up with determinate aspects. According to the explanations developed thus far, 
we can account for the intuition which leads to the concept of contemplation. 
Experiences are aesthetic if we make an experience of dependence in independence. 
                                                           
8 See, for instance, Schopenhauer 1989: vol. 1, § 68. 
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Because they are essentially based on activities and because these activities are always 
determinate, aesthetic experiences are determinate as well. Their specificity is based on 
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FILIPPO FOCOSI  
BEING TIED TO WHAT, AND WHY? 
On the objective side 







Among recent attempts to define aesthetic experience, the one advanced by Georg 
Bertram in his paper entitled Aesthetic Experience as an Aspect of Intepretive Practices (in 
this issue of CoSMo) seems to me very promising. I am sympathetic to it; I think it 
captures something essential about our aesthetic ‘commerce’ with the world, especially 
the art-world. In the present paper, firstly (1) I’ll clarify the conception of aesthetic 
experience defended by Bertram, by pointing out its main statements and arguments. 
Then (2), I’ll show how the insights it offers are consonant with other philosophers’ 
thought about the same topic, as well as corroborated by our first-hand experience of 
artworks. Finally (3), I’ll get to the bottom of the formal/objective side of AE, whose 
importance, albeit recognized by Bertram, is someway obscured by other thinkers 
insofar as they focus on the subjective/phenomenological side, which can allow a vast 
range of AEs, broader – that’s what I’m going to argue – than what a relational account 
of AE, if rigorously interpreted, allows. 
 
1. The relational account of aesthetic experience 
 
I think appropriate to call Bertram’s account of aesthetic experience (hereafter, AE) 
‘relational’, for he basically states that an experience is aesthetic if it is the experience of 
a distinctive kind of relation between an object and a subject. The relation is described 
by Bertram with contradictory terms such as “dependence” and “independence”, which 
signal “antagonistic aspects” internal to AE. This antagonism has – Bertram 
acknowledges – Kantian roots, since the experience of a free play of imagination and 
intellect, while being caused by the finality internal to an aesthetic object, allows the 
subject who perceives it to become aware of the possibility of knowledge. Bertram 
translates this Kantian “conundrum” in more abstract terms: “how can an experience 
fundamentally rooted in an object have the effect that a subject is confronted with the 
self?” But all the apparent puzzlement vanishes as long as he points out the peculiar 
features of the object, as well as of the subject, which enter in the aesthetic relation, and 
shows how they are complementary. 
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The object has to be – in order to prompt a specific reaction on the part of the 
recipient, which marks his ‘entrance’ in the aesthetic relation – a sort of organic whole, 
in which: a) every unit or part stands in relation with the others; b) there are different 
kinds (similarity, contrast, repetition, and so on) and levels (thick or thin, for instance) 
of interrelations, according to the specific weight that each part or unit owns; c) the 
meaning of the whole is the product of this array of internal relations, as the meaning of 
each part cannot be assessed independently of the relations in which it stands to other 
parts; d) the basic elements (words, colors, sounds, etc.) get transformed by their 
occurring and being combined in new guises, while the dynamic which unfolds between 
the various elements causes the work to have its own, unique meaning. These features 
are to be found eminently in artworks, and such a description seems to favor a 
formalistic definition of them. The aspects of an artwork can be “determinate” (media, 
materials, basic units such as theme, subjects, etc.) and “indeterminate” (their number, 
meaning, sense/role). 
The subject/recipient has to be: a) receptive, in order to perceive and understand 
the elements of the artwork; b) “active” – in his passivity – “in order to be guided” by 
the object’s constellation/configuration of parts and meanings; c) mind-opened, in 
order to be ready to change his activity, or approaches, in front of original and 
challenging artworks; d) productive and creative, in order to bring his own approaches, 
web of comparisons, personal taste, in dealing with artworks. 
The relation is one of: a) domination of the object on the subject, and so of 
dependence of the latter with respect to the former, insofar as the constellation of the 
artwork, its determinate aspects, its internal dynamic, its self-referentially established 
relations prompt and guide the interpretative activity of the recipient; b) 
reconfiguration/re-activation of the object (artwork) by the subject/recipient, and so 
of independence of the latter with respect to the former, insofar as he reveals the 
meaning of the elements by means of (bodily, perceptive, cognitive, affective, 
imaginative) interpretation, unveils their inner sense, their role as intended by the 
author and in function of the expressive (or representative, symbolic, purely 
formalistic) aim underlying the artwork, so that the artwork itself gets reenacted. The 
relation, then, is twofold: and its two sides complete with one another. That’s why it 
makes sense, from a relational point of view, to say that AE is an experience of a 
“dependence in independence”.  
 
2. The why-question of art 
 
What is, in my opinion, most noteworthy, is the emphasis that Bertram puts on the 
‘positive’ side of passivity, which has to be understood as: a) the willingness to be guided 
by the dynamic structure of the artwork – this is the mimetic behavior that Bertram 
invokes (quoting Adorno), i.e., a sort of adaptation that the subject undergoes –, to put 
ourselves in the hands of the work (so to speak), which has to be approached in a 
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intensely focused, if not detached, way; b) to actively discover the internal relations, to 
retrace the formal and semantic configuration of the work. It is not the activity of 
determining something; instead, it is the activity of following the specific paths drawn by 
the artist. This is a conception which resonates with the aesthetic thought of a lot of 
philosophers. It reminds me, in the first place, of Monroe Beardsley, who defines 
aesthetic experience as a pleasurable experience of coherence and completeness – and 
consequently, a coherent, unified, and complete experience – which is possible when 
the mental activity of the perceiver “is tied to the form and qualities of a sensuously 
presented or imaginatively intended object on which his primary attention is 
concentrated” (Beardsley 1982: 81; my italics). Later Beardsley speaks of “object 
directedness”, i.e., “a willing accepted guidance over the succession of one’s mental 
states by phenomenally objective properties (qualities and relation) of a perceptual or 
intentional field on which attention is fixed with a feeling that things are working 
themselves out fittingly” (Beardsley 1982: 288). It reminds me also of John Dewey 
(1934), when he says that undergoing “an experience” is a dynamic process where 
doing and undoing rhythmically (i.e., organically) interchange and follow one another; 
and when he speaks of aesthetic experience as inclusive of human desires, impulses and 
thoughts, which play a role in selecting the material suitable to the subject of the 
expressive act which gives rise to artistic creation as well as to appreciative 
interpretation of an artwork.  
There are parallels even with Luigi Pareyson’s conception of interpretation as 
overlapping with execution/performance, insofar as the fidelity of the interpreter with 
respect to the will of the artwork − the reader/spectator/listener, he says, has to take 
the point of view implied by the artwork to evaluate if the choices made by the artists 
are right, that is, if he really made “what the artwork wanted from him to be made” (cfr. 
Pareyson 1988: 252) − requires the interpreter to reveal himself (his personality) in the 
interpretation he offers. As for Bertram’s contemporaries, it is remarkable how a 
philosopher such as Alan Goldman (2013), while offering a phenomenological account 
of AE – which he conceives as “an intense and meaningful experience” involving the 
fully active engagement, and the simultaneous and harmonious interaction, of all our 
mental capacities (“sensuous perception, informed by cognition, enlarged by 
imagination, and prompting emotional responses”; Goldman 233) –, nonetheless 
acknowledges its special kind of passivity, since one cannot successfully be so engaged if 
the work does not sustain such a response, i.e., if the artwork doesn’t exhibit a “perfect 
union of form and content” (Goldman 329).  
Bertram’s account of AE also fits well with our ordinary practice with artworks. 
Limiting ourselves to the musical field, it is widely acknowledged that listening to a 
musical composition, most notably if it belongs to Western classical tradition, involves 
complex perceptive grasping of the dynamic that informs its development − think of 
counterpoint, melodic variations, harmonic modulations, rhythmic stratifications, and 
so on − and emotional receptivity (especially with tonal music) to identify the musical 
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personae (cfr. Levinson 1996: 90-125) that emerge and act through the musical events 
that traverse the score. Even with ‘trance music’, such as early minimalist compositions, 
“we half close our eyes … The mind is listening” (as it is sung in Steve Reich’s Desert 
music). Another musical example comes to my mind: some years ago I was struck by a 
Radio 3 commentator who, in the course of a program devoted to the history of the 
classical form of the trio (piano, violin, cello), described the act of listening as a very 
complex and creative activity, during which the listener has to internally reproduce the 
process unfolding through the succession and interweaving of musical phrases and try 
to capture its overarching architecture. (Incidentally the commentator, Paolo Terni, 
proposed Brahms’ Second Piano Trio as the best achievement in the genre).  
Be “guided by the constellation” of the artwork is akin to reconstruct, by means of 
our perceptive, affective and mental activity, the work itself. This entails also choosing a 
specific point of view, or “bringing up conflicting points”, or bringing forth the 
perceiver own impulses. Bertram calls this practice “interpretive”, suggesting that 
interpretation must be conceived not only as a purely linguistic/cognitive one, but 
rather as a practice that also involves bodily reactions, perceptive grasping, and 
emotional responsiveness. I would further suggest that emotional interpretation, 
together with what could be called imaginative interpretation, is the most ‘independent’ 
part of the interpretive practice, consisting in the continuous effort that the recipient 
makes to answer to the ‘why-question’ that artworks pose to him. Why that element 
and not another? Why in that place, or at that moment, and not in/at another? What is 
the inner sense of the choices made by the artist, of the configuration he has worked 
out, of the development of the materials he has shaped? It is at this stage that 
considerations about the expressive purposes come into play. A similar principle, as 
stated by Peter Lamarque, operates in our appreciative grasp of the significance of a 
narrative (not its meaning, but how it works and conveys meaning): “for any element (a 
phrase, a sentence, a passage, as well as an incident, a character, or a description of a 
place) it is always legitimate to ask what function that element is performing” 
(Lamarque 2007: 38). I don’t want to say that the why-question arises necessarily at a 
conscious level – indeed, it mostly arises at a subconscious level –, nor do I want to say 
that we must always be able to give an answer. The most important thing is that we feel, 
or sense, that there is an answer, and that it would be worth the effort to try to search for 
it, even if it will not take place during the course of our aesthetic experience or after its 
consummation. I think that some contemporary artworks are defective in giving the 
impression that no answer could be possible, because of their excessive complexity or 
coldness – think of Ligeti’s String Quartet n. 1 –, or in giving the impression that our 
search for the answer would come to a trivial end, because of their low degree of 
elaboration and inspiration – think of Andy Warhol’s film Sleeping. 
So conceived, i.e., as a stratified interpretative activity, it’s easy to understand why, 
in the course of AE, recipient’s passivity (his being dominated by the artwork) can 
bring the subject to self-reflection – to the enlivenment of understanding and 
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imagination attained in their free play, to speak in Kantian terms – and self-integration 
(the recipients, Bertram says, are “altered in their very subjectivity”): another feature 
that Beardsley (1982: 289) indicated as constitutive of aesthetic experience, whose 
ultimate effect is that of “a sense of integration as a person, of being restored to 
wholeness from distracting and disruptive influences […] and a corresponding 
contentment, even through disturbing feelings, that involves self-acceptance and self-
expansion”. 
 
3. The formal and expressive grounds of aesthetic experience 
 
The interpretative activity of the subject – while it employs, most notably, affective 
and imaginative capacities which can give both rise to associations with personal events 
and thoughts, which so enter into the building of an AE – is not, Bertram rightly 
underlines, aimless, i.e., free of constraints: its goals are established by the object upon 
which his attention is directed. This means, as I read it, that the tighter are the ‘paths’ 
designed by the artist, the more rewarding is the appreciative ‘walk’ that the subject 
undertakes towards the world of the artwork. We cannot have aesthetic experience of 
everything; at least, not of the same kind, i.e., at the same level of intensity and 
pleasantness. Aesthetic experience is an experience of such and such phenomenal 
characteristics; that would be wonderful, if they suffice to define it. But given the 
current tendency to find AE happening in the most disparate fields, it appears to me as a 
contingent necessity, if not as a general principle, to specify what, an AE, is an 
experience of. This would render clearer even its subjective definienda, in being 
presented also as the subjective correlative of some – specific and irreplaceable – 
objective features. The latter, as Bertram and others firmly state, amount to aesthetic 
form; but can include expressive qualities as well, as they grow out (at least, that’s what 
I’m going to argue) of a distinctive, irreplaceable and successful (with respect to the 
expressive intention of the artist) shaping of a (initially) rough expressive material.  
As regards global aesthetic form, I think it’s useful to distinguish aesthetic form per 
se from what I’d call (following Levinson 2006: 201-2) expressive form. We can 
identify the former with the organic interconnectedness of parts/elements of an 
artwork, including its semantic or expressive components, albeit considered only as 
means towards the reinforcement of pure formal unity itself. Think, for instance, of how 
the introduction of more characters in a novel, of secondary themes in a sonata, or of a 
background landscape in a portrait, represent additional sources for the artist to achieve 
a higher order of coherence in the plot, composition, or design, independent of the 
affective, evocative or symbolic import that such characters, themes or sceneries can 
bring to the work. By expressive form I mean the organic interconnectedness of the 
semantic and expressive properties of an artwork as considered also for what they are, 
i.e., as embodying a distinctive (representational, symbolic or emotional) content. 
Think, for instance, of how the atmosphere evoked by a landscape provides a dreamy 
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background to the intense expression of the figure portrayed, of how the contrasting 
emotions aroused by the principal melodies of the first movement of a sonata develop 
separately to reach an harmonic integration in the final section (the recapitulation), or 
of how our diverse reactions towards the characters and events that we encounter in the 
course of our reading a novel or watching a film “follow naturally one upon another”, 
giving a sense of “psychological inevitability” (as Beardsley [1982: 295] remarked, e.g., 
our emotional experience of a good performance of Shakespeare’s Hamlet). Aesthetic 
and expressive form, so conceived, are what prompt and justify – representing the 
objective/formal grounds of its occurrence – that sophisticated intertwining of 
sensations, percepts, affects, and thoughts to which AE, from a subjective point of view, 
amounts. 
But some rightly assume that an artwork can sometimes induce an AE in virtue of its 
expressive properties, even when they are not, at the overall level, highly unified, and so 
attach only to partial sections of the work. Noёl Carroll (2012: 174), for instance, 
maintains that AE involves focus on how an artwork achieves its purposes, and this can 
be done either “formally” or “qualitatively”, the latter meaning by means of the 
embodiment of remarkable expressive qualities. But then another puzzlement arises: 
how can expressive properties alone (such as being strident, serene, melancholy, 
solemn, and so on) be an objective ground of AE, if their status fluctuates according to 
the affective responses they call for? My answer is that it is only through an emergent, 
organic and coherent combination of, e.g., verbal, visual and acoustic means, that an 
artist can successfully express his view or emotion in the work, and provide it with a 
wide array of human qualities (as Beardsley [1982: 106-110] calls them). The subtle 
melancholy of a melody, the serenity of a landscape, or the ambiguous charm of a 
character, depend on an adequate articulation and synthesis of sounds, colors, words. 
And this formal background from which expressive properties develop their distinctive 
profile is what ensures a certain level of objectivity – insofar as an aesthetic discourse 
admits of objectivity – to the experience they make possible and aesthetically enrich. 
To take place, aesthetic experience requires the recipient’s active responsiveness to 
the object configuration. But it demands also that the work on which our attention is 
directed is capable of eliciting and supporting our interest. Only formally well-
constructed, and semantically rich, artworks, can do this job; and it seems to me that, 
surprisingly enough, we don’t need to search for new artforms to be so involved with 
artworks. Interpretive following of a Filippo De Pisis’ still life painting – discovering the 
significance of each single brushstroke, savoring its delicate chromatic palette, and 
enjoying its melancholy feeling – can be more interactive than participating at a 
performance such as the celebrated Marina Abramović’s The artist is present, which far 
from being as it was presented, that is, as a quintessential interactive experience, at best 
resolves into self-suggestion, due to its lack of interpenetration of the elements 
(including ourselves) involved in the performance. While sitting in front of Ms. 
Abramović, our percepts, affects and thoughts are not tied to her gaze – after all, it’s not 
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a psychoanalysis session –; there’s no plausible answer to the question ‘why did she 
choose that disposition for the spectators, or that length of each exchange of glances’ 
(the means are relatively irrelevant for the end to be reached; the ‘how it works’ of the 
work is not interesting). The artistry is absent, and the spectator is free to look over and 
maybe search for a De Pisis’ exhibition. That’s what we should do, if we care for 
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1. Esperienza estetica e atteggiamento estetico. 
 
Che cosa è l’esperienza estetica? L’approccio tradizionale alla questione vede 
l’esperienza estetica come strettamente legata ad una condizione mentale o stato 
mentale antecedente che può essere definito atteggiamento estetico. Spesso si ritiene che 
l’atteggiamento estetico preceda l’esperienza estetica; perciò quest’ultima è ciò che si dà 
se, nelle circostanze appropriate, viene adottato il primo. L’atteggiamento estetico può 
essere caratterizzato nei termini dell’ignorare o sopprimere certi altri atteggiamenti 
mentali o stati mentali, come ad esempio quelli di tipo pratico, ansioso o desiderativo, 
in quanto questi atteggiamenti precluderebbero, o quanto meno renderebbero 
complicato, il mantenimento dell’atteggiamento estetico.1 In alternativa 
l’atteggiamento estetico potrebbe forse essere caratterizzato come una condizione di 
apertura, ricettività e generosità verso la forma e le qualità percettive di un oggetto, 
nella quale la propria percezione di esse non è controllata o dominata da uno scopo 
ulteriore.2 
Sono consapevole della celebre critica nei confronti dell’atteggiamento estetico 
sollevata da George Dickie e difesa da alcuni dei suoi sostenitori, secondo la quale 
l’atteggiamento estetico sarebbe semplicemente una questione di attenzione verso, 
piuttosto che distrazione da, le proprietà di un oggetto (cfr. Dickie 1964). Ma io 
considero questa critica non conclusiva, addirittura fallace. Questo perché l’attenzione, 
in qualunque grado, non è tutto ciò che è richiesto al fine di considerare qualcosa, o 
avvicinarsi a qualcosa, esteticamente. Vi è anche, ragionevolmente, il modo in cui 
l’attenzione viene diretta, che a sua volta è in parte funzione di ciò che motiva tale 
attenzione, così come la propria disposizione ad essere influenzati da ciò che questa 
                                                           
1 Si veda Iseminger 2003: 106, per una proposta di questo tipo. 
2 Questo genere di proposta, nello spirito di Stolnitz 1960, è offerta in Kemp 1999, che comunque alla 
fine non la difende. 
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attenzione dischiude. Potrebbero esserci inoltre differenze nella qualità dell’attenzione 
stessa. Ad esempio quella tipica del coinvolgimento estetico con un oggetto potrebbe 
essere caratterizzata come assorta e catturata, mentre quella tipica del coinvolgimento 
non estetico come vigile e cauta. 
Senza soffermarsi ulteriormente sulle risposte che si potrebbero avanzare 
all’argomento riduttivo di Dickie, secondo la mia visione la nozione di atteggiamento 
estetico è lungi dall’essere vuota e potrebbe ancora giocare un ruolo nel caratterizzare 
l’esperienza estetica come quel tipo di esperienza di un oggetto che almeno tipicamente 
risulta dall’adozione di quel tipo di atteggiamento verso l’oggetto, o verso l’interazione 
che si ha con esso. 
Presentiamo qui un esempio di un atteggiamento o stato mentale che condiziona 
l’esperienza in maniera marcata, dando a questa esperienza un carattere che non 
avrebbe avuto altrimenti. Immaginate di accettare con gioia di dover guidare da un 
luogo a un altro, dopo aver pianificato originariamente di prendere il treno ma essendo 
stati bloccati da uno sciopero; all’opposto, immaginate di dover accettare di guidare a 
malincuore, ancora fremendo per l’irritazione. 
L’esperienza della stimolazione fisica del guidare, delle visioni e degli odori del 
viaggio, della striscia di autostrada che si distende sotto le ruote, probabilmente 
risulterà fortemente differente dall’altra e questo perché l’atteggiamento di accettazione 
gioiosa normalmente genera risultati esperienziali diversi rispetto all’accettazione 
riluttante. 
O pensate all’attesa di un autobus aspettando di rivedere la propria amata dopo 
molto tempo, rispetto all’attesa di un autobus che porterà, come tutti i giorni, a un 
lavoro che annebbia la mente e distrugge l’anima. Queste esperienze di attesa non 
potrebbero essere più diverse, e queste differenze sono largamente una funzione dei 
differenti atteggiamenti messi in campo dal soggetto nel periodo di attesa impostogli 
allo stesso modo in entrambi i casi. 
Si potrebbe essere tentati di ribattere, con vena dickiana, che nei casi appena 
illustrati l’esperienza in effetti differisce, ma soltanto perché ciò a cui si presta attenzione 
è diverso. Quindi, ad esempio, si potrebbe sostenere che è precisamente per il fatto che 
l’attenzione è rivolta alla striscia di autostrada di fronte ai propri occhi, e non al pensiero 
del tempo perso, che l’esperienza ha un carattere piacevole e non di sofferenza. Ma 
questo, si potrebbe affermare, pone le cose al rovescio. Non è infatti solamente 
focalizzandosi sull’autostrada che si dipana che si accede a un’esperienza più felice; è 
invece attraverso un atteggiamento positivo precedente verso le circostanze che si è 
portati a focalizzarsi sul dipanarsi come tale e a considerarlo una fonte di diletto. 
Sembra quindi ottuso pensare che il tipo di esperienza che generalmente si ha 
quando ci si avvicina ad un oggetto, che si tratti di un’opera d’arte o di una porzione di 
natura, in ciò che uno potrebbe chiamare uno stato mentale di tipo estetico, non sia 
effettivamente diversa dal tipo di esperienza che generalmente si ha quando ci si 
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avvicina a un oggetto in uno stato mentale di tipo acquisitivo, o apprensivo, o analitico, 
o pedante, o alla ricerca di informazioni. 
Una caratteristica che viene tradizionalmente ritenuta centrale rispetto 
all’atteggiamento estetico è quella del disinteresse, a volte interpretato come distacco o 
distanziamento. Risulta chiaro che questo dovrebbe essere compreso nei termini di un 
distaccamento o distanziamento temporaneo dalle preoccupazioni o emozioni 
strettamente personali, evitando di rivolgervi l’attenzione o di agire su di esse, in modo 
da permettere la piena attenzione verso l’oggetto di cui si fa esperienza, piuttosto che un 
distaccamento o distanziamento dalle proprie preoccupazioni e dalla propria capacità 
di rispondere emotivamente in generale. Noёl Carroll nota in uno dei suoi articoli 
recenti su questo argomento che il disinteresse “non sembra riferirsi ad alcuna 
dimensione qualitativa dell’esperienza”, ma sembra invece essere “una caratteristica dei 
giudizi estetici piuttosto che dell’esperienza estetica.” (Carroll 2002: 149) Ora, 
potrebbe essere vero che il disinteresse non sia una caratteristica delle esperienze 
estetiche, ma da questo non consegue che possa solamente essere una caratteristica 
apprezzabile dei giudizi estetici. Questo infatti trascura il fatto che il disinteresse è 
naturalmente inteso come una caratteristica dell’atteggiamento o dello stato mentale con 
il quale ci si accosta a un oggetto al fine di averne esperienza, che può influire in modo 
regolare e prevedibile sul carattere di quella esperienza. Una volta che si accetta che 
l’atteggiamento estetico non è tanto un’attività mentale quanto la disposizione al 
coinvolgimento in particolari attività di questo tipo – ad esempio, prestare attenzione a 
certi aspetti di un oggetto piuttosto che altri, percepire quegli aspetti in un certo modo 
o con certi fini in mente piuttosto che altri, rispondere a quegli aspetti nella maniera più 
aperta, invece che più cauta possibile, e così via – si sarà meno tentati di concepirla 
come un mito o un’illusione. L’atteggiamento estetico consiste nell’essere disposti a 
prestare attenzione, percepire, rispondere o fare esperienza in un certo modo; non è per 
se stesso, come tale, una modalità di prestare attenzione o percepire o rispondere o 
esperire. 
Quindi, dal fatto che abbia luogo un certo tipo di attenzione, percezione, risposta o 
esperienza, non è possibile, invero, inferire che questo tipo di attività è stata preceduta o 
preparata dall’adozione dell’atteggiamento estetico, ma non è nemmeno possibile 
concludere che, visto che questo atteggiamento non va identificato con alcuna attività 
particolare, allora non è nulla. Ne concludo che la prospettiva di caratterizzare 
l’esperienza estetica come quel tipo di esperienza percettivo-immaginativa che 
tipicamente risulta dall’adozione di un atteggiamento estetico può difficilmente essere 
considerata vacua. Tuttavia nel resto di questo articolo non mi baserò su questa 
modalità di caratterizzare l’esperienza estetica – ovvero, in relazione ad un 
atteggiamento estetico identificabile – ma ricercherò una caratterizzazione di tipo più 
diretto, che emergerà gradualmente dall’esame di una concezione antagonista di questa 
esperienza, di tipo minimalista. 
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2. Svantaggi di una concezione minimalista dell’esperienza 
estetica. 
 
Dunque che cos’è una concezione minimalista dell’esperienza estetica? Si tratta, 
concisamente, di una concezione secondo la quale l’esperienza estetica è 
semplicemente un’esperienza nella quale vi è percezione o cognizione di proprietà 
estetiche e/o formali di un qualche oggetto. Una concezione di questo tipo, 
notoriamente difesa da Noёl Carroll, possiede il vantaggio della relativa chiarezza, così 
come di rendere relativamente semplice verificare, alla luce di essa, se un soggetto sta 
avendo un’esperienza estetica oppure no. Si tratta semplicemente di determinare se il 
soggetto è consapevole o sta prestando attenzione ad alcune proprietà formali o 
estetiche dell’oggetto. 
 Vi sono, comunque, notevoli vantaggi nell’adottare una concezione non-
minimalista dell’esperienza estetica, che una concezione minimalista non può vantare. 
Il vantaggio principale è quello di preservare l’intuizione che l’esperienza estetica è 
normalmente un’esperienza gratificante, di valore, o pregevole. Ad esempio, nei casi in 
cui le opere d’arte sono mediocri, o certi paesaggi ordinari, non è sicuro che nel 
momento in cui registriamo alcune delle loro proprietà estetiche e/o formali stiamo 
avendo un’esperienza estetica di essi anche se, in qualche modo, li stiamo esperendo. 
Questo significa che la mediocrità o ordinarietà di essi potrebbe essere sufficiente a 
precludere la modalità estetica dell’esperienza, intesa come una modalità che si 
accompagna normalmente ad assorbimento e soddisfazione, in una certa misura. Ma 
anche quando le opere d’arte sono eccezionali e i paesaggi impressionanti, non è 
plausibile sostenere che abbiamo di essi un’esperienza estetica ogni qual volta 
registriamo di essi, adeguatamente, una qualunque delle proprietà formali o estetiche. 
L’esperienza estetica non è così comune!  
Voglio insistere sull’utilità della nozione di esperienza estetica che, almeno come 
standard, è quella di un’esperienza intrinsecamente pregevole. Vorrei sottolineare 
immediatamente che questo non significa che l’esperienza estetica così concepita sia 
sempre semplicemente piacevole o divertente, ma solamente che è ritenuta in qualche 
modo gratificante o di valore.3  
Una nozione minimalista dell’esperienza estetica, secondo cui un’esperienza di 
questo tipo non coinvolgerebbe né un affetto caratteristico, né un piacere, né una 
soddisfazione, né una esaltazione, né un assorbimento, né un apprezzamento peculiari, 
è una nozione cui non si può fare appello al fine di comprendere l’idea resistente 
secondo la quale le opere d’arte sarebbero artefatti espressamente intesi o progettati per 
procurare un’esperienza estetica. Anche se, alla luce dell’evoluzione dell’arte nel secolo 
scorso, si negasse che una concezione dell’artisticità su basi estetiche è infine 
                                                           
3 Per una discussione sull’argomento, cfr. “Pleasure and the Value of Works of Art”, in Levinson 1996. 
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sostenibile, è chiaro che una simile concezione è perfettamente comprensibile, è dotata 
di un certo fondamento e continua ad attrarre sostenitori. Ma sicuramente la nozione 
secondo cui le opere d’arte sarebbero artefatti concepiti al fine di consentire 
semplicemente la percezione o registrazione di forme e/o proprietà estetiche complesse 
garantirebbe una scarsa presa a livello intuitivo e non permetterebbe con alcuna 
plausibilità di motivare una definizione di arte in termini di esperienza estetica. E 
questo perché, prima di tutto, noi ci rivolgiamo alle opere d’arte per qualcosa di più di 
semplici occasioni di percepire forme e proprietà estetiche complesse e, in secondo 
luogo, sia il mondo naturale, sia il mondo creato dall’uomo al di fuori dell’arte sono 
certamente dotati più che a sufficienza di forme complesse e proprietà estetiche da 
soddisfare qualunque bisogno che si potrebbe supporre di avere di mera registrazione 
di forme o proprietà di questo tipo. 
Si potrebbe, nonostante tutto, accettare facilmente che l’esperienza estetica 
coinvolga necessariamente una qualche forma di reazione valutativa o affettiva a un 
oggetto e allo stesso tempo negare che una simile reazione sia necessariamente positiva. 
Non sarei totalmente in disaccordo; ed è per questo che sostengo che il carattere 
positivo dell’esperienza estetica sia compreso al meglio come una caratteristica 
standard, piuttosto che strettamente definitoria, di tale esperienza. Sembra che 
esperienze di ciò che è disordinato, brutto e disgustoso siano naturalmente concepite 
come tipi di esperienza estetica, seppur non desiderabili. Risulta chiaro comunque che 
in contesti ordinari, quando si riporta di aver avuto un’esperienza estetica si 
presuppone, a meno che non sia indicato altrimenti, che l’esperienza subita sia stata di 
natura positiva, che non sia stata un’esperienza di cui pentirsi, né facile da dimenticare. 
Che un’esperienza estetica sia normalmente concepita come avente carattere positivo – 
che l’esperienza estetica positiva sia lo standard per l’esperienza estetica – è un fatto 
grammaticale, per così dire, e non una mera questione di frequenza statistica. 
 
3. La posizione di Carroll in breve a favore di una concezione 
minimalista dell’esperienza estetica. 
 
In anni recenti il principale, e decisamente tenace, sostenitore di quella che sto 
chiamando una concezione minimalista dell’esperienza estetica è stato Noёl Carroll. 
Carroll, che definisce la sua posizione come un approccio all’esperienza estetica 
orientato al contenuto, sostiene che l’esperienza estetica può essere definita sulla base dei 
fenomeni verso i quali è diretta, ovvero le proprietà estetiche e formali e le interrelazioni 
tra di esse (Cfr. Carroll 2005: 89). Si potrebbe pensare che io, che una volta proposi 
un’analisi del piacere estetico in termini simili,4 sia in linea con un simile approccio, ma 
                                                           
4 Cfr. Levinson 1992. In Levinson 2008, una revisione di Levinson 1992, propongo ciò che segue: “Il 
piacere ricavato da un oggetto è di tipo estetico quando deriva da una apprensione di, ed una riflessione 
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non è così. L’attenzione estetica infatti è una cosa, mentre l’esperienza estetica è un’altra 
cosa, e più ampia. Il fatto che l’attenzione sia rivolta verso certi aspetti di un oggetto, 
ovvero aspetti di tipo formale e/o estetico e verso le relazioni tra di essi, può forse 
essere sufficiente per giustificare la categorizzazione di una tale attenzione come 
estetica. Ma io sostengo che non sia sufficiente che l’attenzione estetica abbia luogo per 
giustificare la categorizzazione dell’esperienza di cui è parte come esperienza estetica. 
Carroll afferma che, rispetto ad approcci all’esperienza estetica orientati al valore o 
all’affetto, che non offrono alcun tipo di guida rispetto all’apprezzamento, un vantaggio 
dell’approccio orientato al contenuto è che “può iniziare a istruire gli aspiranti esteti su 
che cosa dovrebbero fare al fine di avere un’esperienza estetica, ovvero: prestate 
attenzione alla forma, alle proprietà estetiche, e così via, delle opere d’arte” (Carroll 
2005: 91). Ma il difensore di un’interpretazione dell’esperienza estetica orientata al 
valore o all’affetto è probabile che obietti: e per quale motivo gli aspiranti esteti 
dovrebbero voler avere esperienze estetiche, se esse non comportano alcun valore 
positivo o affetto desiderabile? Carroll osserva che notare lo schema rimico di una 
poesia o un’altra sua caratteristica strutturale non conduce automaticamente “lettori 
appropriatamente informati a considerarla meritevole, o intrinsecamente o 
strumentalmente” (Carroll 2002: 163). Ma perché dunque chiamare un tale notare 
esperienza estetica? Che cosa si ottiene degradando in questo modo l’espressione 
esperienza estetica? Non sarebbe più onesto chiamare questo notare semplicemente 
un’esperienza percettiva, o anche più semplicemente una percezione, nella quale qualche 
proprietà, formale o estetica, viene appresa? 
Il mero prestare attenzione alla ripetizione formale in un quadro è un’esperienza 
estetica, afferma Carroll, anche se nessun tipo di piacere, o affetto, o soddisfazione sono 
coinvolti. “Che cosa altro sarebbe?”, si chiede retoricamente (Carroll 2002: 149). Ma 
questa domanda retorica, che Carroll impiega molte volte, è decisamente una petizione 
di principio. Come ha osservato Robert Stecker (Stecker 2005: 49), notare “la 
ripetizione suggestiva di forme rettilinee in un dipinto cubista” (Carroll 2002: 149) 
                                                                                                                                                                          
su, il carattere individuale dell’oggetto e il suo contenuto, entrambi per se stessi e, almeno in casi 
importanti, in relazione alla base strutturale sulla quale tale carattere e contenuto poggiano. Vale a dire 
che apprezzare qualcosa esteticamente significa, tipicamente, prestare attenzione non soltanto alle 
forme, qualità e significati per se stessi, ma anche al modo in cui tutte queste cose emergono dal 
particolare insieme di caratteristiche percettive di basso livello che costituiscono l’oggetto su un piano 
non-estetico. Noi apprendiamo il carattere e il contenuto degli elementi come ancorato nella ed 
emergente dalla struttura specifica che lo costituisce a un livello primariamente osservativo. Contenuto 
e carattere sono sopravvenienti rispetto a tale struttura e l’apprezzamento di essi, se propriamente 
estetico, coinvolge la consapevolezza di questa dipendenza. Apprezzare le proprietà di un oggetto 
esteticamente significa esperirle, in maniera minimale, come proprietà dell’oggetto individuale in 
questione, ma anche tipicamente come legate e inseparabili dalla sua configurazione percettiva.” Per 
una spiegazione più prudente, simile a questa, che pone meno enfasi sull’elemento riflessivo ascritto 
all’apprezzamento estetico, in ciò che è esposto precedentemente, cfr. Budd 2008. 
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oppure “lo schema rimico unificante A/B/A/B” (Carroll 2002: 163) di una poesia 
semplicemente non può essere sufficiente a costituire esperienze estetiche di quelle 
opere, sulla base di qualunque interpretazione ragionevole dell’esperienza estetica. 
Stecker etichetta appropriatamente questi atti di prestare attenzione o osservare come 
“cognizioni delle opere d’arte su base percettiva”, che possono sottostare oppure 
contribuire all’apprezzamento o valutazione positiva di queste opere, ma che non sono 
in se stessi apprezzamenti o valutazioni, e dunque ragionevolmente non sono esperienze 
estetiche di queste opere. 
Ed ecco un’altra versione dell’argomento di Carroll (Carroll 2005: 172):  
 
Sicuramente l’esperienza della comprensione o del cercare di comprendere la forma di un’opera 
d’arte è un’esperienza estetica. Che cosa altro sarebbe? 
 
Ma che l’attenzione alla forma sia una caratteristica dell’esperienza estetica, forse 
addirittura necessaria per l’esperienza estetica, non mostra che essa sia sufficiente per 
l’esperienza estetica. Infatti, se questa forma è irriducibilmente caotica, e quindi 
inafferrabile, o se a tale forma, sebbene afferrabile, non si presta attenzione nella giusta 
maniera o con lo spirito giusto, è plausibile suggerire che, anche se c’è un’esperienza di 
qualche tipo, essa non costituisce un’esperienza estetica. In un modo simile Carroll 
nota che si potrebbe prestare attenzione alle caratteristiche del corpo di Katherine 
Hepburn, del suo volto, del suo eloquio e dei suoi gesti, e determinare quanto queste 
caratteristiche siano adatte al nervosismo che i suoi personaggi cinematografici 
dovrebbero comunicare, “e nonostante questo si potrebbe non trarre alcun piacere, né 
patire alcun altro affetto, mentre lo si fa. Su quali basi verrebbe negato che questa è 
un’esperienza estetica? E se non si tratta di un’esperienza estetica, che tipo di esperienza 
è?” (Carroll 2002: 72.). Potrebbe essere un’esperienza cognitiva, un’esperienza 
percettiva, un’esperienza analitica, un’esperienza informativa, e così via. Non è che non 
ci siano altre plausibili denominazioni a disposizione.5  
In breve, sarebbe meglio semplicemente non prestare ascolto alla ricorrente 
domanda retorica di Carroll, riguardante esperienze nelle quali proprietà formali e/o 
estetiche vengono percepite: “Che tipo di esperienza potrebbe essere, quindi, se non è 
estetica?” Infatti, in questo modo si assume illegittimamente che si tratta o di questo o 
altrimenti di nulla – ovvero, o di un’esperienza estetica, oppure di nessun tipo di 
                                                           
5 In modo che non si pensi che stia esagerando in merito al grado di entusiasmo di Carroll per questo 
argomento, di seguito ne riporto altre due versioni: “[…] come dobbiamo interpretare le esperienze 
insoddisfacenti di arte inadeguata, in particolar modo quelle in cui coloro che percepiscono si 
focalizzano sui luoghi tradizionali dell’esperienza estetica? […] se queste esperienze insoddisfacenti 
delle dimensioni formali ed espressive delle opere d’arte fallimentari non sono esperienze estetiche, di 
che tipo sono?” (Carroll 2002: 155); “[…] infine, se prestare attenzione alle proprietà formali ed 
espressive di un’opera d’’arte con discernimento non è una esperienza estetica, in che altro modo 
potremmo classificarla?” (Carroll 2002: 161). 
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esperienza. Il modo di argomentare di Carroll mi ricorda la famosa forma argomentativa 
normalmente attribuita, forse in forma apocrifa, a Sidney Morgenbesser: “Conclusione: 
p. Argomento: che cosa, se non q?”. 
 
4. Lo stato mentale estetico, l’esperienza estetica e 
l’apprezzamento estetico. 
 
Mi occuperò ora di una concezione non-minimalista dell’esperienza estetica, una 
concezione con cui sono in larga misura in accordo, ovvero quella di Gary Iseminger. 
Iseminger propone che lo stato mentale estetico possa essere considerato equivalente 
all’apprezzare un certo stato di cose, dove l’apprezzamento può essere caratterizzato 
come “il valutare positivamente per se stessa l’esperienza di quello stato di cose” 
(Iseminger 2005: 99). Iseminger nota che l’apprezzamento è possibile che implichi, ma 
non necessariamente, profondo rapimento, un affetto evidente, o addirittura 
divertimento nel normale senso del termine (Iseminger 2005: 102). Iseminger afferma 
che questo è l’apprezzamento in generale, visto che non intende basarsi su una nozione 
di apprezzamento specificamente estetico. 
Ma nonostante ciò che afferma Iseminger, penso che dovrebbe essere inteso 
specificamente come apprezzamento estetico, o forse come apprezzamento intrinseco, 
visto che si potrebbe apprezzare, ovvero considerare di valore, uno stato di cose che si 
stava esperendo per gli usi o conseguenze di quello stato di cose, e questo sarebbe 
presumibilmente un caso di apprezzamento non-estetico di esso. Ad esempio potrei 
apprezzare la lezione che stavo seguendo per la profonda comprensione acquisita grazie 
a essa, o apprezzare un massaggio per gli effetti positivi che mi aspettavo avrebbe avuto 
il giorno seguente sulle mie possibilità di movimento. Metterò da parte questo punto, 
comunque, e converrò sul parlare semplicemente di apprezzamento tout court, visto 
che, anche se ho ragione sul fatto che esiste, in effetti, un apprezzamento strumentale, 
nel caratterizzare lo stato mentale di tipo estetico noi abbiamo plausibilmente a che fare 
solamente con l’apprezzamento intrinseco. 
Lo stato mentale estetico, sottolinea Iseminger, è complesso, consistendo nel 
valutare-positivamente-un’esperienza-in-se-stessa (Iseminger 2005: 100). Oppure, 
come lo descrive in maniera alternativa in un altro punto, lo stato mentale estetico è un 
composto formato dalla cognizione epistemica delle proprietà di un oggetto e dalla 
valutazione positiva intrinseca di quell’esperienza cognitiva (Iseminger 2005: 114). 
D’accordo. Ma se accettiamo la prima formulazione allora quel complesso stato 
mentale non è anche un’esperienza, il cui carattere complessivo è un valutare 
positivamente? E, se assumiamo la seconda formulazione, allora quello stato mentale 
composto non è forse formato da due esperienze, una delle quali ha l’altra come 
oggetto, e quindi è essa stessa un’esperienza? In altre parole, che cosa ci impedisce di 
identificare semplicemente stati mentali estetici ed esperienze estetiche? 
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Iseminger ritiene che insistere sulle differenze concettuali tra lo stato mentale di 
tipo estetico e l’esperienza estetica è necessario al fine di respingere l’argomento dei 
“due-soggetti-che-esperiscono-un-quadro”, ripetutamente utilizzato da Carroll, contro 
le concezioni valutative e affettive dell’esperienza estetica che sostiene che, nella misura 
in cui i due soggetti prestano attenzione e registrano le medesime proprietà formali ed 
estetiche del quadro, stanno avendo la stessa esperienza, indipendentemente dalle 
differenze tra i soggetti riguardanti l’atteggiamento o la motivazione sottostante (cfr. 
Carroll 2002 e Carroll 2005). 
Di seguito, per riferimenti futuri, la formulazione di Stecker dell’argomento (Stecker 
2005: 51): 
 
[…] considerate Jerome e Charles, che sono entrambi coinvolti nell’esperienza della visione di un 
quadro di Picasso. Jerome ritiene meritevole l’esperienza per se stessa, il che non gli preclude di 
apprezzarla per i benefici addizionali che ne derivano come risultato. Ciò che invece è richiesto 
specificamente è che se tali benefici potessero essere forniti in qualche altro modo, allora Jerome 
sentirebbe che sta comunque perdendo qualcosa che valuta importante nel perdersi l’esperienza del 
quadro di Picasso. Charles pensa di ritenere meritevole l’esperienza del quadro di Picasso 
semplicemente per i diversi benefici che ne ricava. Egli gode delle sue aumentate capacità di 
discriminazione, di riconoscimento di schemi, e così via. Ma entrambi stanno interiorizzando le 
stesse proprietà del dipinto e perciò stanno notando le stesse strutture formali e caratteristiche 
espressive. Non stanno quindi entrambi avendo la stessa esperienza del dipinto? Si afferma quindi 
che, se quella di Jerome è un’esperienza estetica, allora lo è anche quella di Charles. 
 
È tuttavia possibile replicare a questo argomento addirittura senza introdurre la 
questione del valore, come invero fa Stecker, il quale nota che nonostante i due soggetti 
stiano elaborando percettivamente le stesse proprietà del dipinto, questo non implica che 
le loro esperienze siano interamente, o anche solo in maniera significativa, le stesse, in 
quanto i due soggetti stanno “reagendo a questo elaborare percettivo in maniera 
differente”, come testimoniato nel modo più chiaro dal fatto che uno ne ricava piacere 
mentre l’altro no, che uno continuerebbe ad esservi coinvolto anche ove non ci fosse 
alcuna ragione ulteriore per farlo, mentre l’altro non lo farebbe (Stecker 2005: 52). 
Iseminger, tuttavia, preferisce replicare all’argomento di Carroll in un’altra maniera, 
affermando che la chiave per evitare la sua conclusione  
 
[…] è distinguere tra l’esperienza che le due persone stanno avendo e ciò che potrebbe essere 
chiamato lo stato mentale complessivo in cui si trovano […]. Lo stato mentale estetico non è 
meramente l’esperienza di individuare caratteristiche formali ed espressive ma […] lo stato 
mentale nel quale, mentre si individuano tali caratteristiche […] si reputa questa individuazione 
per se stessa di valore […]. Il fatto che essi stiano avendo, come supponiamo, la medesima 
esperienza è compatibile con il fatto che uno di essi si trovi in uno stato mentale di tipo estetico 
mentre l’altro no […]. (Iseminger 2003: 103) 
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Ora io concordo con Iseminger sul fatto che i soggetti si trovano invero in stati 
mentali differenti, uno dei quali viene plausibilmente etichettato come estetico, mentre 
l’altro no. Supponendo tuttavia che ci sia un aspetto esperienziale nel valutare, allora c’è 
in effetti una ragione addirittura per negare che i due soggetti stiano avendo la stessa 
esperienza.  
Questo ci conduce a come si dovrebbe intendere il valutare positivamente perché 
esso sia al servizio dell’analisi di Iseminger dello stato mentale estetico, o 
apprezzamento. Iseminger sembra ritenere che questo possa essere semplicemente 
spiegato nei termini di un certo tipo di credenza, ovvero, che una certa cosa è buona per 
ragioni non-strumentali, ma ho alcuni dubbi su questo. A mio parere il valutare 
positivamente, se vogliamo considerarlo il marchio definitivo dell’apprezzamento, deve 
essere una posizione attiva o un evento, un considerare-pregevole, per così dire, dotato 
di una qualche sorta di fenomenologia, e il semplice credere, che normalmente è un 
non-evento ed è privo di fenomenologia, sembra poco adatto a ricoprire questo ruolo. Il 
valutare positivamente nel senso che la teoria di Iseminger richiede deve includere una 
presa di posizione attiva, ed avere un carattere simile, se non identico, all’ammirare o al 
godere, come stati che accadono, piuttosto che disposizionali. Che cosa può essere 
dunque il valutare positivamente, inteso come una presa di posizione positiva e 
presente alla mente verso qualcosa, sia esso un oggetto, una attività o un’esperienza? Si 
tratta chiaramente di qualcosa di più rispetto all’amare o al preferire una certa cosa, 
oppure al trarne diletto, anche se è ovviamente compatibile con essi, e generalmente 
presuppone e si costruisce a partire da questi stati. Un elemento che sembra rilevante 
nella posizione del valutare positivamente, rispetto al semplice gradire, preferire o trarre 
diletto, è una presa di posizione a favore o forse l’approvazione. Dunque potremmo forse 
affermare che l’apprezzamento è, con forte approssimazione, soddisfazione per cui si 
prende favorevolmente posizione e quindi, con riferimento a questo caso specifico, che 
valutare positivamente un’attività percettiva-immaginativa come tale è più o meno: 
trarre soddisfazione da un’attività di questo tipo per se stessa e allo stesso tempo, ad un 
qualche livello, sostenere o approvare una tale azione. 6 
Valutare positivamente un’attività o un processo di percezione o cognizione per se 
stessi implica adottare e sostenere una certa presa di posizione verso di essi, qualcosa di 
simile alla soddisfazione sostenuta. E questa posizione aggiunta, ragionevolmente o 
costituisce una differenza nell’esperienza complessiva che si ha, oppure conduce a una 
differenza nell’esperienza complessiva che si ha. Perciò è quanto meno possibile che il 
valutare positivamente, inteso come una presa di posizione attiva da parte di un 
                                                           
6 L’espressione “a un qualche livello” intende significare che nonostante il valutare positivamente molto 
spesso coinvolga una cosciente e riflessiva presa di posizione, in alcuni casi la presa favorevole di 
posizione che ha luogo potrebbe essere non-riflessiva e non completamente cosciente. 
 FOCUS • Art and Aesthetic Experience 
 
JERROLD LEVINSON • Verso una concezione 
non minimalista dell'esperienza estetica 
 
 
CoSMo   Comparative Studies in Modernism n. 6 (Spring) • 2015 
93 
soggetto, sia anch’esso esperienziale, e possa dunque costituire il cuore dell’esperienza 
estetica sulla base di una concezione non-minimalista. 
Stecker, per come io l’ho interpretato, sembra propendere per questo senso del 
valutare positivamente come una presa di posizione o coinvolgimento attivo. Tutta 
l’esperienza estetica, afferma, coinvolge il valutare positivamente l’esperienza 
percettiva-immaginativa che si sta avendo, reputarla intrinsecamente utile e meritevole 
per se stessa, dove un segno del valutarla positivamente per se stessa è il continuare a 
valutarla tale anche quando si crede che essa non porti o procuri nient’altro che si 
ritenga meritevole (Stecker 2005: 49-50). La terminologia del ‘reputare meritevole’ e 
del ‘continuare a valutare in maniera positiva’ certamente suggerisce, per quanto non 
imponga, una lettura del ‘valutare’ secondo la quale il valutare positivamente sarebbe, o 
a ogni modo potrebbe essere, un’attività o presa di posizione con un aspetto 
esperienziale.7  
Per riassumere questa parte della mia argomentazione, sebbene io concordi con 
Iseminger sul fatto che l’individuazione di certe caratteristiche senza apprezzarle non si 
configura come stato mentale estetico, sono in disaccordo sul fatto che uno stato 
mentale estetico, nel quale si riconosca il valore o si apprezzi-per-se-stessa una certa 
esperienza percettivo-immaginativa interna, non sia di conseguenza a sua volta 
un’esperienza estetica. Iseminger rinuncia prematuramente alla nozione di 
un’esperienza distintamente estetica in quanto sembra obbligato a non attribuire 
l’etichetta ‘esperienza’ al complesso stato mentale che ha caratterizzato, ovvero 
valutare-positivamente-una-certa-esperienza-percettivo-immaginativa-in-se-stessa. Ma 
se il valutare positivamente nel senso necessario per sostenere la nozione di Iseminger 
di uno stato mentale di tipo estetico è esso stesso, come io ho proposto, 
necessariamente esperienziale, allora non vi è alcuna ragione per opporsi alla 
conclusione che uno stato mentale estetico è anche, ipso facto, un’esperienza estetica, e 
quindi i due soggetti dell’esperimento mentale di Carroll stanno in effetti avendo 
esperienze complessive che sono distinte. 
C’è tuttavia un apparente controesempio all’affermazione che il valutare 
positivamente, nel senso della soddisfazione sostenuta in un’esperienza percettivo-
immaginativa, possa caratterizzare tutta l’esperienza estetica. Prendete un’opera d’arte 
innovativa e provocatoria che non si sappia come considerare o come avvicinare, con la 
quale ci si confronti, si tenti di comprenderla, si cerchi un modo per entrarvi, o si tenti 
di afferrarne il senso, ma fino a quel momento senza successo. Non è forse naturale 
affermare che nel fare questo si sta avendo un’esperienza estetica, anche se non si sta 
                                                           
7 Il concetto del valutare positivamente come atto sostanziale, avente una dimensione esperienziale, ha 
avuto alcuni illustri sostenitori. Uno di questi è stato Edmund Husserl, il fondatore della 
fenomenologia. L’idea del valutare positivamente come atto o stato mentale che accade, che la nozione 
di apprezzamento estetico sembra richiedere, si ritrova allo stesso modo anche sia nelle opere dei 
successori di Husserl, Sartre e Merleau-Ponty, sia in quelle del predecessore di Husserl, Franz Brentano. 
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traendo soddisfazione dal proprio coinvolgimento percettivo-immaginativo con le 
proprietà formali o estetiche dell’opera? 
Forse, ma sembra che si debba allora almeno trarre soddisfazione o reputare utile 
quello sforzo esplorativo e interrogativo mirante a ottenere un coinvolgimento 
percettivo-immaginativo soddisfacente con l’opera. Altrimenti sarebbe ragionevole 
sostenere che non si starebbe ancora avendo un’esperienza estetica dell’opera, ma che si 
starebbe semplicemente tentando, con la migliore volontà al mondo, di avere quel tipo 
di esperienza. In altre parole, a meno che il soggetto non ne ricavi a un certo punto una 
qualche gratificazione, sembrerebbe forzato affermare che sta avendo luogo 
un’esperienza estetica. Non penso dunque che questo esempio riesca nell’intento di 
sollevare un dubbio reale in merito alla tesi in questione. 
 
5. Caratterizzare l’esperienza estetica 
 
Nonostante io abbia difeso, con alcune modifiche, una concezione non-minimalista 
dell’esperienza estetica da ritrovarsi nella letteratura recente, ovvero quella offerta da 
Gary Iseminger, il quale propone che il positivo valutare sia il cuore dell’esperienza 
estetica, invero non sposo quella specifica proposta. Sembra che ci siano esperienze con 
carattere positivo che saremmo inclini a classificare come esperienze estetiche, che è 
effettivamente possibile che siano di valore, ma che non includono come tali l’elemento 
del valutare da parte del soggetto dell’esperienza. 
Cerchiamo dunque di capire, alla luce della discussione fino a ora condotta, se 
possiamo identificare, in termini in qualche modo più generali, gli elementi necessari 
per una caratterizzazione illuminante dell’esperienza estetica. Sembra che siano 
richiesti due elementi. Il primo elemento richiesto è che al centro dell’esperienza vi sia 
la giusta modalità di attenzione o percezione. L’altro elemento richiesto è una risposta o 
reazione positiva nei confronti di quell’attenzione o percezione fondamentale, che sia di 
natura edonica, affettiva o valutativa. Permettetemi di rivedere questi due elementi uno 
per volta. 
Per attenzione estetica si intende l’attenzione focalizzata sul carattere di un oggetto o, 
espresso altrimenti, sulle sue forme e proprietà percepibili, per se stesse, nella loro piena 
individualità, al di là dell’utilità del prestarvi attenzione, su qualunque contenuto 
emerga da queste forme e proprietà e sulle relazioni tra queste forme, proprietà e 
contenuti.8 La percezione estetica può quindi essere compresa come il risultato 
                                                           
8 Molte delle proprietà a cui si presta attenzione in questo modo sono proprietà estetiche, ovvero 
proprietà percettive di un ordine superiore, rilevanti per la valutazione positiva, di tipo gestaltico, che 
emergono da configurazioni di proprietà percettive di ordine inferiore. Ma l’attenzione può essere 
estetica, in maniera riconoscibile, anche quando nessuna delle proprietà su cui ci si concentra è una 
proprietà estetica per se. Per saperne di più sulla caratterizzazione delle proprietà estetiche, cfr. Levinson 
2005.  
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dell’attenzione estetica, un coinvolgimento percettivo con un oggetto nel quale sia la 
capacità immaginativa, sia la corporeità del soggetto che percepisce dovrebbero essere 
intesi come giocanti un ruolo, sebbene in gradi diversi a seconda dei casi differenti.9  
Nel dire che si sta avendo una risposta positiva o una reazione edonica, affettiva o 
valutativa all’esperienza percettiva si intendono risposte o reazioni come le seguenti: 
gradire o gustarsi questa percezione, essere toccati da ciò che si sta percependo, 
registrare un’emozione in relazione a ciò che si sta percependo, valutare positivamente 
l’attività percettiva in cui si è coinvolti, reputare meritevole il mantenimento di quella 
attività percettiva, ammirare ciò che viene rivelato nell’esperienza percettiva che si ha, e 
così via. Questi casi, auspicabilmente, sono sufficienti a fornire un’idea adeguata del 
tipo di risposta o reazione richiesta per trasformare un caso di percezione estetica in un 
caso di esperienza estetica. 
Mettendo dunque insieme i due elementi, una caratterizzazione dell’esperienza 
estetica generale, non-minimalista, che sia utile per la teoria estetica potrebbe essere 
formulata come segue: L’esperienza estetica è l’esperienza che coinvolge la percezione 
estetica di un qualche oggetto, radicata nell’attenzione estetica verso quell’oggetto, e nella 
quale vi è una risposta edonica, affettiva o valutativa alla percezione stessa oppure al 
contenuto di quella percezione. 
 
6. L’esperienza estetica e l’esperienza sessuale, farmacologica e 
mistica. 
 
Ipotizziamo, ai fini della discussione seguente, che l’esperienza estetica possa essere 
appropriatamente caratterizzata come sopra e, in particolare, che tale esperienza non 
risulti essere di un tipo tale per cui certe proprietà vengono meramente registrate. Ci si 
potrebbe chiedere se il campo dell’esperienza estetica così caratterizzato non sia 
comunque troppo ampio, comprendendo molte tipologie di esperienze al di là di quelle 
comprese nell’apprezzamento estetico dell’arte e della natura, che tradizionalmente 
non vengono concepite come esperienze estetiche. Ho in mente esperienze sessuali, 
farmacologiche e mistiche. Che cosa differenzierebbe l’esperienza estetica da queste 
altre forme di esperienza, essenzialmente percettive e potenzialmente meritevoli 
(Iseminger 2003: 99)? Al fine di fornire una spiegazione dell’esperienza estetica è 
necessario rispondere a questa domanda, oppure negare che in fondo vi sia alcuna 
differenza, ammettendo quindi semplicemente all’interno della categoria tutte le 
esperienze di questo tipo. 
                                                           
9 Anche se per semplicità continuo a utilizzare l’espressione “esperienza percettiva” per indicare il 
centro cognitivo di un’esperienza estetica, quella espressione dovrebbe essere considerata come una 
forma semplificata di quella forse più adeguata di “esperienza sensoriale-percettivo-immaginativa”.  
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Recenti teorie dell’esperienza estetica hanno messo l’accento sul carattere cognitivo, 
immaginativo e focalizzato sull’oggetto di tale esperienza e la teoria sopra esposta non 
costituisce un’eccezione. Ma tali caratteristiche, o quella aggiuntiva della positiva 
risposta edonica, affettiva o valutativa, sono sufficienti a distinguere l’esperienza estetica 
da almeno alcuni casi di esperienza sessuale? L’esperienza sessuale di un’altra persona 
non può forse coinvolgere il pensiero, chiamare in causa l’immaginazione, e focalizzarsi 
su forme e qualità sensibili per se stesse – essendo allo stesso tempo, in maniera ancor 
più ovvia, gradita e valutata positivamente dal soggetto? 
La risposta a questo quesito sembra essere ‘sì’, e quindi non c’è ragione per 
escludere categoricamente le esperienze sessuali positive dal dominio dell’estetica. È 
pur vero, tuttavia, che tali esperienze non vi figureranno tipicamente. Questo perché 
normalmente non sono sufficientemente focalizzate sulle forme e proprietà percepibili 
della persona di cui si ha un’esperienza sessuale per se stesse, sulle interrelazioni tra tali 
forme e proprietà e su qualunque contenuto che si possa pensare che emerga da queste 
interrelazioni. Espresso in un altro modo, l’attenzione diretta verso l’altro 
nell’esperienza sessuale non è generalmente attenzione estetica, come l’ho 
caratterizzata, ma qualcosa più nell’ordine dell’attenzione puramente sensoriale o 
appetitiva, mirante più di ogni altra cosa ad assicurare e sostenere l’eccitazione. 
Che cosa si può dire delle esperienze farmacologiche, in particolar modo quelle di 
carattere psichedelico o allucinogeno? Ancora una volta probabilmente non c’è ragione 
per escluderle dal dominio dell’estetico, ma non si configureranno automaticamente 
come tali anche quando si focalizzino su forme e qualità percepibili per se stesse, e 
anche quando la risposta del soggetto a tale percezione sia di approvazione o 
soddisfazione. E questo perché in queste esperienze il contatto percettivo con una 
porzione del mondo reale – come un’opera d’arte, una scena naturale o un ambiente 
urbano – è tipicamente diminuito, a volte a tal punto da svanire, fino a che l’esperienza 
percettiva in questione non può più essere considerata chiaramente come quella di un 
oggetto indipendente che viene percepito. In altre parole, nella misura in cui 
l’esperienza, che sia caricata affettivamente o edonicamente, perde il suo carattere di 
cognizione, la sua pretesa di valere come esperienza estetica è indebolita. Vale la pena 
notare, allo stesso tempo, riguardo alle esperienze farmacologiche, che esse 
normalmente non riescono a esibire il tipo di coinvolgimento attivo, di controllo 
partecipativo sulla direzione, durata e focus del coinvolgimento percettivo che si ha con 
un oggetto che, se non costituisce forse una caratteristica necessaria dell’esperienza 
estetica, è in ogni caso tipico di questa esperienza.10 Molte esperienze farmacologiche – 
                                                           
10 Tale partecipazione e controllo attivo sono paradigmatici dell’esperienza estetica, anche se forse non 
richiesti in maniera assoluta come parte di questa esperienza, dati casi come quelli di scenari naturali di 
una bellezza o sublimità mozzafiato. Di fronte a tali scenari ci si potrebbe facilmente sentire soggiogati e 
sovrastati, e sentire indebolito il proprio senso di attiva partecipazione all’esperienza e di controllo 
sull’esperienza. 
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in particolar modo quelle che sono sostanzialmente allucinogene – non sono quindi 
soltanto al limite dell’esperienza estetica per il loro ridotto carattere cognitivo, ma 
anche per la ridotta attività. Casi di questo tipo potrebbero quindi essere considerati 
come casi di esperienza quasi-estetica. In conclusione l’esperienza estetica è 
normalmente posta in contrasto non solo con le esperienze sessuali e farmacologiche, 
ma anche con quella mistica. È possibile che si verifichi in questo caso un’esclusione 
virtualmente automatica dall’ambito dell’estetico nel senso che le esperienze mistiche, 
per come io le intendo, non possono essere anche estetiche, in quanto in esperienze di 
questo tipo la distinzione tra soggetto e oggetto si dissolve completamente, e con essa 
ogni senso che si può dare alle proprietà di un oggetto come distinte dalla percezione di 
esse, e dell’oggetto come esistente indipendentemente dal soggetto. In ogni caso 
rimangono chiaramente molte questioni interessanti riguardo a dove sia possibile 
pensare che risiedano i limiti dell’esperienza estetica se tale esperienza viene 
caratterizzata approssimativamente come è stato suggerito nelle sezioni precedenti di 
questo saggio.11  
 
7. Conclusione: Perché una concezione non-minimalista 
dell’esperienza estetica? 
 
La ragione primaria per adottare una concezione non-minimalista dell’esperienza 
estetica è che un obiettivo centrale delle opere d’arte è fornire un’esperienza estetica di 
questo tipo, nonostante il fatto che si speri anche di ricavare un’esperienza estetica dalla 
contemplazione della natura, degli esseri umani e dell’ambiente costruito dall’uomo. 
Una concezione non minimalista dell’esperienza estetica spiega al meglio il modo in cui 
si intende diffusamente ciò a cui la maggior parte dell’arte mira. Una tale concezione, 
inoltre, si articola senza difficoltà, attraverso una spiegazione attraente, se non 
interamente adeguata, del valore artistico delle opere d’arte, ovvero la loro capacità di 
permettere esperienze estetiche di una certa entità e percepite correttamente.12 
Rispondere edonicamente, affettivamente, o valutativamente in maniera positiva 
sembrerebbe essere il sine qua non dell’esperienza estetica nel senso richiesto, 
collocando quindi questo senso a una certa distanza dal senso dell’esperienza estetica 
                                                           
11 Una sfera che, anche se non tradizionalmente considerata come estetica, certamente sembra offrire un 
ampio margine per l’esperienza estetica è quello dell’assistere a eventi atletici. Gli spettatori di questi 
eventi possono certamente avere quelle che si configurerebbero come esperienze estetiche sulla base 
degli elementi qui descritti, nella misura in cui la percezione si concentra sulle proprietà e sulle forme 
degli eventi che vengono percepiti e sulle loro interrelazioni. 
12 Cfr., ad esempio, Budd 1995. 
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che consisterebbe nel semplice registrare, senza necessariamente reagire, alle proprietà 
formali ed estetiche di un oggetto della percezione.13 
Noto infine che la questione che è stata al centro di questo saggio, ovvero quale tipo 
di esperienza di un oggetto conti come esperienza estetica, è stata posta esclusivamente 
dal punto di vista della ricezione degli oggetti da parte dei fruitori. Senza dubbio si 
potrebbe parlare anche di artisti che hanno esperienze estetiche nel corso della 
produzione di opere d’arte, ma queste esperienze, e la loro analisi appropriata, non sono 
stati oggetto di questo saggio.14 
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1. The elements of Levinson’s analysis  
 
The main goal of Levinson’s paper is to suggest an account of aesthetic experience 
(AE) alternative to minimalist accounts of AE, such as the one put forward by Noёl 
Carroll (Carroll 2005). Levinson sums up the core of such views as follows: “aesthetic 
experience is just experience in which there is perception or cognition of aesthetic 
and/or formal properties of some object” (Levinson 2015: 86). Carroll deliberately 
leaves out of his account certain traditional ideas about AE, whereas Levinson provides 
some reasons to hold such views and concludes that Carroll’s minimalist account is a 
defective conception of AE. The ideas generally entertained about AE and left aside by 
Carroll’s account are: a) AE is rewarding/valuable/worthwhile (Levinson 2015: 86); 
b) AE is “of positive character” (Levinson 2015: 86); c) AE comports “some measure 
of absorption and satisfaction” (Levinson 2015: 86). 
a), b) According to Levinson, AEs are always felt/considered as rewarding and/or 
valuable and/or worthwhile and/or pleasurable (Levinson 2015: 95). There is nothing 
like an AE lacking an element of positive response of the kinds listed. According to 
Carroll (Carroll 2005: 72), on the other hand: 
 
some aesthetic experiences may not only be bereft of pleasure, but may lack affect altogether. For 
example, one might take note of the angularity of Katherine Hepburn’s body, her gestures, her 
facial structure, and her way of speaking and, in addition, realize how this all “fits” with the 
“edginess” of that her characters are meant to project; and yet one may take no pleasure, nor suffer 
any other affect while doing so. On what grounds would it be denied that this is an aesthetic 
experience? And if it is not an aesthetic experience, what sort is it? 
 
To this, Levinson replies: “it might be a cognitive experience, a perceptual 
experience, an analytical experience, an informative experience, and so on. It’s not as if 
no other plausible labels are available” (Levinson 2015: 89). That experiences of paying 
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attention to the very same properties of objects that are central to AE are not 
pleasurable or rewarding ones, then, does not mean that AE is not characterized by 
being rewarding and “of positive character” (Levinson 2015: 87) and that such 
experiences should count as aesthetic ones. This is because there are alternative and 
appropriate ways to categorize such experiences: namely, they can count as “cognitive”, 
“perceptual”, “analytical”, “informative”, and so on. 
c) Absorption in the object of AE can be characterized as requiring that the subject 
of the experience pay attention to the object with a willingness to perceive it as such, for 
no other reason than experiencing it in its fullness. In other words, absorption may 
seem to require disinterestedness on the side of the subject. Accordingly, Levinson 
stresses that we do not just pay attention to the relevant properties of the object of AE, 
but that we do it in a peculiar way, “apart from the utility of so attending” (Levinson 
2015: 94). Absorption in the object of AE, then, is another aspect of AE Carroll’s 
account fails to make sense of. 
In order to sketch his alternative account of AE, Levinson needs to show that there 
is at least an element of AE that Carroll’s minimalist account does not capture and that 
is capable of explaining why we entertain at least some of the ideas about AE listed 
above (a, b, c). There are two candidates for the job: the aesthetic attitude and the 
aesthetic state of mind, as it is conceived by Gary Iseminger (Iseminger 2005). Levinson 
discards the first candidate and argues that the second requires some improvement. 
The aesthetic attitude, as Levinson observes, has generally been described as “the 
ignoring or suppressing of certain other mental attitudes or frames of mind, such as 
practical, anxious, or desirous ones” which are thought “to preclude, or at least to 
render difficult, the sustaining of the aesthetic one” or as “a condition of openness, 
receptivity, and generosity towards an object’s perceivable form and qualities” 
(Levinson 2015: 83). Levinson believes – contra e.g. George Dickie – that this notion 
plays a relevant role in the realm of the aesthetic and characterizes it as an essentially 
disinterested disposition toward an object (Dickie 1964: 56-65). However, Levinson 
stresses that, since adopting an aesthetic attitude means being disposed to have an AE, 
one can correctly claim that it is likely that AEs are often preceded by the adoption of an 
aesthetic attitude, whereas one cannot correctly claim that if a subject S has an AE, then 
S has adopted an aesthetic attitude. The aesthetic attitude, then, is not suited to fulfill 
the role of the missing element in the minimalist’s characterization of AE. 
The aesthetic state of mind might seem to make a better candidate. Levinson is 
sympathetic with Iseminger’s view of the aesthetic state of mind as “appreciating a state 
of affairs, where appreciating can be characterized as ‘valuing for its own sake the 
experiencing of that state of affairs’” (Iseminger 2005 in Levinson 2015: 90). Levinson 
also adds that the appreciation at issue should better be characterized as aesthetic or 
intrinsic, in order to distinguish it from appreciative states of the instrumental kind 
(Levinson 2015: 90), and that such kind of appreciation is not just a certain kind of 
belief, but an experience with “some sort of phenomenology” (Levinson 2015: 92). 
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There are, however, according to Levinson, cases of AE that are not characterized by 
the adoption of an aesthetic state of mind of the kind described by Iseminger. One such 
case is that of the experience of a “novel and provocative artwork that one doesn’t quite 
know how to regard or approach” (Levinson 2015: 93). Here is Levinson’s whole 
description: 
 
Consider a novel and provocative artwork that one doesn’t quite know how to regard or approach, 
that one is grappling with, trying to figure out, find a way into, or grasp the point of, but so far 
without success. Isn’t it natural to say that one is having aesthetic experience while doing so, even 
though one is not, or not yet, taking satisfaction in one’s perceptual-imaginative engagement with 
the work’s formal or aesthetic properties? (Levinson 2015: 93-94) 
 
Here, the subject of the experience is not “taking satisfaction in one’s perceptual-
imaginative engagement with the work’s formal or aesthetic properties”, therefore one 
might doubt that s/he is in an aesthetic state of mind, which has been defined as the 
valuing (“taking satisfaction”) for its own sake of the experience of a certain object 
(“one’s perceptual-imaginative engagement with the work’s formal or aesthetic 
properties”), and hence doubt that s/he is having an aesthetic experience. However, 
Levinson stresses that, although the subject of the experience is not valuing the 
experience of a certain object’s formal or aesthetic properties for its own sake, it seems 
appropriate to say that s/he is enjoying his/her effort to grasp the point of the work: the 
latter is an experience that generates a positive response and, since it is generated by 
one’s engagement with an object’s formal or aesthetic properties for their own sake, it 
deserves to be considered an aesthetic experience (Levinson 2015: 94). Levinson, then, 
is largely sympathetic with Iseminger’s proposal, although he stresses that AE in some 
cases might not feature the kind of valuing described by Iseminger with his 
characterization of the aesthetic state of mind.  
According to Levinson, there is a further and crucial lesson we should learn from the 
novel and provocative artwork case, since this example also shows what is the element 
of AE that is missing from the minimalist’s account:  
 
it seems that one must then at least be taking satisfaction in or finding good that very exploratory 
and interrogative effort of trying to achieve a satisfying perceptual-imaginative engagement with 
the work. Otherwise it would be reasonable to say that one wasn’t yet having aesthetic experience 
of the work, but only endeavoring, with the best will in the world, to have such experience. In other 
words, unless there is some reward to the subject at some level, it will seem strained to claim that 
aesthetic experience is occurring. (Levinson 2015: 94) 
 
From this passage it can be inferred that AE is, according to Levinson, an experience 
that is always rewarding at some level. 
Here, then, are the elements of Levinson’s positive, non-minimalist characterization 
of aesthetic experience: 
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i. aesthetic attention: “focused on an object’s character, or otherwise put, its 
perceivable forms and properties, for their own sake, in their full individuality, apart 
from the utility of so attending, on whatever content emerges from such forms and 
properties, and on relationships among such forms, properties, and contents”, 
which issues in aesthetic perception: “a perceptual engagement with an object in 
which both the imaginative capacity and the embodied corporeality of the 
perceiving subject should be understood to play a role” (Levinson 2015: 95); 
ii. positive response: “enjoying or savoring such perceiving, being moved by what one is 
perceiving, registering an emotion in relation to what one is perceiving, valuing the 
perceptual activity one is engaged in, finding worthwhile the sustaining of that 
perceptual activity, admiring what is revealed in the perceptual experience being 
had” (Levinson 2015: 95). 
According to Levinson, then, AE requires aesthetic attention and perception, and it 
always involves a positive response toward the perceived object and/or the experience of 
perceiving it; such response is constructed broadly and – if I understand Levinson 
correctly – sometimes, but not always, it amounts to an aesthetic state of mind, 
conceived as “taking satisfaction in one’s perceptual-imaginative engagement with the 
work’s formal or aesthetic properties”. In particular, the description of aesthetic attention 
shows that absorption in the experienced object is a relevant feature of AE (c) and the 
description of the range of possible positive responses to AE captures what it is to 
consider AEs rewarding/valuable/worthwhile (a) and/or “of positive character” (b). 
Although broadly construed, AE is not under-characterized by the non-minimalist 
account, according to Levinson, since it can be distinguished from typical 
pharmacological experiences, mystical experience and from (most) sexual experiences. 
Together, the concepts of aesthetic attention and perception and of positive response do 
the explanatory job that aesthetic attitude and aesthetic state of mind were shown not to 
be capable of doing. 
 
2. Missing replies to Carroll 
 
Let me stress again the main differences between Carroll’s and Levinson’s 
characterizations of AE. In section 4 of his paper, Levinson criticizes a thought 
experiment mentioned by Carroll in order to show that AE is merely the experience of 
paying attention to an object’s aesthetic and formal properties. Levinson argues that 
Carroll’s example does not capture the fact that there is an experiential aspect to 
valuing. However, as I have explained, later in the paper Levinson acknowledges that 
the positive response involved in an AE need not consist in valuing one’s experience of 
an object’s formal and aesthetic properties. Nevertheless, Levinson criticism against 
Carroll’s example stands, because he argues that AE is distinguished by the fact that it 
issues in a positive response, and that it requires a peculiar form of attention (aesthetic 
attention), i.e., undivided attention to the object for its own sake. Both the positive 
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response and the manner in which we pay attention to the object of the AE give a 
peculiar characterization to the phenomenology of AE and it is this specific character of 
AE that Carroll’s account fails to grasp. 
There might be, however, a couple of issues raised by Carroll that Levinson fails to 
take into account and that might weaken the solidity of his proposal. First, Levinson’s 
view requires a direct perceptual encounter with the object of AE but, as Carroll claims, 
it seems that with many works of conceptual art we do not need a direct perceptual 
encounter in order to appreciate them aesthetically (Carroll 2005: 78.). Levinson does 
not consider the topic of conceptual art in his paper, so he does not tell us whether he 
agrees with Carroll’s view on this form of art. If he does, he would have to admit that his 
view of AE does not accommodate the AE of conceptual art. Perhaps this is Levinson’s 
position since, at the end of the paper, he states that his view is meant to apply to the 
experience of most, but not all, works of art (Levinson 2015: 97). Be that as it may, 
some discussion of the problem raised by conceptual art would be helpful to clarify 
Levinson’s position. 
A more serious challenge, I believe, comes from Carroll’s remarks on the case when, 
as he claims, our reflections on “a poem once read” give us an AE (Carroll 2005: 80). 
Perhaps we can remember objects once experienced and, by means of reflecting on 
their form and aesthetic properties, have an indirect AE of them. As Iseminger 
(Iseminger 2005: 100) notices 
 
someone might be in a position to justifiably assert that the contrapuntal interplay in Mozart’s 
symphony [No. 41] is intricate by means other than hearing that it is […] for example, on the basis 
of memory or the testimony of a reliable authority. Someone who appreciates something in this 
sense may, but need not, become a ‘spellbound spectator’, lost in contemplation. Appreciation may 
sometimes be all-consuming and drive out all other thoughts, but […] it seems possible that it may 
be relatively fleeting and casual. 
 
It seems that Levinson’s view would not allow for such an experience to be 
considered an AE, since it requires that in AE we have direct perceptual encounter with 
the object of the experience (ii). It seems to me, however, that more argument is called 
for to explain why, according to Levinson, this is a necessary requirement and therefore 
why, on his view, experiences such as the ones mentioned by Carroll and Iseminger do 
not count as AEs. Perhaps Levinson would claim, on the one hand, that remembering 
aesthetic features of a poem or a symphony is a cognitive, but not an aesthetic, 
experience, while allowing, on the other hand, that we can remember objects once 
experienced in a way that revives our earlier experience of them and, by means of 
reflecting on the form and aesthetic properties of the objects whose earlier experience 
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3. Some remarks and requests of clarification 
 
1. I am a little puzzled by the heterogeneous characterization of positive responses 
associated with AE that Levinson gives us: 
 
enjoying or savoring such perceiving, being moved by what one is perceiving, registering an 
emotion in relation to what one is perceiving, valuing the perceptual activity one is engaged in, 
finding worthwhile the sustaining of that perceptual activity, admiring what is revealed in the 
perceptual experience being had” (Levinson 2015: 95). 
 
Some of these are responses to the object perceived, other are responses to the 
experience of perceiving such object. “Registering an emotion in relation to what one is 
perceiving”, in particular, seems very generic. Is there a common feature that all and 
only such kinds of positive responses share? Are there necessary and sufficient 
conditions that a positive response need meet in order to qualify as a positive response 
that characterizes aesthetic experience? 
 
2. There might be an inconsistency in Levinson’s account. In his brief discussion of 
the notion of aesthetic attitude in the first section of the paper, Levinson agrees with 
Carroll that disinterestedness may not be a feature of AE (“it may well be true that 
disinterestedness is not a feature of aesthetic experiences”, Levinson 2015: 85) and he 
suggests that it is more plausibly a feature of the aesthetic attitude (“disinterestedness is 
most naturally understood as a feature of the attitude or frame of mind with which one 
approaches an object so as to experience it”, Levinson 2015: 85). Later, however, while 
characterizing aesthetic attention, which he considers a necessary ingredient of AE, he 
writes that it is “focused on an object’s character, or otherwise put, its perceivable forms 
and properties, for their own sake, in their full individuality, apart from the utility of so 
attending, on whatever content emerges from such forms and properties, and on 
relationships among such forms, properties, and contents” (Levinson 2015: 94). What 
is this, if not a description of disinterested attention in the object of AE? Perhaps, 
however, this is only a prima facie inconsistency. The disinterestedness characterizing 
the aesthetic attitude is a disposition towards focusing on an object’s character and so 
on, which, according to Levinson, one need not have while having an AE. On the other 
hand, the disinterestedness characterizing AE is a state one happens to be in, i.e., the 
state one is in when one focuses on an object’s character and so on, which might well be 
an essential feature of AE.1 
 
3. It is important to stress that Levinson’s goal in this paper is to give us a 
characterization of AE and not to state what are the necessary and sufficient conditions 
                                                           
1 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to me. 
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for one to have an AE. It is, however, tempting for the reader to speculate about 
whether the characterization implicitly contains a description of the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for one to have an AE. According to Levinson, the perception of 
aesthetic properties is not sufficient for an AE to obtain (aesthetic properties are defined 
in note 8 as “higher-order, evaluation-relevant, gestalt-like perceptual properties arising 
from configurations of lower-order perceptual properties”). If it were sufficient, 
Levinson would be agreeing with Carroll, which is not the case (see esp. Levinson 
2015: 87-88). Moreover, it remains an open question whether the perception of 
aesthetic properties is necessary to AE. Aesthetic perception certainly is not defined by 
Levinson as the perception of aesthetic properties. Furthermore, in a footnote remark 
(Levinson 2015: 94-95, n. 8) he writes: “attention can be recognizably aesthetic even 
when none of the properties focused on is an aesthetic property per se”. From this 
remark it can be inferred that, according to Levinson, provided that we have aesthetic 
attention and aesthetic perception, we can have AE, no matter the fact that we do not 
perceive any aesthetic properties. That we have aesthetic perception entails that we 
have a positive experience, because we respond positively to properties of the perceived 
object and/or because we respond positively to the fact of being absorbed in the task of 
perceiving such an object, as the case of the “novel and provocative artwork” seems to 
show. 
 
4. A related issue concerns the case of bad art. Let us look again at the passage from 
footnote no. 8 (Levinson 2015: 94-95): “attention can be recognizably aesthetic even 
when none of the properties focused on is an aesthetic property per se”. This might 
open the door to AE of absolutely ordinary objects. Consider, however, that Levinson 
also claims, contra Carroll: “when artworks are mediocre, or landscapes are ordinary, it 
is not clear that we are having aesthetic experience of them when we register some of 
their formal and/or aesthetic properties, even if we are undeniably experiencing them 
in some fashion” (Levinson 2015: 86; Carroll 2005: 82). Perhaps we cannot have an AE 
of bad artworks regarded as works of art but, if we can have AE of ordinary objects, it 
might be that we can also have AE of bad artworks, merely regarded as artifacts of a 
certain kind. Suppose a work of art W has certain aesthetic properties and is intended to 
have a certain representational content that should also enrich our AE of it. Suppose 
also that W is a bad artwork, in that the interplay between its aesthetic properties and its 
representational content issues in a dull and uninteresting object. That W is considered 
dull and uninteresting discourages us from paying aesthetic attention to it, i.e., to be 
absorbed in it, therefore we have no AE of W. Now, suppose we decide not to focus on 
the interplay between aesthetic properties and representational content in W and focus 
only on W’s aesthetic properties. It seems that we can pay aesthetic attention to this 
aspect of W and therefore have an AE of this aspect of W. The same would be true also 
if W had no aesthetic properties, if Levinson allows for there to be AE of objects that do 
not have aesthetic properties. Would Levinson accept such claims? 
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5. The considerations put forward in point 3 above also bring me to look at the role 
of aesthetic attention in Levinson’s account of AE. Aesthetic attention, according to 
Levinson, certainly is a necessary ingredient of AE, together with aesthetic perception. 
Depending on how question 3 is answered we will have either that aesthetic attention 
and aesthetic perception together are not sufficient for AE, because also the perception of 
aesthetic properties is necessary, or that aesthetic attention and aesthetic perception 
together are sufficient for AE. Now, as we have seen, there are two central 
phenomenological features of AE, according to Levinson. One, absorption in the object 
perceived (reached by paying aesthetic attention), is probably a necessary condition for 
AE, whereas the other, a positive response on the side of the subject of the experience, 
tells us what it looks like for a subject to have an AE, i.e., what, once all the necessary 
conditions for AE have been met, happens to the subject who is having an AE. It 
remains an open question, however, where the positive response that characterizes the 
phenomenology of AE comes from. That, according to Levinson, a broad variety of 
positive responses characterizes AE, perhaps testifies to the fact that the perception of 
aesthetic properties might be, but need not be an ingredient of AE. When it happens to 
be a component of a given AE, then it is possible that the positive response to the AE 
consist (at least in part) in the pleasure felt in perceiving certain aesthetic properties. 
When there is no perception of aesthetic properties, but an AE nevertheless, then either 
the positive response that characterizes the phenomenology of the AE is a positive 
response to the experience being had (finding it rewarding, etc.) rather than to the 
experienced object, or it is a positive response to some striking non-aesthetic property 
of the object experienced (e.g. its particular shade of color).  
 
6. Suppose Levinson believes that aesthetic attention and aesthetic perception are 
conjointly necessary and sufficient to AE. Would it be possible to think of a case where, 
even though there are aesthetic attention and aesthetic perception, there is no positive 
response and therefore no AE, contra Levinson? It seems to me that Levinson would 
rule out any such case because he claims that aesthetic attention and perception result 
in absorption in the perceived object and that absorption is something we always value 
positively (see point 3 above). So there might not be any feeling of pleasure to a certain 
AE, but there always is absorption and this is enough to make the AE valuable to us and 
therefore to arouse in us a positive response. If this were correct, then it would remain 
an open question why we always value positively experiences of absorption in objects, 
but answering such question might not be a task for the philosopher.2 
 
 
                                                           
2 Thanks to Jerrold Levinson, Gabriele Tomasi and Jan Czarnecki for their comments on a previous 
version of this paper. Thanks to two anonymous reviewers from Cosmo for their insightful comments. 
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VITOR MOURA 




Ariadne: Gibt es kein Hinüber? 
Sind wir schon da? 
Wie könnt' es geschehen? 
Hofmannsthal, Ariadne auf Naxos 
 
Even if we accept the arguments of those who argue against the very notion of 
“aesthetic experience”,1 there is still some latitude for questioning how the experience 
of artworks can affect or be affected by the duration of that experience. There is the 
issue, on the one hand, of the way aesthetic transactions manipulate our sense of time 
and, on the other hand, the issue of whether we can assess the proper duration of those 
experiences. The former looks for a kind of intra-chronology of the work involved, and 
is the topic of numerous investigations, for instance, as to the specific nature of fictional 
time. The latter inquires about the duration of the exposition to artworks and whether 
we can stipulate or otherwise evaluate the time needed for a relevant or rewarding 
aesthetic transaction to take place. To the best of my knowledge, this issue has been 
seldom and only indirectly addressed.  
The two topics are related, of course. In order to produce effective fictional time 
illusion, proper duration is required – take the case of the masterfully planned 
“Breakfast Scene” in Orson Welles’ Citizen Kane. And some specific stylistic devices 
require that the right calibration of time be attained so as to allow those devices to 
work. For instance, when discussing the import that point-of-view-editing and the 
Kuleshov Effect have in contemporary Hollywood movies as a way of mimicking the 
viewer’s daily perceptual behaviour, Noël Carroll (Carroll 1996) introduces the issue of 
the exact time length of this device. A point-glance shot of a character’s face activates in 
the spectator the need to read out that character’s expression which in turn calls for the 
behavioural conditioned reflex of following the gaze of that character. The movies’ 
particular characteristics allow for the fulfilment of this behavior to be done in a way 
much closer to our “perceptual prototype”, i.e., in a consecutive way, first glancing at 
the “facial range” – the point/glance shot acting as an emotional “range finder” (Carroll 
1996: 132) – and then considering the “filtering object” – the point/object acting as 
“focuser”. Whilst point-of-view editing deletes the perceptual pathway between both, it 
allows for the possibility of playing with the timing of that “revelation”. A proper 
detention of the spectator on a point/glance shot is important in order to allow her to 
                                                           
1 Most notoriously, Dickie 1964.  
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quickly survey the range of the character’s possible emotional states, oscillating 
between interest and excitement, enjoyment and joy, surprise and startle, distress and 
anguish, caution and terror, etc. A shot too short won’t activate the spectator’s attention 
that derives from the need to anticipate the character’s exact expression. A shot too 
long disperses that concentration. If done properly, the duration of the shift between 
point/glance and point/object shots acts as a visual filter guiding the viewer to what is 
salient in the point/object shot: “we will then attend to the open sores on the zombie’s 
body and not his designer jeans” (Carroll 1996: 132).  
But our question is wider and encompasses the so-called “spatial arts”, the visual arts 
where the issue of “proper duration of experience” is much less debated. Naturally, 
there is a minimum amount of time required to acknowledge and grasp the visual 
information provided by any picture and this varies with the picture’s complexity. Some 
paintings are presented as visual palimpsests with a variety of graphic and symbolic 
levels. For instance, some paintings present what Gestalt psychologists call “reversible 
pictures”, i.e., images like the famous “Duck-rabbit” head that can be seen as one object 
or another. Dali’s output offers numerous examples (e.g., “Bust of Voltaire in the Slave 
Market”) but one could also consider a painting like Vermeer’s The Lacemaker. The 
shift from different “seeing-as” aspects may require some time of adaptation but does 
the duration of this adjustment constitute a significant part of the aesthetic experience, 
or does the painter somehow prescribe it as an intentional component of the piece? 
Many other genres of painting – e.g., trompe l’oeil depictions, such as Andrea del 
Pozzo’s massive frescoes – also require some time to for the mere seeing-in to occur, 
i.e., for the spectator to discern a landscape in what prima facie looks like distorted 
geometric shapes. The fact that their full presentation isn’t available on a first look may 
be taken as exemplifying – in the Goodmanian sense – a characteristic of all painting. 
But this requires some scrutinizing.  
So: what intrinsic variables affect the amount of time needed in order to attain a 
relevant or rewarding aesthetic transaction? Or, to put it in George Dickie’s more 
skeptical terms (1964): how long should our span of attention be in order to allow us to 
say that we are paying proper attention to the artwork? I am using the expression 
“intrinsic variables” here because I want to restrict this inquiry to the conditions that 
may impose a specific attention span from within the artwork itself. Naturally, there are 
all sorts of external conditions that affect the time needed to perceive an artwork. For 
instance, some philosophers have recently drawn attention to the influence that joint 
attention has upon aesthetic appreciation (Cochrane 2009: 59-73) When we listen to 
music together with an audience or visit an art gallery with a friend we are sharing a 
cognitive environment and our perceptual activities are integrated or interdependent 
mainly because we are biologically predisposed to share emotional reactions towards 
the objects we perceive. In particular, there is a constant “preparedness” (Cochrane 
2009: 62) to alter the way we attend to these objects should our fellow observer direct 
our attention to a specific aspect so that “my awareness of the subject is also an 
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awareness of the person sitting next to me” (Cochrane 2009: 64). And this too alters 
our inner sense of time. Phenomenologist Alfred Schutz claimed that music had a 
special capacity to align the listeners’ sense of time and that there is a significant 
difference between listening to music in a concert hall and radio listening (Schutz 1971: 
159-178). Public listeners sharing the same concert hall, or even better the same noisy 
environment, acquire a sense of simultaneity with other listeners or, as Schutz put it, a 
sense of “growing older together”. The fact that they all attain a basic level of co-
ordination and that they are more aware of the response of the others also means that 
their experiential time is environmentally conditioned and synchronized. 
But let us return to our search for intrinsic ways of timing the aesthetic experience. 
The quest for these intrinsic temporal prescriptions could start off by analyzing an 
insightful text by Jerrold Levinson and Philipe Alperson, “What is a Temporal Art?” 
(Levinson & Alperson 1991). In this text the authors have proposed a number of time-
related characteristics that could be taken as conditions for qualifying some artistic 
objects as “temporal” and they went on by proposing a repartition of these conditions 
in three different groups. For expository reasons, I shall alter their order of appearance.  
First, we have “content-based” characteristics. This set of characteristics applies to 
temporal properties of what the work represents and is particularly significant in the 
case of those objects that somehow adopt time itself as their reference or subject.  
I believe an eloquent case will suffice to exemplify this kind of characteristics. In 
2004 Christopher Williams produced “Supplement 04”, a video presenting what 
seemed at first an ordinary morning talk show with the usual culinary segment. The 
cook and the TV hostess prepared a tasty pie and placed it inside the oven. The 
audience cheered. The camera then focused on the oven’s window but no ellipse 
occurred, i.e., the video showed the slow cooking of the pie for an entire hour. This 
sudden shift to real-time representation produced some discomfort and no spectator 
remained sitting on the Franz West sofa throughout the entire video. Resisting the 
video’s sequence and timing became an important part of the work’s experience but, on 
the other hand, time became its content in an unexpected way. We leave this set of 
characteristics behind since it is not directly connected to our quest, although it seems 
true that, as in the case of the Williams video, there are artworks whose temporal 
manipulation of the spectator’s attention is often exemplified within the art object itself. 
Second, there are “object-based” characteristics. This set of characteristics refers to 
the temporal properties of the work itself since most art forms and artworks require 
time for their being presented to the audience, essentially because they imply (a) a 
vectorized “sequentiality” and (b) a prescribed pace.2 
                                                           
2 The second set: objects of the art form require time in presentation, i.e., they require performance or 
exposition of some sort and their parts are not available at any one moment, but only consecutively; 
objects of the art form consist of elements or parts arranged in a linear order, with definite direction, 
from first to last; objects of the art form are such that non-temporally extended parts of the objects are 
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Finally we have experience-based characteristics and these refer to the temporal 
properties of the observer’s experience of the work and derive from the fact that the 
interaction with the art object “possesses some non-trivial duration (…) or imposed 
linear order” (Levinson & Alperson 1991: 446). This final set is directly connected to 
our inquiry, although it isn’t exactly clear how we can establish a clear cut distinction 
between object-based and experience-based characteristics. For instance, an object’s 
inherent sequentiality obviously conditions the timespan needed for proper 
appreciation and it seems fair to anticipate that “sequential” art objects will require 
more time for proper appreciation than, say, instantaneous or “in your face” objects 
such as haiku poems, easel paintings, and small facades or reliefs (Levinson and 
Alerpson’s examples). Some art objects odd sequentiality may even condition the 
attention timespan in a symbolically significant way (e.g., Joyce’s Ulysses, Alain Resnais’ 
Last Year in Marienbad, Christopher Nolan’s Memento, or Gaspar Noé’s Irreversible). 
Partly to respond to these objections, the authors propose a final characteristic that 
straddles the “experience-based” and the “content-based” classifications:  
Objects of the art form are such that their proper appreciation centrally involves 
understanding of the temporal relations within them. 
We proceed by taking a closer look at the experience-based characteristics proposed 
by Levinson and Alperson: 
1) “Objects of art require time for their proper aesthetic appreciation.” This is such 
an obvious idea and so universally applicable to all artworks that it doesn’t seem 
sufficient to isolate the way time relations may be aesthetically relevant. We shall 
discard them as insignificant in this context. 
2) “Objects of the art form require a significant interval of time for the mere 
perception or apprehension of their full extent.” This notion is closer to our purpose 
although we are looking for something a bit different than the time requirements for 
“mere perception or apprehension” of the complete work, namely what are the intrinsic 
variables in the work that affect the amount of time needed to attain a relevant or 
rewarding aesthetic transaction.  
3) “Objects of the art form are properly experienced in the order in which their 
elements are determinately arranged and at a rate that is either inherent to the artwork 
itself or to its prescribed mode of presentation.” However, sequentiality and pace are 
not always simultaneously present in determining proper fruition of a work. We may 
even propose a typology of forms of art according to the way their intrinsic 
sequentiality and pace determine the way these objects are to be experienced: 
                                                                                                                                                                          
not aesthetically significant (their isolation does not contribute to the full experience of the object); 
objects of the art form are created in the act of presentation, so that the time of creation, time of 
presentation and (usually) time of reception all coincide; objects of the art form require presentation in 
a time lived through and by the presenters; objects of the art form lack relatively fixed identities over 
time, but are mutable and shifting. 
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a) Unchangeable sequentiality and pace. This seems to be characteristic of the 
“performing arts” and a fortiori of improvisational performances where the artist’s fixed 
sequentiality and pace control determine the audience’s attention and prescribe proper 
timing for proper enjoyment. 
b) Unchangeable sequentiality and flexible pace. Novel or poetry present a fixed 
sequentiality, if by that we mean the mere ordering of letters, words and sentences that 
form syntactic meaning. Sequentiality at the higher level of semantic sections is not 
always univocally prescribed since some literary works – like Fernando Pessoa’s The 
Book of Disquiet – may be followed in no particular order. The reader however is able to 
control pace and, therefore, fruition time is quite flexible as well (although there are 
also exceptional cases where poets try to prescribe a certain reading speed3). The 
content of some recorded music and film also allows the user to determine pace of the 
work in toto. Home fruition of some artworks, with the use of DVD and CD players, has 
emancipated the viewer or listener from observing the timing prescribed in the work or 
altering its pace of presentation – interrupting a Bruckner symphony to pick up the 
phone, for instance. This possibility turns the experience of these artworks as at least 
potentially similar to the experience of literature or poetry. Notice that we are referring 
here to the pace of presentation of the whole work, like an entire Bruckner symphony, 
and not to the pace of its musical rhythm. It seems doubtful that a more intense 
interaction with the work, like changing the viewing speed of a DVD or constant shuffle 
of a CD, would qualify as a legitimate fruition of that work – and above a certain degree 
of interaction one could start thinking that a new and altogether different work is being 
produced. (One could argue, of course, that a piecemeal and / or elliptical approach to 
a recorded work is in fact segmenting the work in smaller artistic bits and that these are 
aesthetically experienced per se and with their respective pace and sequential order so 
that the object of aesthetic attention is no longer, say, the entire St. Matthew’s Passion 
but just the aria Können Tränen, with its sequence and pace intact.4 If we accept this 
amendment then the real difference here would lie between those artworks that 
determine and those that merely direct the sequence of their experience, i.e., between the 
performing arts and recorded music and film, on the one hand, and literature, on the 
other.)  
To some extent, I think that architecture matches this strategy of determining 
aesthetic timing. But one should beware not to confuse here mere time for 
apprehending the work (Levinson and Alperson’s characteristic number 1) and the way 
artworks may condition the spectator’s inner sense of time in such a way that it 
becomes a part of the experience thereof. Mutatis mutandis one can easily compare 
                                                           
3 Levinson & Alperson mention the case of Nicole Broissard (442). 
4 Naturally, we are considering here a distinction between live performances and recorded-versions-of-
performances justified by the different role that sequentiality and pace play in our experience. At least in 
this regard, they constitute two different works. 
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sequentiality in fictional works and the notion of “itinerary” in architecture. But are 
these merely referring to configurational properties of the objects involved or do they 
also hint at something of an experiential nature, something similar to the way artistic 
sequence and order affect the spectator’s time of experience? 
Psychologists have studied the means through which architects have learned how to 
guide locomotion and indeed the relative duration between passages and dwelling 
spots. “Progression”, “constriction”, “expansion” are all concepts that literally define 
spatial experiences but can easily become characterizations of the wanderer’s temporal 
relation with buildings: “any passage from a corridor to the sudden expanse of a room 
quickens the visitor’s experience with a visual shock” (Arnheim 1977: 157); if when 
guided through a corridor the viewer finds herself suddenly traversing a large room 
whose main axis is being crossed at a right angle, she loses the visual and kinaesthetic 
support provided by the corridor’s walls and “enjoys the freedom tinged with anxiety of 
being on [her] own” (Arnheim 1977: 157). There is a quickening of experience that is 
often accompanied by a simultaneous impulse to slow down the walking and draw 
closer to the walls, so as to resist this sudden “freedom”. Temporary retardation is also 
an important feature of particularly dynamic architectural pieces, such as Francesco de 
Sanctis’ Piazza di Spagna in Rome. The piazza is quite unusual in its rather paradoxical 
condition of being both a scalinata, i.e., a passing corridor, and a piazza, i.e., a dwelling 
spot. On the one hand, it is a highly vectorized spatial organization thrusting and 
orienting both the visitors walking downwards as well as those who climb the Spanish 
Steps (notice that the fact that is a highly segmented staircase means that it is not 
perceived by the climbing visitor as an insurmountable or difficult obstacle but rather as 
an amenable path towards the church of Trinità dei Monti). On the other hand, it is 
constantly stopping the motion flow with obstacles and belvedere. Its complex 
arrangement of staircases, balustrades and spatial buffers conditions the pedestrian 
experience in such a way that it could be compared to a musical sequence of tension 
(climbing yet another staircase) and resolution (temporarily dwelling on an 
intermediary balcony): “after climbing the first groups of steps, one runs into a 
balustrade, which splits the flow of traffic toward the left and right; and hardly has the 
flow reunited when it is stopped again by another bulwark, surmounted by an obelisk” 
(Arnheim 1977: 159). Robert Venturi (Venturi 1966) has also called the attention to 
the unusual dynamics provided by the entrance to Sainte Madeleine’s Basilique in 
Vézelay in the way it generates a tension of sudden constriction, soon to be resolved 
into new expansion: the access to the church is interrupted by a large central column 
perceived as a clear obstacle that slows down the visitor and makes her look up just to 
find a bas-relief of a welcoming Christ with open arms. The symbolism of the 
architectural gesture is obvious – the entrance becomes an announcement, literally an 
announcement of the main hall – but in view of the massive open space that lays ahead 
it is literally a breaking point – a “traffic-stopping post”, as Arnheim calls it (Arnheim 
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1977: 161) –, holding back and slowing down the visitor, both visually and 
kinaesthetically. 
Thus, at least some highly engaging works of architecture are capable of 
determining a sequence and of conditioning the pace of their experience. A first visit to 
these buildings makes the experience somewhat similar to that of watching a live 
performance. But higher familiarity with the building turns its experience closer to 
reading a literary work. The fact that every visitor of such works retains the option of 
altering the prescribed pace is comparable to the way CD or DVD owners may also 
alter a prescribed mode of presentation. (But likewise, segregated smaller portions of 
the building may still retain a sense of sequence and pace.) 
c) Flexible sequentiality and fixed pace. Some authors argue that videogames should 
be considered as art. If it is so, then some videogames are the closest thing to adopting 
this kind of aesthetic time warp. The ability to change the object’s sequence without 
changing its pace requires a kind of interaction that we probably will only find in this 
kind of products. Of course, not all videogames preserve a fixed pace of presentation 
since different playing modes or styles, and the joint intervention of other co-players, 
inevitably alter the pace.  
d) Flexible sequentiality and pace. If the spectator is free to alter sequentiality and 
pace then it looks as if there’s no more room to believe that phenomenological timing is 
being driven or directed by the piece’s inherent timing. But the fact that to follow a 
prescribed order and pace is not necessary for an adequate appreciation of the work 
does not mean that order and pace are not suggested and that this suggestion is not 
integrated in the observer’s experience. It also does not mean that to follow that 
suggestion is not sufficient to have a proper experience of the work. The fact that the 
observer is free to choose becomes an important component of the object’s 
appreciation. I would like to argue that if time matters in the aesthetic experience of at 
least some painting, then flexible sequentiality and pace constitute the strategy with 
which pictorial art controls the viewer’s time of contemplation.  
But how can we talk about sequentiality and pace in painting? We can acknowledge 
the fact that duration is a component of the appreciation of paintings in at least two 
ways. First, we may rather obviously observe that, as in any other visual experience, 
time is a necessary part of the aesthetic experience of paintings due to the biological 
limitations of our visual sense. Our visual acuity has three distinct sectors. From less to 
higher visual acuity: 1) Peripheral vision, encompassing a visual angle beyond 10 
degrees. At the extreme end of our peripheral vision, we can only detect an object if it is 
moving. 2) Parafoeval vision, encompassing a visual angle of up to 10 degrees. 3) 
Foeval vision, which encompasses a visual angle of only 1-2 degrees. Since the majority 
of our visual neurons (rods and cones) are concentrated in a very small portion at the 
centre of the retina, we can only see clearly what we are directly gazing at. Because of 
this, eye movements or saccadic movements are constantly being made. Through this 
process, objects are constantly being scanned and indeed composed. Saccades occur 
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extremely fast. A 2-degree saccade takes 25 milliseconds and 1 10-degree saccade takes 
about 45 milliseconds. Frequency and duration of visual saccades can be controlled and 
are dependent upon human volition, intention and attention. More recently, and 
following the pioneering work of Soviet psychologists in the sixties, cognitive 
psychologists have introduced technology that allows them to measure the frequency 
and duration of eye movements and have used this to measure the visual scanning of 
artworks (Solso 1996). Experimental data shows that the time of fixation is related to 
the information contained in a picture. Different styles and periods of art produce 
different kinds of saccades and fixations and that the duration of gaze varies 
accordingly. For instance, the average duration of fixation for a Baroque painting, such 
as Tintoretto’s Origin of the Milky Way (1580), filled with all sorts of graphic and 
chromatic details, was about 60 milliseconds briefer than for a more classical picture, 
such as Titian’s Venus of Urbino (1538). In general it is admitted that complex pictures 
(such as Baroque paintings or paintings by Pollock or Vasarely), produce shorter 
fixation times than simple pictures (like those by Mondrian) (Molnar 1981). Now it 
could be rightly argued that acknowledging the occurrence of different types of 
saccades is not peculiar of the perceptual activity involved in painting appreciation. 
Gazing a large natural landscape or a small room will induce similar types of gazes. For 
sequentiality and pace to become factors that distinctively guide the spectator’s 
experience they need to be somehow assumed by the painting itself. Thus, duration as 
intended in this first sense is naturally involved but is not aesthetically relevant. 
A second way would be to consider duration in the way the painter tries to guide the 
perceptual activity of the viewer in a distinct way, namely by proposing a relatively 
flexible (but nonetheless suggested) sequential structure. The eye-brain recursive loop, 
which implies a constant interplay between the eye and the brain (top-down and down-
top visual processing), is intentionally controlled and there are ways of inducing the 
brain as to how (namely, in what order and according to which pace) and what in a 
given object should be causing our attention. For instance, a hypothesis is planted in 
the subject’s mind, who then seeks confirmation by moving her eyes to selected areas. 
Norton and Stark have named these visual itineraries “scanpaths” and have noticed 
that, although the norm is to find idiosyncratic scanpaths, some objects – notably, 
artistic paintings – are able to guide their viewers through a significant number of 
consensual or pre-formatted paths (Norton & Stark 1971: 34-43). Group portraits such 
as those by Rembrandt or Frans Hals belong to the kind of paintings that influence the 
viewer’s intentionality and consequently her eye movements and fixations. An 
important part of this visual guiding technique is based on the fact that primates are 
biologically conditioned to follow the gaze of the primates they are observing. A large 
portrait painting such as Frans Hals’ Banquet of the Officers of the St George Civic Guard 
(1616) offers a complex trail of gazes, which the viewer tends to follow. But even if the 
viewer resists the path prescribed, that sense of inertia is added to the experience and 
arguably influences the duration and sequence of her visual scanpaths. The degree of 
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control that some paintings have over their viewers is quite remarkable but the causes 
of this control are diversified. A related psychological experiment started off by asking 
two groups of fine arts students in Paris to contemplate Rembrandt’s The Anatomy 
Lesson (1632) (Molnar 1981: 385-414). Some idiosyncratic trails notwithstanding, the 
map of both groups’ visual saccades was remarkably similar both in terms of average 
fixation and movement frequency: notably, they all try to follow the gaze of the 
characters involved and shuttle from each character’s face to the corpse that is being 
analysed.  
Therefore, visual complexity but especially content (e.g., trying to decipher the 
hierarchy or social connection between the characters that are being portrayed) 
influences intentionality and intentionality determines the scanpath. But these are not 
the only ways – and arguably not the most aesthetically relevant or cognitively 
rewarding – to condition the timing of visual art experiences. In realistic paintings or, 
more generally, paintings where graphic verisimilitude is a criterion for appraisal, 
optical anomalies may prompt the viewer to engage on a more attentive and timed 
relation with the artwork – we know something is being represented (i.e., something 
other than that which is being figuratively represented) but we don’t know exactly 
what.5 Take the case of Van Dyck’s Equestrian Portrait of Charles I (1638). The 
apparent realism of the portrait is shattered when the viewer starts noticing intriguing 
discrepancies in the painting: we can see the sole of Charles’ riding boots and the belly 
of his horse so we assume that we are watching the scene from a lower ground. But 
when we consider the King’s face one realizes that it is not depicted in the way we 
would realistically expect, if we were to be watching from underneath it. Quite the 
contrary, the King’s head is displayed as if the viewer was looking at him face to face. 
This anomaly prompts the viewer to consider other discrepancies such as the odd 
illumination of the entire scene. This intentional scanning takes time. The painting 
prescribes an experiential duration with proper sequentiality and pace. Step by step, the 
viewer starts to understand that this is not only the portrait of Charles I but an iconic 
representation of a political agenda: the King as primum inter pares, placed above the 
viewer but looking her face to face. 
4) “Objects of the art form generate a kind of time that is peculiar to them, that 
exists for the perceiver only in and through experience of the work.” 
At some point in his theory of aesthetic attitude, Jerome Stolnitz has argued that art 
– all art, that is – provides the observer with a special awareness of time. His argument 
begins with a quite intriguing reinterpretation of the classical notion of 
“disinterestedness”. It goes like this: unlike practical perception, “which serves some 
ongoing purpose pointed toward the future”, when having an aesthetic experience “the 
individual does not look ahead to some future goal” but is “concerned only with the 
                                                           
5 This corresponds to what Noël Carroll calls the conditional generic type of representation in art 
(Carroll 1999).  
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enjoyment of the present moment” (Stolnitz 1960: 65-66). Negating Lessing’s 
traditional distinction between “arts of time” and “spatial arts”, Stolnitz proposed 
instead that the temporal character of aesthetic appreciation constitutes an essential 
aspect of every aesthetic transaction. Art provides the spectator with a special awareness 
of time by drawing attention to the significant connection between the instants that 
compose the experience of art objects. By annulling the utilitarian nature of the object, 
the aesthetic gaze cuts it off from a sort of subservience to the future and allows the 
observer to linger on a circle of meaning where past, present and future dimensions are 
more tightly knit together in a vivid way. 
Certainly, this interrelation is also present in everyday life but the ordinary 
succession of events does not generate any particular interest. Some instances of 
practical experience, however, engage our interest in a far more intense way. A “well 
played chess game”, a doctor’s constant monitoring of her patient’s serious condition 
and, particularly, aesthetic appreciation, are among such instances. In them, our 
“interest is engaged at each moment” and “each moment creates forward-looking 
interest in the next” with an “ever increasing interest in the climax (Stolnitz 1960: 67). 
In art, however, this awareness of the temporal fabric is more intense for each moment 
seems to condense a forward-looking tension – the “protensive” dimension – and a 
vivid memory of the instants that preceded the present one – the “retensive” character. 
The aesthetic kind of protensive expectation, however, should be distinguished from its 
mundane version. Practical anticipation means that we are looking forward to 
something that comes as a consequence of the experience – a gain of a non-
phenomenological nature, so to speak – whereas aesthetic keenness awaits for 
something which is an inextricable part of the experience “which is had just for the sake 
of having the experience” (Stolnitz 1960: 69). Sitting in the concert hall, instead of 
anticipating the way this performance will provide a great conversation topic while 
hanging out with my friends after the usual Saturday night concert, I notice the way 
every passage in the last movement of Mahler’s Sixth Symphony prepares the 
autobiographic hammer blows that close the piece. 
The fact that this intentional imbrication of “before” and “after” is integral to our 
appreciation of art forms characterized by sequentiality and pace seems undisputed. 
But how can we apply to painting, sculpture and architecture Morris charming 
description of each aesthetic moment as “an elegant present having a future”? Stolnitz 
tries to do this by employing two temporal notions: “rhythm” and “movement”. As we 
have done in point 3 above, Stolnitz notices that the experience of “spatial arts” also 
occurs in and through time and that every work prescribes a given “rhythm” of 
apprehension, namely because of the way eye movements anticipate future 
“occurrences” as they scan the object. Significantly, the “rhythmic pattern” can be 
altered and thus the rhythm in which the viewer apprehends a painting or a building 
may shift as a kind of variation on top of the object’s visual dynamics “just as the ‘beat’ 
in music can be syncopated or as subtle modifications can be made in the meter of a 
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poem (Stolnitz 1960: 70). The awareness that some visual artworks prescribe a rhythm 
of apprehension that is seldom perceived in more common objects “helps to unify and 
‘hold together’ “ the viewer’s experience. But of course rhythm – if by that we mean a 
“rhythmically ordered succession of like elements” (Stolnitz 1960: 71) – is not a 
common characteristic of all visual arts. For the most part, we would rather speak of 
“movement”. “Movement in the picture” refers to the way a vectorized graphical 
sequence guides the spectator’s gaze and it is thus a phenomenological trait of aesthetic 
appreciation. We referred earlier to the way group portraits of the Flemish tradition 
inspire the viewer to follow a visual track. But Stolnitz provides an even more eloquent 
example: Roger Fry’s description of Correggio’s “Jupiter and Antiope”:  
 
… The figure is lying on the ground turned diagonally to the picture plane, so that the eye in 
following the sequence of its planes carried forcibly back into the depths of the wood behind, whilst 
a counterbalancing diagonal movement of the figure of Jupiter brings us back again with a kind of 
spiral movement, thus closing and completing an asymmetrical but perfectly self-contained rhythm 
phrase. 
 
Along these lines, one could add that a way to perceive “movement within the 
picture” is to consider how some variation paintings allude to their model painting’s 
graphic dynamics thus inducing a kind of temporal shift in the spectator’s experience. 
This is what happens when we compare Manet’s Olympia to its model, the Venus of 
Urbino by Titian.  
Visual cues in sculpture are even more numerous given the wider extension of its 
stylistic tools and its hold of the viewer’s attention: “thrust and recession, light and 
shadow, heaviness and buoyancy can create a little drama in its own right” (Stolnitz 
1960: 72). All things considered, the tighter control with which the so-called temporal 
arts prescribe a sequence of events and a pace of experience is merely a difference of 
degree vis-à-vis the “spatial arts”. 
Thus, if all these elements hold, then Stolnitz is justified in concluding that “all art is 
temporal when viewed aesthetically”. An important caveat though is that familiarity 
with the work of art is necessary in order for the observer to be engaged on a proper 
“recollection of the past and imaginative anticipation of the future”. Aesthetic 
experience is therefore cumulative and suitable awareness of a work’s structure, formal 
organization and unity is often the product of repeated exposition to the work. 
Anticipating the objection that this addendum seems to neglect the performing arts, for 
which repeated experience is not available, Stolnitz mentions the importance of the 
reprise in jazz as a way to achieve something of a retensive and protensive nature: 
 
[I]mprovisation can be so fanciful that it seems to take us thousands of light-years away from the 
original melody. But then the music simply turns a corner, and we are back at the melody. The 
experience has been rich and diverse, but it is tied together by this return (Stolnitz 1960: 75). 
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However, the “familiarity” clause may complicate things a bit because it reveals the 
persistence of a strong difference between our awareness of time in the so-called 
temporal and spatial arts. In temporal arts, the duration of implementation runs 
together with the duration of appreciation. I.e., the time necessary for exposing the 
work necessarily affects the spectator’s psychological time, what Bergson called “la 
durée”, or inner time. This does not seem to be the case within the “spatial arts”. Even if 
the spectator loses herself in contemplation of a painting it isn’t clear how the painting’s 
“rhythm” or “movement” necessarily affects her. Scale and level of detail may play an 
important part in this respect but familiarity with the work will eventually smoothen 
and facilitate our perception of the whole. Familiarity with a musical piece or a narrative 
fiction, however, will never reduce the physical amount of time necessary for the 
retensive-protensive attention to work. Using my CD’s remote control I may fast 
forward to the different climaxes in the fourth movement of Mahler’s Sixth Symphony. 
But this will annul its momentum, which has to be experienced as searching for closure 
in successive waves of anticipation. The succession of musical instants up to that 
moment is a necessary condition for a proper – call it “prescribed” – appreciation of 
that instant with its complete and complex load of retentions. Nothing of this sort seems 
to be possible in the visual arts. Fascinating as it may be to follow Fry’s spiral movement 
in Correggio’s Jupiter’s painting, each visual segment can be appreciated per se without 
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AUGUSTIN DUMONT 
LA DUPLICITÀ DEL SIMBOLISMO 
NELLA PITTURA ROMANTICA TEDESCA  









In queste pagine, ci si propone di tracciare un filo rosso nel romanticismo tedesco, 
mobilitando diversi aspetti dell’apparato interdisciplinare che esso stesso ha istituito 
(critica, filosofia, letteratura, scienza, arti plastiche) allo scopo di esaminare la sua 
dimensione plastica. Si può enunciare subito la tesi del presente lavoro con una formula 
che, in un primo momento, apparirà certamente banale: circoscritta qui alle sue due più 
grandi figure, Caspar David Friedrich (1774-1840) e Philipp Otto Runge (1777-1810), 
la pittura romantica tedesca vuol essere al tempo stesso una pittura critica, più 
precisamente un’autocritica tragica, e una pittura che sarà spesso definita mistica, alla 
ricerca di una presentazione simbolica dell’assoluto. Nei due casi, il linguaggio pittorico 
si esprime attraverso la mediazione del simbolo, ma per certi aspetti anche del racconto. 
La differenza sta nel fatto che il simbolismo vuol essere autonomo e riflessivo nel caso 
dell’autocritica, laddove la seconda tendenza mira alla chiusura dell’orizzonte del senso 
privilegiando nettamente l’allegoria. Friedrich appartiene alla prima tendenza, Runge 
alla seconda. Nonostante i progetti di Runge e di Friedrich siano irriducibili l’uno 
all’altro, vale la pena di considerare la pittura romantica tedesca come un tutto, benché 
certamente scisso, in quanto essa è animata, anche in Carus e persino in Dahl, da una 
simile volontà di rottura con l’arte neoclassica. Friedrich e Runge problematizzano 
entrambi il rapporto dell’assoluto con la sua immagine, o dell’infinito con il finito, in un 
modo alquanto inedito, tale da richiamare ancor oggi l’attenzione sulla nostra eredità 
della modernità. La pittura romantica tedesca in quanto tale è dunque attraversata o 
sostenuta da un’esitazione, come da un’onda anomala, da un’instabilità, un costante 
sfocato, che è opportuno evidenziare. Sarà privilegiata qui la figura meno conosciuta di 
Runge prima di metterla in prospettiva con quella di Friedrich. 
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1. Runge, Schelling e Tieck 
 
Si può partire da una nota ritrovata tra i fogli di Henrik Steffens, discepolo di 
Schelling e amico di Runge, a proposito del Mattino (in particolare la versione: Der 
Kleine Morgen del 1808): “Rappresentazione allegorica della filosofia schellinghiana” 
(citata da Tunner 1991: 60). A prima vista, questa nota appare singolare, soprattutto se 
si considera tutta l’energia dispiegata dai romantici per rendere autonoma l’arte e per 
liberarla dalle sue dipendenze, per emanciparla dalla mimèsis classica in tutte le sue 
forme. Il principale abbaglio del filosofo non è forse di credere ancora, all’epoca del 
romanticismo, che un’opera d’arte si presenti o che possa porsi come una semplice 
illustrazione o imitazione, non soltanto degli antichi ma anche di un certo corpus della 
storia della filosofia? L’imitazione fedele di scene religiose o storiche nella pittura 
classica, è screditata nell’arte romantica – ed è il minimo che si possa dire – a favore 
della sua autopoiesi, ovvero della sua performatività. L’arte romantica si associa 
maggiormente ad una forma di riflessività, d’inedita mise en abyme, in quanto l’artista 
non deve più soltanto introdursi nel suo quadro (il riferimento è ovviamente a Las 
Meninas e alla sua posterità), ma deve riflettere nella tela, come ha scritto Élisabeth 
Décultot (Décultot 1997: 152), le condizioni di possibilità dell’interpretazione di una 
tela, e deve persino istituire tali condizioni “inventando” un pubblico e reinventando la 
critica – questa riflessività è un elemento costante della Frühromantik. Come potrebbe 
dunque un’opera tanto potente e originale come il Mattino non esser altro che la 
semplice illustrazione di un’opera preliminare e di un corpus filosofico? Questo sembra 
indicare la nota di Steffens: che il Mattino non sia altro se non una mera trasposizione in 
termini pittorici di un sistema filosofico, dunque un’imitazione più che una creazione 
indipendente e autonoma. Eppure, tutto porta a credere che Steffens, di certo zelante 
promotore della Naturphilosophie schellinghiana, non esageri troppo. Le testimonianze 
concordano: durante le sue conversazioni con il pittore, Steffens riesce a suscitare in 
Runge un vero entusiasmo per Schelling, il successore di Fichte a Jena, e a renderlo 
cosciente della profonda convergenza tra le loro forti aspirazioni religiose. In una lettera 
a Schelling del 1810, Runge, al quale è appena stato regalato lo scritto intitolato Ricerche 
filosofiche sull’essenza della libertà umana, confessa al suo corrispondente, senza 
nascondergli peraltro le difficoltà di tale lettura, la sua immensa gioia “perché ho 
ritrovato in esso la stessa concezione sotto il cui profilo è sempre apparsa anche a me la 
totalità di ciò che potevo vedere” (Runge 1840-41 I: 156 e segg.; trad. it. Runge 1985: 
185). Ovviamente, si sarà già capito, se il Mattino è un modo di narrare su tela il 
pensiero di Schelling, si deve cogliere in esso una forma di traduzione in senso forte, 
una forma d’interpretazione creatrice. D’altronde, per essere un minimo fedele alla 
concezione schellinghiana dell’arte come potenza della filosofia, la singola opera 
pittorica deve esprimere un passaggio alla potenza e non una piatta illustrazione. Nel 
Frammento di saggio per una teoria dei colori, Runge scrive: 
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Osserva dunque al tuo intorno il mondo colorato, in cui ogni forma ti si affratella nel significato e 
ogni cosa, piccola o grande che sia, è misteriosamente abitata dal medesimo, struggente anelito 
[Sehnsucht] e cerca di trovare il principio perenne dal quale scaturisce ogni diversità (Runge 1840-
41 I: 69 e seguenti ; trad. it. Runge, 2008: 44). 
 
Questa ricerca di un principio unico, di una Luce eterna che genera tutti i colori, e 
con loro tutte le creature, allo scopo di vedersi nelle sue molteplici variazioni, o di 
prendere coscienza di se stessa nelle sue differenze, è chiaramente il segno di 
un’ispirazione schellinghiana e böhmiana. L’idea di una fusione della sensazione e della 
riflessione nell’opera, che deve toccare, secondo Runge, “l’uomo rozzo, il dilettante e 
l’artista” (Runge 1840-41 I: 69; trad. Runge 2008: 46), ricorda in particolare Schelling. 
L’arte, nella quale, secondo il Sistema dell’idealismo trascendentale del 1800, devono 
riunirsi il soggettivo e l’oggettivo, la libertà e la natura, il conscio e l’inconscio, può 
essere interpretata a partire dalla libertà umana così come a partire dalla natura. 
Riflettendosi nei suoi prodotti, negli enti, la natura come massa oggettiva prende 
coscienza di se stessa e si soggettivizza; dall’altro lato, la libertà soggettiva si oggettivizza 
riflettendosi e fissandosi in delle rappresentazioni. Per quanto riguarda le produzioni 
artistiche, esse si situano all’esatta giuntura dei due processi, poiché si tratta di 
rappresentazioni generate liberamente dallo spirito in vista di un fine particolare, pur 
essendo il frutto di una spinta della natura nell’artista stesso, di una natura naturans 
incosciente della sua finalità. Destinato a sfuggire continuamente all’oggettivazione, 
l’assoluto può tuttavia essere rivelato in modo privilegiato, secondo Schelling, 
dall’opera d’arte, ed è questa la missione dell’intuizione estetica. Sovvertendo 
l’intuizione intellettuale di Fichte, che intendeva con tale concetto l’acquisizione 
immediata da parte dell’Io della sua attività infinita nonostante la limitazione sensibile 
prodotta dall’atto stesso di quest’acquisizione, Schelling vede nell’arte il mezzo di 
risollevare, o di sublimare, il deposito oggettivo dell’intuizione pura di sé. In effetti, se 
l’intuizione intellettuale fichtiana permette al filosofo di accedere al carattere infinito 
della riflessività, ciò avviene nonostante il richiamo alla sua finitezza, a dispetto della 
limitazione indotta dall’atto di prendere coscienza di sé. Schelling si aspetta invece che 
la sua intuizione estetica oggettivizzi l’inoggettivabile, che essa oggettivizzi questa 
coincidenza del finito e dell’infinito, che deponga nel prodotto finito, tramite il genio, 
l’intuizione intellettuale in quanto tale, che permetta letteralmente di vedere la 
coscienza dell’assoluto (cfr. Tilliette 1995: 53-70 e 175-191). In altri termini, 
l’intuizione estetica permette al tempo stesso al genio di produrre le belle opere e a 
chiunque di cogliervi l’assoluta identità del soggetto e dell’oggetto, a cominciare dal 
filosofo, che delega peraltro all’artista, all’epoca del Sistema del 1800, il potere di riunire 
ciò che può solo dividere. Fecondando reciprocamente l’immaginazione cosciente dello 
spirito e l’immaginazione inconscia della natura, l’opera d’arte identifica propriamente 
l’assoluto, nel senso che fornisce un luogo all’identità radicale del soggetto e 
dell’oggetto, un solo ed unico luogo, da dove deriva, secondo Schelling, il carattere 
profondamente unico di tutte le opere singolari. Come scrive Runge seguendo 
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un’ispirazione deliberatamente schellinghiana, l’uomo incolto è colpito e trasformato 
dall’arte perché l’opera rivela a tutti la Rivelazione, la eleva a potenza – la Rivelazione 
che si offre già da sé vale soltanto per l’élite in grado di percepirla, come natura e come 
spirito. Si tengano a mente queste brevi considerazioni sulla filosofia schellinghiana del 
1800, in particolare la volontà di una presentazione dell’assoluto in quanto tale, 
l’esigenza di una riunificazione della natura e della libertà umana, o la confluenza delle 
due immaginazioni, ovvero delle due maniere tramite cui l’assoluto si fa immagine 
nell’ordine delle creature. 
Si potrebbero certamente tentare audaci accostamenti con l’estetica del sistema 
dell’identità, insegnata a Jena e a Würzburg tra il 1802 e il 1805, e contemporanea dei 
primi grandi progetti estetici di Runge. Senza dubbio, quest’ultimo è entrato in contatto 
con lo spirito generale di questa fase della filosofia schellinghiana. Ma quali aspetti 
dell’estetica possono filtrare attraverso Steffens? Ci si accontenterà qui di ricordare che 
il grande concetto della filosofia dell’identità, quello di punto d’indifferenza, è 
esplicitamente ripreso da Runge – si vedrà in che modo singolare. In Schelling, esso 
designa l’identità totale e incondizionata del soggetto e dell’oggetto, ovvero la 
negazione e l’abolizione di tutte le loro differenze, o anche l’essere considerato in se 
stesso, in quanto tale, e non dal punto di vista finito dell’esistente – ciò che verrà 
chiamato, in una parola, l’assoluto. Nell’estetica dell’identità, l’arte, che contiene al suo 
interno una serie reale – quella delle arti plastiche – e una serie ideale – quella delle arti 
della parola -, si presenta come una “costruzione” capace di riunire i contrari, che 
l’analisi filosofica dovrà esaurire e sopprimere, allo scopo di evidenziare la sua 
appartenenza alla pura identità. L’arte nella sua interezza appare allora, in primo luogo, 
come l’ultima potenza della serie ideale, ossia della manifestazione dell’assoluto in 
quanto spirito, prima di elevare a potenza la filosofia stessa, in tutte le sue parti, come 
riunione dell’ideale e del reale. La chiusura dell’arte in se stessa richiesta dal sistema 
dell’identità è mostrata da Runge sicuramente nel modo più efficace che ci sia. Questi 
non avrebbe rinnegato le righe d’apertura del corso d’estetica di Schelling: “Resta molto 
cammino da percorrere a colui che non abbia compreso che l’arte è, proprio come la 
natura, un tutto chiuso, organico e necessario in tutte le sue parti” (Schelling 1999: 49). 
Ciò detto, è impossibile misurare il debito reale di Runge nei confronti del sistema 
dell’identità, e in particolare della sua estetica. Tanto più che quest’ultima si basa su 
un’opposizione marcata tra simbolo e allegoria in fin dei conti estranea al giovane 
pittore. Se l’opera d’arte riunisce l’universale e il particolare nel particolare, secondo 
Schelling essa non può farlo se non tramite il simbolo. Ispirandosi a Goethe, il filosofo 
sottolinea il carattere semplicemente funzionale dell’allegoria, puramente transitiva, 
laddove, come scrive Caroline Sulzer commentando Schelling, 
 
nel simbolo si trova l’identità che deve essere mostrata in quanto tale e non di fronte ad una 
determinazione funzionale diretta. Il simbolo soddisfa l’esigenza di Schelling di presentazione 
artistica assoluta, che si collega alla presentazione con indifferenza totale, in modo che l’universale 
sia totalmente il particolare e il particolare l’universale, ma senza che lo dimostrino. La 
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significazione diventa al tempo stesso l’Essere, trasferito nell’oggetto, e il simbolo, il paradigma 
della filosofia dell’identità (Sulzer 1999: 37). 
 
Pertanto, è abbastanza strano descrivere proprio l’arte rungiana come un’allegoria 
del sistema di Schelling. Eppure, la formulazione paradossale di Steffens propone 
qualcosa di interessante. Si vedrà allora Runge attaccarsi con precisione all’allegoria, e 
cercare una presentazione autentica dell’identità assoluta che sia innanzitutto la 
significazione, pienamente transitiva, di un’identità passata, quella che precede il peccato 
originale. Pur trattandosi di un tempo mitico, di un tempo fuori dal tempo, esso 
appartiene tuttavia, dal punto di vista dell’opera d’arte umana e storica, al passato, o 
meglio: all’origine. Ecco che si impone l’allegoria. Il sistema schellinghiano, dal canto 
suo, difende l’aspetto eterno dell’arte, perché in esso le opposizioni temporali e storiche 
non fanno parte dell’essenza o dell’identità, ma semplicemente della sua presentazione 
formale. L’opera e la filosofia che la commenta possono dunque esprimere una 
presentazione dell’assoluto e indifferenziare il tempo senza eludere in tal modo la 
storicità dell’opera, come ha sottolineato di recente, e in modo estremamente 
convincente, Mildred Galland-Szymkowiak (cfr. Galland-Szymkowiak 2013: 187-203). 
Secondo Schelling, l’allegoria esiste proprio come un momento storico dell’arte – 
quello dell’arte cristiana dove il finito è destinato ad essere solo l’allegoria dell’infinito 
(cfr. Schelling 1999: 121) -, ma dal punto di vista logico e sistematico, l’arte è per 
essenza simbolica. Per capire meglio questa divergenza con Runge, è indispensabile 
approfondire l’itinerario del pittore. 
Stabilitosi a Dresda su consiglio di Friedrich, dopo aver frequentato, come lui 
d’altronde, l’Accademia delle Belle Arti di Copenaghen, Runge si nutre della sua famosa 
Gemäldegalerie intorno alla quale gravitano gli artisti e da cui gli scrittori dell’epoca 
traggono ispirazione, a cominciare da Schelling e da tutti gli autori dell’Athenäum. Ma 
alla stessa epoca, Runge fa un secondo incontro – sempre a Dresda -, ancor più decisivo 
di quello con Steffens: quello con Ludwig Tieck, l’inventore del meraviglioso moderno 
e uno dei più importanti scrittori del primo romanticismo tedesco, la cui genialità di 
narratore fu ben presto riconosciuta. Il suo grande romanzo iniziatico Franz Sternbalds 
Wanderungen, pubblicato tre anni prima, nel 1798, aveva scosso il giovane pittore a tal 
punto da determinare, secondo le sue stesse parole, la sua vocazione di pittore. Durante 
la lettura stessa del romanzo, Runge s’identifica immediatamente all’eroe, il giovane 
apprendista pittore Franz, discepolo fittizio di Albrecht Dürer, pittore e teorico dell’arte 
tedesca del Rinascimento. Sente immediatamente il desiderio d’illustrare – un’altra 
volta – il romanzo, così come ha voluto illustrare, in modo più indiretto, l’estetica 
schellinghiana. Le fasi del giorno sono dunque, come riconosce lo stesso Runge, un 
prolungamento della sua lettura di Tieck. Il vero incontro con lo scrittore nel 1801 gli 
apre definitivamente le porte del mondo dello spirito. Secondo Johann Daniel Runge, 
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fratello del pittore, Tieck è la personalità che esercitò su di lui l’influenza maggiore.1 Lo 
scrittore funge per Runge da mediatore delle riflessioni dell’Athenäum, in particolare di 
quelle di Wackenroder e di Novalis. Più tardi Runge si familiarizzerà ugualmente con 
quelle di Ritter e di Schubert. Ma Tieck è anche il tramite per la filosofia del mistico 
tedesco Jakob Böhme, nella quale è immerso in quel periodo, così come lo sono Baader 
e soprattutto Schelling stesso, le cui strutture triadiche dell’estetica sono un richiamo 
trasparente alla struttura ternaria della realtà per Böhme (l’oscurità, la luce e il divenire 
dell’una nell’altra). Se in seguito Runge è noto soprattutto per la sua rivoluzionaria 
teoria dei colori, concretizzata nella celebre Farbenkugel, alla quale Goethe stesso diede 
il suo consenso, vedendovi la prima teoria dei colori alternativa a quella di Newton e 
alla sua, questa teoria si pone deliberatamente in continuità con la cosmologia e la 
metafisica schellinghiano-böhmiana. 
Dal canto suo, Tieck ha come progetto – un progetto rimasto alla fine lettera morta 
– di fornire alle Fasi la scrittura mancante, di “commentarle” in qualche modo. Ecco un 
caso dei tipici “passaggi” tra le arti e le scienze di cui pullula il romanticismo. Non 
appena venuto a conoscenza dei disegni di Runge, Tieck ne è sconvolto, come prima lo 
era stato Runge per il suo romanzo. Ques’ultimo racconta al fratello il silenzio 
meravigliato di Tieck davanti agli schizzi di Fasi, e poi la sua impressione di trovarsi 
brutalmente davanti all’arte dei nuovi tempi, che non avrebbe mai potuto immaginare 
così chiaramente.  
Tuttavia, in veste di buon romantico di Jena, Tieck rimane esattamente sulla 
frontiera tra l’arte come autocritica detentrice della sua tragedia e l’arte come nuova 
assunzione dell’assoluto, in un senso più schellinghiano. Tieck incarna pienamente 
l’esitazione di cui si parlava nell’introduzione. Quest’esitazione è costitutiva del suo 
stile, il meraviglioso tieckiano che non rinuncia mai – anzi – all’ironia critica 
dell’Athenäum e allo scarto tragico che separa la produzione creatrice dalla 
presentazione astorica dell’assoluto, alla quale, in fin dei conti, Tieck non crede. Per 
questa ragione, progressivamente, si allontana da Runge, come ricorda Érika Tunner: 
 
Tieck, angosciato, straziato, soggetto a gravi crisi di melanconia nevrastenica, è incapace, alla fine, 
di condividere sia la fede solida, serena, in fondo incrollabile del suo amico, sia le sue convinzioni 
forse troppo affermative, troppo intransigenti. Runge, dal canto suo, non è per nulla incline allo 
scherzo e non ha quel gusto dell’ironia acerba con la quale Tieck sa talvolta guardare agli eventi, 
anche solo per lottare contro i suoi terrori irragionevoli (Tunner 1991: 16). 
 
Sempre in una prospettiva postkantiana, Tieck, ispirato dalla terza Critica ma anche, 
in modo forse più contraddittorio, dall’indicibile della mistica renana, teme anche che 
in Runge il mistero della genialità venga soppresso da un simbolismo troppo didattico. 
                                                           
1 Il giovane pittore scrive a sua madre: "Non ho trovato nessuno che mi capisca interamente, nessuno da 
capire a mia volta, al di fuori di Tieck" (Runge 1840-41: 181 ss.). 
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Secondo l’estetica kantiana, la natura attraversa e guida il genio senza che questo possa 
nominare il concetto che presiede alla sua creazione; ma pare che Runge non possa 
impedirsi, mentre elabora la sua grande opera, di dipingere le definizioni che 
accompagnano i simboli utilizzati, cosa contro cui Tieck lo mette in guardia. Ma se lui 
per parte sua non se ne cura troppo, Steffens fa in fondo un’osservazione simile a 
proposito della pittura di Runge. Nelle sue Memorie del circolo romantico, in cui traccia 
un ritratto emozionante di quest’ultimo, Steffens nota: “Per quanto le sue produzioni ci 
sembrino enigmatiche, questi enigmi possiedono un senso. Non ci fanno indietreggiare, 
ma ci affascinano, e noi non potremmo abbandonarli senza aver tentato di tutto per 
risolverli” (Steffens 1991: 65). In questo senso, è molto avvincente constatare che 
Tieck, l’autore di alcuni racconti romantici tra i più enigmatici, entra alla fine in 
collisione con l’esigenza rungiana di una risoluzione dell’enigma e di una coincidenza 
totale dell’opera con se stessa, unico supporto autentico di una presentazione finita 
dell’infinito o, se si preferisce, dell’assoluto. Ancor prima del completamento del 
Mattino, l’amicizia tra i due uomini è svanita. 
 
2. La funzione del paesaggio nel simbolismo plastico rungiano 
 
In un breve saggio, lo scrittore Joseph Görres, come spiega lui stesso, ha tentato di 
tradurre in parole ciò che Runge ha cercato di esprimere tramite l’immagine in Le fasi 
del giorno. Verso la fine del testo, precisa: 
 
Questo modo di pensare, qualifichiamolo dunque un geroglifico dell’arte, un simbolismo plastico! In 
quanto la natura ha costituito i corpi a partire dagli elementi, la vita afferra la materia per 
trasformarla in forme organiche. L’arte, a sua volta, riprende queste forme e riversa su di esse, nel 
quadro, l’armonia e la bellezza ideale. L’idea, infine, coglie la forma bella. Fornisce a se stessa la 
parola, come fa lo spirito, e pronuncia delle parole significative e profonde, delle parole sacre che 
bisognerebbe ascoltare con raccoglimento (Görres 1991: 83). 
 
Il simbolismo plastico: tale denominazione definisce in modo abbastanza preciso 
l’opera rungiana. L’arte non si pone in rottura con la natura, ma ne prolunga la forza 
creatrice fino al simbolo, dove sorge l’idea, che è la coscienza di sé della natura. Ma di 
quale simbolo e di quale natura si tratta? Se davvero l’artista eleva a potenza, seppure 
riadattandolo, il progetto estetico più ambizioso dell’idealismo all’inizio del XIX secolo, 
quello di Schelling – sotteso a sua volta da Böhme –, appoggiandosi alla finzione 
letteraria del Franz Sternbald, resta ancora da definire con precisione, al fine di non 
trascurare il progetto estetico di Runge, la sorte che quest’ultimo riserva al simbolismo. 
Non è infatti sufficiente affermare che l’allegoria rimpiazza il simbolo. 
Si è ripetuto più volte come le ambizioni artistiche di Runge si cristallizzino attorno 
al paesaggio. Se non altro si ritrovano lì le sue ambizioni teoriche, perché se ha voluto 
essere l’ideatore di una nuova pittura di paesaggio, alla fine l’ha sperimentata meno di 
Friedrich, il quale, viceversa, non ha quasi per nulla teorizzato la sua pratica. Non si 
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tratta soltanto di realizzare un genere già sperimentato nel corso del XVIII secolo da 
Nicolas Poussin o da Claude Lorrain, si tratta più fondamentalmente di rivedere la 
gerarchia tradizionale, per la quale la pittura di tema storico costituisce la pittura 
superiore. Se l’arte del paesaggio, definita Landschafterei in una lettera al fratello del 
febbraio 1802 (cfr. Runge 1840-41 I : 5 e seguenti), è superiore all’imitazione di scene 
storiche, ciò si deve al fatto che il suo linguaggio simbolico è più potente di quello della 
storia, per delle ragioni esse stesse storiche. Tutti concordano oggi nel riconoscere nello 
schema storico rungiano l’influenza determinante di Tieck. Quest’ultimo suggerisce al 
suo amico, all’epoca in cui i loro rapporti sono buoni, un paragone tra la storia delle 
religioni e la storia dell’arte, secondo il quale 
 
le fasi di declino che ha conosciuto ciascuna delle grandi religioni della storia dell’umanità 
corrispondono anche ai momenti in cui sono stati prodotti i più grandi capolavori: l’arte raggiunge 
un apice solo quando esprime, in una specie di canto del cigno, la quintessenza di una religione sul 
suo declino (Décultot 1994: 43). 
 
E Runge fornisce un contenuto proprio, sul quale non ci soffermeremo, a questo 
schema formale: all’età dell’Egitto antico succede l’epoca greca, alla quale succedono 
nella stessa epoca i “Romani moderni” – l’espressione è di Runge – e l’era del 
cattolicesimo con il primato del genere storico, il cui declino e tramite esso l’avvento 
delle opere maggiori è segnato dalla Riforma. In questo modo, non è lui, Runge, a farci 
entrare nell’arte del paesaggio – la quarta epoca – ma, molto curiosamente, Raffaello e 
Michelangelo. Realizzando la pittura storica di un mondo cattolico in declino, essi 
inaugurano da lontano una nuova epoca, in quanto le loro opere oltrepassano già la 
semplice composizione storica. L’apice della pittura di paesaggio coinciderà secondo 
Runge con il declino, già iniziato, del protestantesimo. Una lettera a Tieck del dicembre 
1802, presentata come il seguito di una discussione in corso, esprime molto 
chiaramente ciò che intende per paesaggio, e vale la pena di citarne un lungo passaggio: 
 
Il significato del paesaggio risiederebbe ora nella proposizione opposta, secondo la quale l’uomo in 
tutti i fiori e in tutte le piante così come in tutte le manifestazioni di natura non vedrebbe che se 
stesso, le proprie qualità e passioni. Fiori e alberi mi ricordano con sempre più certezza ed evidenza 
che in ognuno di essi vi è un certo spirito, un certo concetto e sentimento umano, e la cosa mi 
appare con tanta chiarezza che credo essa debba avere origine dal paradiso. Ciò è quanto di più 
puro abbiamo al mondo e in cui possiamo riconoscere Dio o la sua immagine, l’immagine alla quale 
Dio, durante la creazione, diede appunto il nome di uomo. L’uomo non può insomma farsi 
un’immagine di Dio, ma è piuttosto come nella Bibbia sta scritto: “Allora il Signore Dio plasmò dal 
suolo ogni sorta di bestie selvatiche e tutti gli uccelli del cielo e li condusse all’uomo, per vedere 
come li avrebbe chiamati: in qualunque modo l’uomo avesse chiamato ognuno degli esseri viventi, 
quello doveva essere il nome”. Il passo si potrebbe interpretare dicendo che le cose della natura 
devono avere lo spirito che in esse l’uomo ha posto. Così si realizza anche il vero fiore, poiché credo 
che qui siano intesi anche i fiori, e dovremmo ricercare quali nomi valgono per essi. […] Credo 
veramente che i fiori siano almeno per me delle creature comprensibili […] Già nella 
composizione dei fiori vorrei esprimere l’idea della origine prima, mettendo il giglio nella luce più 
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alta, circondato da fiori rossi, gialli e azzurri, là dove una quercia stende come un eroe i rami su di 
esso. I fiori devono ricevere il loro significato, propriamente, attraverso la gaia musica della fonte, 
che in loro si perde, e la composizione dell’una deve essere la composizione degli altri, cosicché 
l’una sia coordinata agli altri. Lo spirito, inoltre, così come è nei fiori è anche negli alberi. È 
necessario infine che non solo si individuino le figure, ma anche il momento giusto rispetto ai fiori, 
e penso che sia possibile trattandosi essenzialmente di coraggio e di esercizio […] Mi pare 
insomma di poter dire che se in tutte le composizioni di fiori venisse dipinto il sentimento umano, il 
sentimento ogni volta necessario, la gente si abituerebbe a poco a poco a pensarlo come sempre 
presente. […] Il tutto dovrebbe per il presente condurre più che altro in direzione dell’arabesco e 
del geroglifico, e da questi soltanto il paesaggio dovrebbe prendere le mosse, non diversamente da 
come anche la composizione storica ha preso le mosse da essi (Runge 1840-41 I: 23 ; trad. 1985: 
81-85). 
 
Runge non si nasconde: la nuova pittura di paesaggio conduce al paradiso. 
Sostenuto o manifestato dalla tela, tale paradiso dovrebbe permettere di riconoscere 
Dio nella sua immagine, o addirittura di riconoscere Dio al di là dell’immagine – 
l’esitazione dell’autore è sorprendente in questo caso. La natura viva, quella che ci si 
deve sforzare di dipingere, parla un linguaggio oramai cifrato e geroglifico, ma ancora 
capace di entrare immediatamente in risonanza con il vero linguaggio dell’uomo. Infatti 
è stato quest’ultimo a battezzare la natura all’origine: non con le parole di cui si serve 
oggi ma con la lingua adamica. Oggi, questa lingua è tanto enigmatica per l’uomo 
quanto lo è la lingua dei fiori, essendo la stessa. La lingua adamica esiste nell’uomo 
oramai soltanto all’interno delle sue sensazioni, dei suoi sentimenti, dei suoi affetti, che 
sono il linguaggio divino stesso. I fiori, in particolare, e i loro colori, attraggono 
costantemente Runge. Erano là quando Yahvé ha creato il suolo, insiste, e non hanno 
vissuto il peccato originale, al contrario dell’uomo. Renderli tramite il pennello, 
equivale a far risuonare la lingua d’Adamo dentro di sé, parlata ancor oggi dai fiori, 
ancorché questa stessa lingua si sottragga al nostro linguaggio verbale. 
La certezza di Runge secondo la quale è possibile rendere (di nuovo) comprensibile 
il linguaggio dei fiori ricordandosi il nome che l’uomo stesso gli aveva dato prima del 
peccato originale sarà presto criticata da Tieck. Toccare il fiore nel suo cuore, si è visto, 
significa per Runge dipingere con certezza la sensazione umana che l’accompagna e il 
cui linguaggio ricopre quello del fiore. Non si tratta neanche più di un semplice ideale: 
“Penso che sia possibile”, scrive il pittore al suo corrispondente. È certo alla 
reminiscenza che si fa appello, ma questa declassa evidentemente la memoria storica, ed 
è per tale ragione che la pittura di paesaggio va oltre la pittura storica, senza per questo 
contraddirla. Infatti, la composizione storica procede anche, o meglio procede già, 
dall’arabesco e dal geroglifico, eppure crede di poter ultimare la decifrazione dell’uomo 
senza passare attraverso la natura. Se il paesaggio dialoga sempre con l’umano, ciò 
avviene in un modo al tempo stesso più astratto e più potente, perché il sentimento 
puro, ovvero la lingua delle origini, è convocata immediatamente. Soltanto essa 
corrisponde alla natura stessa, che costituisce, come dice Runge senza esitazioni, a ciò 
che vi è di più puro al mondo – più puro dell’uomo. Pertanto, la quarta epoca religiosa 
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ed artistica, quella della Landschafterei, è effettivamente un ritorno al paradiso perduto, 
e annuncia di conseguenza la fine dei tempi, poiché nessuna nuova epoca può 
succedere al ritorno all’origine. 
È dunque evidente che, nella sua accezione rungiana, la Landschaft non corrisponde 
a una mera rappresentazione della natura in quanto tale – contrariamente a quanto 
avviene nei paesaggi di Friedrich, la natura in senso stretto è quasi assente dalle opere di 
Runge. Si tratta di un paesaggio mistico, che Runge, talvolta, suggerisce essere interiore; 
la rappresentazione della natura, in fondo, altro non è che una modalità di tale 
paesaggio mistico. Vicino, da questo punto di vista, agli scrittori del romanticismo di 
Jena – si pensi ai Dipinti di August Wilhelm Schlegel per esempio – Runge decentra 
l’umano e destabilizza l’arte neoclassica, i cui precetti erano incarnati in Germania da 
Winckelmann ed erano ancora attuali agli occhi d’un Goethe. Eppure è il cristianesimo 
ben compreso che si tratta d’interpretare in questa svolta, come scrive ancora Tieck 
nella stessa lettera: “Come comprendere del resto questa arte se non muovendo dalle 
profondità di una mistica religiosa, dal momento che essa deve procedere infine da 
questa e su questa anche saldamente poggiarsi, altrimenti crolla come la casa costruita 
sulla sabbia?” (Runge 1840-41 I: 23 e seguenti; trad. 1985: 85). La mistica non “ispira” 
in senso proprio il programma rungiano, lo “fonda” in un modo quasi scientifico. Tratta 
principalmente da Böhme, questa mistica innestata sull’Ungrund (il senza fondo) si 
guarda dal riconoscere troppo rapidamente nell’uomo il coronamento supremo della 
Creazione. Il primato della figura umana nell’arte classica assomiglia stranamente 
secondo Runge al “resto di un antropomorfismo pagano, al quale deve ineluttabilmente 
succedere l’arte cristiana del paesaggio” (Décultot 1994: 51), come nota Élisabeth 
Décultot. In modo tale che, se è ancora permesso – è persino un’esigenza – andare a 
caccia dell’umano, ovvero della sensazione, nel paesaggio, questo non deve più offrirsi 
immediatamente alla vista. L’umano deve nascondersi o ritirarsi dalla tela perché possa 
manifestarsi una natura che precede il peccato originale, perché possa sentirla parlare 
ed entrare in risonanza con lei, in altri termini – e ciò entra evidentemente in sintonia 
con un certo neoplatonismo cristiano – perché possa ricordarsi. Se dunque il paesaggio 
simboleggia l’uomo, esso simboleggia solo la sua lingua originaria, in quanto ogni 
elemento della natura conserva sempre il nome che l’uomo gli ha dato in seguito alla 
richiesta di Dio prima del peccato originale. Questi nomi vibravano allora del soffio 
divino, erano pronunciati nello slancio della creazione. Pertanto, il simbolismo del 
paesaggio rinvia sicuramente all’uomo, ma solo nella misura in cui si cerca Dio nella 
tela, nella misura in cui l’uomo è dunque pronto a farsi da parte.  
È opportuno insistere sul carattere, a nostro parere, chiuso della semantica rungiana. 
Da questo punto di vista, siamo lontani dal romanticismo di Jena, così come da 
Friedrich: il codice simbolico proposto, i cui vettori principali sono i colori e i fiori che 
Runge crede di dover associare ancora a delle figure infantili (e ciò al fine di educare il 
pubblico al paesaggio non-umano), è chiuso. Come già detto, se Runge utilizza 
l’allegoria più del simbolo nel senso di Goethe, è perché il paesaggio cifrato è votato 
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non tanto a produrre un senso inedito e per così dire incaricato di presentare se stesso 
(presentando così l’identità assoluta, in Schelling), quanto a rinviare ad una materia o 
ad un racconto precedente, quello della lingua adamica, che contiene già in sé il proprio 
senso. Un colore o un gioco di colori si presenta in Runge innanzitutto come un indice 
transitivo sottomesso al suo significato. Tieck lo rimprovera proprio di questo quando 
lo accusa di comprimere la forza del simbolo all’interno del geroglifico arbitrario, 
rivolto in modo troppo evidente verso ciò che designa. Friedrich Schlegel, all’epoca in 
cui non è già più un romantico di Jena, fa una critica che è simile solo apparentemente, 
in quanto lui denuncia un eccesso di creatività nell’allegoria, dimentico del simbolismo 
trasportato dalla storia (cfr. Schlegel 2003: 238). Detto altrimenti, per Tieck, il simbolo 
enigmatico degenera in allegoria scontata, ed è per questo che alla fine non riconosce 
l’ispirazione del suo Franz Sternbald in un dipinto come Le fasi (che Runge, tuttavia, 
non considerava come un dipinto di paesaggio ultimato). Ma per Schlegel, l’allegoria 
rungiana è talmente nuova e singolare da non essere assolutamente comprensibile. 
Uomo scisso, Tieck non è sicuramente stato un compagno di viaggio facile da 
seguire per il giovane Runge. Una parte dell’ispirazione di Tieck non smette di tendere 
verso quella del giovane pittore e contribuisce a forgiarlo in modo decisivo. Si pensi 
soltanto a Effusioni di un monaco amante dell’arte, testo noto a Runge ed emblematico 
almeno di una parte dell’orientamento estetico di Jena, scritto dal giovane romantico 
Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder con la complicità di Tieck, che aggiunge o corregge dei 
passaggi, e infine pubblica l’opera. Vi si ritrova quasi parola per parola la spiegazione dei 
motivi religiosi della pittura di Runge. Si valuti da quanto segue: 
 
Il linguaggio delle parole è un grande dono del cielo, e fu un beneficio eterno del Creatore 
sciogliere la lingua del primo uomo in modo tale che potesse nominare tutte le cose che l’Altissimo 
aveva disposto intorno a lui nel mondo e tutte le immagini spirituali che aveva messo nella sua 
anima, ed esercitare il suo spirito a giocare diversamente con quest’abbondanza di nomi. Grazie alle 
parole, regniamo su tutta la superficie della Terra; tramite loro, acquisiamo agevolmente tutti i 
tesori terrestri. Solo l’invisibile, che aleggia al di sopra di noi, non può scendere nella nostra anima 
per mezzo delle parole. […] Conosco tuttavia due linguaggi meravigliosi tramite cui il Creatore ha 
permesso agli uomini di cogliere e di comprendere le cose celesti in tutta la loro potenza, nella 
misura in cui, tuttavia (per non parlare con temerarietà), ciò è possibile per delle creature mortali. 
Penetrano la nostra interiorità per vie diverse da quella delle parole. Commuovono l’intero nostro 
essere in un colpo solo, e in modo meraviglioso. S’immischiano in ognuno dei nostri nervi, in 
ciascuna delle nostre gocce di sangue. Solo Dio parla uno di questi linguaggi; l’altro è parlato 
soltanto da un piccolo numero d’eletti tra gli uomini, ch’Egli a consacrato tra i suoi favoriti. 
Intendo: la natura e l’arte (Wackenroder e Tieck 2009: 81). 
 
Il linguaggio verbale ha reso il mondo terrestre abitabile dall’uomo. Ma per 
comunicare con il mondo sovrasensibile, altri due linguaggi sono messi dal divino a sua 
disposizione, ovvero la natura e l’arte. Solo Dio parla il linguaggio della natura, benché 
l’uomo possa decifrarlo. Ma l’uomo, o se non altro alcuni uomini, possono parlare il 
linguaggio artistico, e tutti gli uomini possono capirlo – almeno de iure, bisognerebbe 
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aggiungere con Kant. Bisogna riconoscerlo: la tentazione è grande, per il lettore esperto 
di Wackenroder e di Tieck, di cercare concretamente un’opera d’arte conforme a 
quest’interpretazione, tanto più che si fatica a vedere come una rappresentazione possa 
sfuggire all’allegoria e al suo arbitrio. Il “monaco amante dell’arte” insiste pesantemente 
su questi problemi, e di certo contribuisce ad allontanare Runge dal simbolo 
schellinghiano, ancorché Runge si dedichi ad una presentazione dell’assoluto, intesa nel 
senso di Schelling come ritrovo “chiuso” della natura e dell’arte: 
 
Ignoriamo cos’è un albero; una prateria o una roccia; non possiamo parlargli nella nostra lingua; ci 
capiamo solo tra di noi. E tuttavia il Creatore ha messo nel cuore dell’uomo una simpatia così 
meravigliosa per queste cose che esse, tramite delle vie sconosciute, conducono il suo cuore a dei 
sentimenti o a dei pensieri, qualunque sia il nome che gli diamo, che non raggiungiamo mai per 
mezzo di parole adeguate (Wackenroder e Tieck 2009: 82). 
 
Si legge ancora: 
 
L’arte è un linguaggio di tutt’altro genere rispetto a quello della natura, ma pur intraprendendo le 
stesse vie oscure e segrete, possiede ciononostante lo stesso meraviglioso potere sul cuore umano. 
L’arte parla per mezzo di immagini umane e si serve di conseguenza di una scrittura composta da 
geroglifici (Wackenroder e Tieck 2009: 83). 
 
L’arte è dunque invitata ad esprimersi tramite geroglifici se vuole agire 
immediatamente sul cuore dell’uomo; il suo linguaggio non è lo stesso di quello della 
natura ma imbocca le stesse vie oscure, un cammino al di qua delle parole. Molto 




Il viaggio iniziatico di Franz Sternbald è profondamente motivato dalla Sehnsucht, 
ovvero dal desiderio nostalgico d’un ideale nascosto, indicibile in quanto tale. Non 
tanto perché sfugge al linguaggio come tale, quanto perché è irriducibile ad ogni 
linguaggio verbale. Formato da Albrecht Dürer, Sternbald deve al maestro la sua 
tecnica, il suo sapere, e la sua comprensione intima, seppur ingenua, del mondo che lo 
circonda. Ma solo il passaggio gli rivela, nel senso che gli ricorda, il suo ideale più 
profondo. Il desiderio di dipingere, motivato dalla ricerca dell’ideale, nasce sempre da 
una violenta separazione dalla felicità, che si deve riconquistare continuamente e la cui 
nostalgia pervade l’artista: “Perché dobbiamo sempre dimenticare la felicità passata per 
poter essere di nuovo contenti?” (Tieck 2012: 17), si preoccupa Franz. La reminiscenza 
della felicità coincide con quella dell’ideale, della fonte persa dell’ispirazione, conferita 
soltanto dal paesaggio. In questo caso, il paesaggio dell’infanzia, quello che sorprende 
Franz con brutalità in occasione del ritorno al suo villaggio natale: 
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Giunse ad uno spazio aperto nella foresta, e improvvisamente si fermò. Nemmeno lui sapeva 
perché si fosse immobilizzato, e si attardò per rifletterci. Tutto accadeva come se lì dovesse 
ricordarsi di qualcosa che sarebbe diventato per lui talmente piacevole, così indicibilmente caro; 
ogni fiore nell’erba alzava il capo in un modo tanto amichevole, come se avesse voluto aiutarlo nei 
suoi ricordi. "È qui, è qui sicuramente!" disse a se stesso, mentre cercava ardentemente l’immagine 
brillante che era trattenuta come da nuvole nere nella parte più intima della sua anima. Di colpo gli 
salirono le lacrime agli occhi, sentì venire dal campo il suono desolato del doppio fiuto di un 
pastore, e allora seppe tutto. A quel tempo ragazzo di sei anni, era venuto qui nella foresta, aveva 
cercato dei fiori in questo posto, accadde che un’auto passasse per di là e restasse immobile, una 
donna mise i piedi a terra e posò un bambino a terra […] (Tieck 2012: 44-45). 
 
Questo tipo di passaggio ha affascinato Runge al punto tale che ne ha voluto render 
conto in modo quasi letterale, se così si può dire, nei suoi quadri: la reminiscenza 
improvvisa di un significato ideale inesprimibile, la ricerca di fiori particolari e la loro 
onnipresenza, l’apparizione d’una sconosciuta e del suo bambino (in questo modo, la 
Vergine e il Cristo appena nato sono suggeriti), il sentimento di una rivelazione 
improvvisa, tutto ciò costituisce sin dall’inizio il cuore dell’impresa rungiana e dei suoi 
motivi. Il carattere ancora infantile dello stesso Franz nel momento della scena 
ricordata è notevole: il bambino, nella pittura di Runge, ha un ruolo quasi magico, lo 
stesso che Tieck gli conferisce nei suoi racconti. Ad esempio in queste parole, rivolte da 
Franz al suo amico Sebastian: “Voglio restare per sempre un bambino” (Tieck 2012: 
19). L’apprendista non ha tanto l’innocenza del bambino – perché il bambino non è 
mai “innocente” nel romanticismo, almeno nel senso in cui si intende di solito questa 
parola – quanto la sua ingenuità e al tempo stesso la sua vulnerabilità di fronte al mondo 
e agli altri. Dopo essersi separato da un fabbro incontrato lungo il cammino, il 
viaggiatore si ritrova solo, non soltanto di fronte agli altri ma persino di fronte a se 
stesso, s’inabissa in se stesso: 
 
Mentre calava la sera, numerosi oggetti da dipingere venivano in mente al giovane Sternbald, che li 
ordinava nei suoi pensieri, e indugiava con amore su queste rappresentazioni; più rossa era la sera, 
più melanconiche diventavano le sue fantasticherie, si sentiva di nuovo solitario nel vasto mondo, 
senza forza, senza aiuto in se stesso (Tieck 2012: 26. Sottolineiamo). 
 
Si trova qui, senza dubbio, il disaccordo tra Tieck e Runge. In veste di buon 
romantico di Jena, Tieck non vede nessuna soluzione a questa vulnerabilità dell’io 
poetico. Esso non è minacciato dal mondo, come si crede troppo spesso – come se la 
soggettività romantica non dovesse far altro che ripiegarsi sulla propria genialità 
patetica. L’io poetico, quando il mondo lo spinge “in una compassione nostalgica con se 
stesso” (Tieck 2012: 26), non vi si compiace. Infatti, non vi è nulla in realtà al di là 
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dell’incontro continuamente rinnovato e sempre inatteso con il mondo.2 Se il mondo è 
enigmatico, se è ornato d’indizi in concordanza segreta con l’io, è perché l’io è 
altrettanto enigmatico per il mondo. Franz non può far capire agli altri quel che l’ha 
spinto verso la pittura: “Questo, non potrei nemmeno dirvelo; improvvisamente, era là, 
senza che potessi sapere com’è successo, ho sempre sentito dentro di me una pulsione 
(Trieb) di dipingere qualcosa” (Tieck 2012: 37). Ma la tentazione del giovane Runge, 
che tuttavia si riconosce in Franz, è di ritrovare una forma di trasparenza radicale tra lo 
sfondo enigmatico del mondo e la rappresentazione di esso, facilitata di certo da 
quest’affermazione premonitoria di Franz: “Tutta l’arte è allegorica” (Tieck 2012: 257). 
In Tieck, però, il principio stesso del dipingere, la fonte dell’ispirazione, è votata a 
sottrarsi, simbolicamente e persino letteralmente. Ritornato al suo villaggio natale, 
Franz assiste all’agonia del padre. Poco prima di morire, prima di sparire fisicamente, 
colui al quale Franz deve il suo profondo senso religioso e di conseguenza la sua 
ispirazione creatrice gli fa sapere improvvisamente (in questo stesso “modo 
improvviso” all’origine dell’ispirazione o del ricordo stesso), mentre “il sole si oscurava 
più profondamente” (Tieck 2012: 49) e mentre “il volto del vegliardo pareva in fuoco” 
(Tieck 2012: 49): “Tu non sei mio figlio, bimbo caro” (Tieck 2012: 49). Laddove 
Runge, in fondo, rifiuta d’inserire la perdita nell’immagine, secondo Tieck la perdita 
dell’origine è necessaria alla risonanza dell’enigma. Di conseguenza, tra l’invenzione di 
un paradiso perduto simbolizzato nell’immagine e la presentazione cruda di questo 
paradiso semplicemente allegorizzato da Runge, vi è una frattura. Rispetto a ciò, non è 
insignificante il fatto che Franz debba letteralmente ri-scoprire e ri-vedere altrimenti la 
Landschaft, nel sesto capitolo del primo libro, ovvero subito dopo il funerale del padre. 
Spesso si evita di considerare questo tipo di passaggio singolare, ma così tipico del 
romanticismo, poiché Franz, in pieno lutto, non si sente afflitto ma liberato, perso ma 
“aperto” all’enigma. Vagabonda per i campi, osserva gli alberi riflettersi nello stagno 
vicino e si accorge che “fino a quel momento non aveva mai contemplato un paesaggio 
con un simile piacere” (Tieck 2012: 49). Ancor di più, sono i colori stessi che gli si 
rivelano come per la prima volta – questi colori, essenziali per Franz, centrali in Runge: 
“fino a quel momento non gli era mai stato concesso di scoprire la diversità dei colori 
                                                           
2 Eppure, come confessa al suo corrispondente Rudolf Köpke alcuni decenni più tardi, a Jena Tieck 
aveva l’impressione che il suo Sternbald non fosse ben capito dai suoi amici dell’Athenäum a causa del 
privilegio che accordava alla patria, alla casa. Egli spiega come i fratelli Schlegel, in particolare, fossero 
letteralmente “pieni del cosmopolitismo allora in vigore” (citato in Tieck 2012: 502, “Dokumente und 
zeitgenössische Urteile”), e privilegiassero il “mondo” rispetto alla casa propria. Benché molto vicino 
agli Schlegel per altre ragioni, Tieck si è sentito “isolato” a questo proposito. Ecco ciò che sovverte la 
concezione classica del romanticismo di Jena come ricerca del proprio e della casa. Ciò non significa 
che Tieck, dal canto suo, pensasse meno dei suoi compagni l’estraneo, ma nella sua opera la casa è 
sempre, in fin dei conti, più dell’esteriorità, il luogo privilegiato della prova dell’estraneo. Si tratta di un 
viaggio che trasforma la casa e in fondo, in virtù del ruolo centrale attribuito all’enigma, non la trova 
mai. 
 FOCUS • Art and Aesthetic Experience 
 
AUGUSTIN DUMONT • La duplicità 
del simbolismo nella pittura romantica tedesca 
 
 
CoSMo   Comparative Studies in Modernism n. 6 (Spring) • 2015 
137 
con la loro ripartizione delle ombre, la soavità del silenzio, l’effetto del battito degli 
alberi nella natura, come gli appariva ora nell’acqua chiara [dello stagno]” (Tieck 2012: 
49). Solo allora viene colpito dalla “prodigiosa prospettiva” (Tieck 2012: 49) che 
s’introduce nell’immagine, e dal cielo, o dal Cielo, che s’impongono alla sua creatività. 
Ma è anche il momento di scoprire la resistenza del paesaggio: 
 
Franz prese la tavolozza e volle cominciare a disegnare il paesaggio; ma già la natura reale gli 
apparve secca comparata alla sua proiezione nell’acqua, ma ancor meno i tratti sulla carta volevano 
soddisfarlo, non riproducendo affatto ciò che lui vedeva davanti a sé. A presente non era ancora 
riuscito a disegnare un paesaggio, considerava quest’ultimo solo come un’aggiunta ai numerosi 
ritratti storici, ma non aveva ancora mai provato quanto la natura morta potesse produrre l’effetto 
di un tutto perfetto, e quanto fosse perciò degna di diventare l’oggetto di una rappresentazione 
(Darstellung) (Tieck 2012: 49).  
 
Quando però Franz si sente indotto a dipingere delle sensazioni pure, quelle del 
paradiso, fallisce dichiaratamente a raggiungerlo, e ciò sin da prima della morte del 
padre. Il mondo degli angeli non può da solo “ergersi (hinaufsteigen) per guardare là in 
alto il paradiso splendente” (Tieck 2012: 46), in quanto la sua pittura materializza solo 
la “forma di un sogno (Traumgestalt)” (Tieck 2012: 46). Tieck, che ha riconosciuto 
d’aver sempre sofferto di un’immaginazione patologicamente sensibile, pronta a 
suggerire l’angoscia e la morte, al tempo stesso ha attinto dalla Phantasie quanto di utile 
per risalire all’unità. Vi sono dunque in Sternbald come altrove nell’opera di Tieck dei 
veri momenti di godimento dell’immagine. È questa la reversibilità böhmiana del caos e 
dell’armonia cosmica che talvolta scuote violentemente Franz, che passa dall’angoscia 
alla gioia di una fusione tra l’alto e il basso, nelle ore più belle e nelle più sublimi 
(erhabensten Stunden) (Tieck 2012: 72). Ma la risalita entusiasta segue sempre una 
discesa traumatizzante, che la pittura di Runge, in fondo, non attraversa. L’esperienza 
della pittura di paesaggio è per Franz sublime e inquietante al tempo stesso, poiché, in 
quanto l’uomo non vi compare più, spariscono anche gli imperativi religiosi portati 
dalla storia che accompagnano il suo ritratto, proprio come il padre defunto, fonte della 
legge e impostura al tempo stesso; il paesaggio è il solo a dover far sorgere il sacro, e se 
non altro il pittore ha come missione quella di lasciare che la natura riveli tale sacralità 
facendola parlare. Agli occhi di Tieck, Runge si premura indubbiamente di “praticare” 
questa constatazione di Franz, secondo cui “la natura si rivolge di certo a noi con le sue 
tonalità, in una lingua straniera, ma noi sentiamo lo stesso la significanza 
(Bedeutsamkeit) delle sue parole e ricordiamo volentieri i suoi accenti meravigliosi” 
(Tieck 2012: 88). Comunque sia, questa preoccupazione ha rivoluzionato la teoria dei 
colori. 
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4. Dalla teoria dei colori al Mattino 
 
Il progetto delle quattro Fasi del giorno s’inscrive nell’ambito della riflessione 
rungiana sul colore, giudicata “mistica” (Runge 1840-41 I: 16 e segg. ; trad. 1985: 75) in 
una lettera del pittore al fratello, che precisa, come ci si potrebbe aspettare: “è l’arte che 
noi – per le vie di una stupefacente intuizione – comprendiamo soltanto, di nuovo, nei 
fiori” (Runge 1840-41 I: 16 e segg. ; trad. 1985: 75). A tal punto che, in realtà, è quasi il 
contrario: il progetto di una nuova teoria dei colori appare nello slancio stesso e a causa 
delle Fasi, dove i fiori dovevano svolgere un ruolo decisivo, in quanto esigevano un 
lavoro specifico e nuovo sul colore. Più d’ogni altro motivo, il colore partecipa al 
cifraggio ermetico – persino esoterico, in quanto l’influenza di Tarot si mescola 
all’iconografia cristiana – all’opera nella rappresentazione del mattino, del giorno, della 
sera e della notte. Dei quattro disegni, solo il Mattino è diventato un dipinto. La 
principale figura enigmatica concreta di questo quadro è senza dubbio il giglio, di fianco 
al neonato ovviamente, lui stesso dipinto come un fiore che sboccia nella luce dell’alba e 
– se non altro è quel che ha sostenuto Steffens – già votato alla contemplazione, e 
perciò affrancato dal regno creaturale. Ma l’operatore simbolico generale di questa 
realizzazione è chiaramente il colore stesso. 
In Runge, la luce pura, bianca, rappresenta il Bene assoluto. Proprio come il sole, 
non la si può guardare direttamente, mentre il nero puro, l’oscurità assoluta, è l’assenza 
di visione. Essa si ritrova dunque assimilata al Male, precisa Runge nella stessa lettera a 
suo fratello, ispirato dalla Genesi e da Böhme. Luce e oscurità si sottraggono 
interamente al senso e dunque all’attività della comprensione umana. Bianco e nero 
non sono perciò dei colori in senso proprio, poiché il colore è il luogo del senso, della 
comprensione e dell’interpretazione – se non altro se si intende il bianco e il nero puri, 
come non possiamo rappresentarceli. La Rivelazione divina non è altro se non quella 
del colore: grazie ai tre colori primari, ovvero il blu primario – il ciano, nella teoria dei 
colori contemporanea -, il rosso primario – oggi il magenta – e il giallo primario, Dio si 
fa conoscere presso gli uomini e mediatizza così la luce e l’oscurità, l’ideale e il reale, lo 
spirito e la natura, il soggetto e l’oggetto. Se il bianco puro non è né guardabile né 
comprensibile, esso si mediatizza nel rosso quando il cielo s’imporpora. Il rosso è 
dunque il Figlio, mentre il blu, il colore della prospettiva, indica l’allontanamento del 
Padre ebreo, la sua distanza infinita, fonte degli infiniti punti di vista nello spazio. Il 
giallo è quello della luna, è il colore dello Spirito Santo, che sorge come un fuoco 
notturno di consolazione. Più un colore tende verso il blu, più è ideale; più diventa 
rosso, più è reale, e si fa dunque carne e sangue. La Rivelazione come concordanza 
dell’ideale e del reale può in tal modo, nella mente di Runge, essere dipinta in quanto 
tale.  
Se in via generale disapprova la sua pittura, Goethe è stato sufficientemente 
impressionato dal testo sulla Sfera del colore (Runge 1840-41 I: 112 e segg. ; trad. 1985: 
146-161) di Runge da aderirvi pienamente. Non è possibile descriverlo qui nei dettagli, 
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ma si noti che il problema principale di un Runge, di un Goethe, poi di uno 
Schopenhauer, problema che molto più tardi sarà quello di un Kandinsky – il quale si 
richiama senza ambiguità al romanticismo – è costituito dall’irriducibilità degli effetti 
prodotti dall’azione dei colori alla semplice rifrazione della luce bianca, che, secondo 
Newton, si scompone nei sette colori dello spettro. Runge riconosce tuttavia che il suo 
studio sui colori non si situa allo stesso livello di quello del fisico: è l’antitetica 
böhmiana della luce e dell’oscurità che motiva la sua ricerca, laddove Newton non sa 
che farsene dell’oscurità, almeno intesa come principio ontologico. Ai tre colori 
fondamentali, Runge aggiunge il bianco e il nero (che tuttavia “disponiamo in una 
classe in certo modo opposta” (Runge 1985: 149), come precisa) per costituire i cinque 
elementi primari del suo sistema, al di fuori dei quali tutto è mescolanza. Infatti, il blu e 
il giallo insieme formano il verde, il giallo e il rosso compongono l’arancione, il rosso e il 
blu danno il viole. Verde, arancione e viola sono dunque i tre grandi colori secondari. 
Runge è pertanto condotto ad elaborare un sistema della mobilità (Beweglichkeit) dei 
colori secondari, i quali, in opposizione rispetto ai tre punti fissi che sono i colori 
primari, sarebbero capaci di animarsi e di reagire. Così, il verde è animato da una 
tendenza al blu e una tendenza contraria al giallo, il viola da una tendenza al rosso e una 
tendenza contraria al blu, l’arancione da una tendenza al giallo e una tendenza contraria 
al rosso. Queste tendenza o attrazioni (Neigungen) sono delle opposizione, delle 
contraddizioni, che ricordano persino nel lessico la filosofia della natura schellinghiana. 
Molto più che altrove nella sua opera, l’influenza di Schelling si fa sentire nella teoria dei 
colori, pur venendo immediatamente sovvertita da una presentazione dei suoi principi 
alla quale Schelling non ha mai pensato.  
Runge propone innanzitutto diversi triangoli per illustrare il gioco dei colori. Come 
i tre angoli di un triangolo, il blu, il giallo e il rosso sono dei puri punti matematici 
indecomponibili. Ma il verde, l’arancione e il viola sono ciascuno una pluralità 
(Mehrheit), che appare come colore specifico solo a partire dal momento in cui è 
equidistante dai due angoli che collega. Ebbene, se la differenza (Differenz), puramente 
quantitativa benché non quantificabile, del blu e del giallo, può formare un verde più o 
meno bluastro, e più o meno giallastro, il verde equidistante dal blu e dal giallo è la loro 
indifferenza (Indifferenz); in tal modo, Runge si riferisce esplicitamente al più 
importante dei concetti schellinghiani dell’identità, ovvero a quello di “punto 
d’indifferenza”, dove è il primo dei tre termini a interessare qui particolarmente. La 
ragione è che il verde, il viola e l’arancione equidistanti dai loro angoli rispettivi sono 
proprio dei punti astratti. Perciò si ottiene, innanzitutto, un piccolo triangolo di colori 
secondari nel grande triangolo dei colori puri. Il nero e il bianco, dal canto loro, 
esistono già in questo primo schema, ma sul modo della presenza-assenza: non sono né 
un angolo né un punto equidistante, ma i tre punti equidistanti hanno tutti e tre un 
rapporto universale, precisa Runge, con il bianco e il nero, in quanto ogni colore 
secondario può schiarirsi tramite il bianco o scurirsi con il nero: 
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I tre punti Vr., Ar. e Vl. così come tutte le mescolanze che giacciono tra di loro, e i tre punti A. G. e 
R. intrattengono lo stesso rapporto di differenza con il punto del bianco da un lato e del nero 
dall’altro (che sono appunto due opposizioni) e si trovano nella stessa distanza dal bianco e dal 
nero nella quale si trovano anche i punti A. G. e R., laddove noi abbiamo appunto deciso di 
assumere la regola che uguali differenze tra forze naturali vengono espresse da linee (distanze) 
uguali (Runge 1985: 152). 
 
Si vede allora che il bianco e il nero si presentano anche come dei punti astratti, 
assolutamente opposti ai colori puri ma anche ai colori secondari essenziali. La Differenz 
– che Érika Tunner preferisce rendere con repulsione – dei diversi colori secondari e 
dei punti bianco e nero è uguale alla Differenz dei colori puri e dei punti bianco e nero. 
Partiti da un triangolo doppio, ci avviciniamo ora alla sfera, in quanto i due triangoli 
equilateri AGR e VrArVl formano un esagono integrato in una sfera, una volta allargato 
il triangolo VrArVl alla stessa dimensione di AGR. I punti nero e bianco, indicati B e N 
“si comportano come due poli che giacciono all’esterno della superficie circolare e la cui 
distanza B. N. sarà da interpretare come una linea (asse) che passa per il centro del 
cerchio” (Runge 1985: 152). L’esagono comprende quelli che si chiamano per 
convenzione i sette colori dell’arcobaleno, benché quest’ultimo ne contenga un’infinità, 
i cui punti principali sono tuttavia il blu, il verde, il giallo, l’arancione, il rosso e il viola – 
che fa sette se si divide il viola in viola bluastro e viola rossastro. Runge sembra dunque 
integrare il magenta nell’arcobaleno, al contrario della fisica post-newtoniana che lo 
esclude. In accordo con questa, tuttavia, fa dell’indaco un colore secondario, laddove 
Newton vi vede – ciò non ha mancato di stupire – un colore primario. 
Il punto d’indifferenza universale si situa al centro invisibile della sfera, e questo 
punto è grigio: “Nel mezzo della linea, laddove l’azione delle due forze si bilancia, 
avremo il punto in cui il grigio si presenta con un carattere di completa indifferenza, 
possedendo inclinazione e differenza uguali e rispetto al bianco e rispetto al nero” 
(Runge 1985: 153). Il grigio può essere raggiunto da un punto qualsiasi, nella misura in 
cui il colore è animato da una tendenza all’indifferenza: infatti i tre colori primari, 
mescolati in parti uguali, formano il grigio. Ai colori secondari principali, che sono già 
l’incontro di due colori primari, si deve semplicemente aggiungere il colore primario 
mancante perché divengano grigi. Se aggiungiamo al verde puro, derivato dal blu e dal 
giallo, il rosso, otteniamo il grigio. Aggiungere del blu all’arancione, che è un composto 
del rosso e del giallo, forma a sua volta del grigio, così come l’aggiunta di giallo al viola, 
ovvero al composto di blu e di rosso, produce anch’essa il grigio. “Del resto non 
possiamo rappresentarci un verde che tende al rosso, un arancio che tende all’azzurro, 
un violetto che tende al giallo, proprio come non possiamo rappresentarci un occidente 
orientale o un nord meridionale” (Runge 1985: 154). Questo grigio, inteso se non altro 
come l’annullamento assoluto di tutte le differenze, è un punto in senso proprio 
incolore. I colori primari così come i colori secondari si trovano dunque tutti, dice 
Runge letteralmente, in una differenza simile all’universale, che è il punto 
d’indifferenza, o ancora il grigio. 
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In breve, blu, giallo e rosso, da una parte, viola, verde e arancione, dall’altra, 
esercitano un’attrazione simile e producono lo stesso rapporto di differenza con il nero 
e il bianco, così come il nero e il bianco esercitano un’attrazione simile e si trovano nella 
stessa differenziazione con questi colori. Il ragionamento è lo stesso con il centro grigio 
della sfera. Per quanto riguarda tutte le gradazioni di colori esistenti, esse sono 
sottomesse a delle forza ineguali d’attrazione e di differenziazione con i due “poli” nero 
e bianco – e con loro unicamente, poiché sono sempre il prodotto di due dei cinque colori 
disposti sull’esagono centrale a equidistanza dal nero e dal bianco, che Runge chiama 
l’“equatore”. Le molteplici variazioni sono sempre legate alla tendenza al 
riassorbimento del colore nel nero o nel bianco, secondo una gradazione progressiva. 
Ma in questo modo esercitano in ogni punto di tale gradazione un rapporto di 
differenziazione rispetto al grigio sempre simile, rapporto che cerca di differenziarsi 
proprio dalla tendenza dei tre colori primari a co-agire e a fondersi nel grigio uniforme, 
ovvero a cancellare ogni individualità. 
In una breve appendice a questo piccolo trattato, Runge tenta di conciliare le 
impressioni sensibili prodotte dai colori con la sfera. Pur non potendoci soffermare a 
lungo su questo punto, possiamo però notare che le impressioni di armonia e di 
disarmonia derivano naturalmente dal gioco delle forze, attrattive o repulsive, che 
organizza tutta la sfera dei colori. Fianco a fianco, i colori antagonisti formano un 
contrasto piacevole: il blu e l’arancione, il viola e il giallo, o il rosso e il verde. In ognuno 
di questi casi, un colore primario si combina armoniosamente con un colore 
secondario. L’armonia è provocata dalla sensazione di una differenza che risalta bene 
sull’unità, cioè sul referente cromatico generale che è il grigio. Mettere fianco a fianco il 
giallo, il blu e il rosso primari, al contrario, produce una sensazione più di disarmonia 
che d’armonia. La disarmonia non è per questo spiacevole: genera un’eccitazione, una 
forte stimolazione della nostra sensibilità visiva. L’impressione è quella di 
un’esacerbazione massima di forze pienamente individuali, la cui mescolanza potrà 
produrre soltanto un annullamento puro e semplice. D’altronde, sarà necessario, per 
ristabilire l’armonia, inserire il grigio tra i due colori fondamentali. Tale stimolazione si 
trasforma infine in monotonia quando si visualizzano i colori nell’ordine di successione 
dell’esagono, e quando si mettono per esempio fianco a fianco il blu, il viola e il rosso. Il 
viola mediatizza il blu e il rosso fondendoli, ma non può fondere altri colori. È dunque il 
referente esclusivo del blu e del rosso e non ricorda il referente cromatico generale, 
ovvero l’insieme che comprende tutte le differenze possibili – da cui l’inevitabile 
sentimento di sollievo. Il grigio è proprio l’indifferenza dei colori, e non fa nient’altro 
che assorbire ogni individualità. È il referente universale. Al contrario, non si potrebbe 
parlare di referente nel caso di un colore mediatore messo fianco a fianco ai due colori 
primari dai quali è derivato. Così il viola, mediatore del rosso e del blu, o l’arancione, 
mediatore del giallo e del rosso, o ancora il verde, mediatore del blu e del giallo. 
Quando questi colori coesistono con i loro due colori-fonti, fanno apparire l’uno e 
l’altro in sé, li fanno transitare tramite loro, attenuando o destabilizzando le loro 
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individualità. Il grigio, invece, non fa apparire in sé alcun colore, non fa agire in sé 
alcuna forza: le annulla puramente e semplicemente, in quanto in lui non transita nulla 
in senso proprio. Ma per questo, una volta inserito tra due colori primari, per esempio il 
rosso e il blu, mantiene le loro individualità rispettive senza riunirle, ciò che il viola non 
può fare.  
A partire da queste poche leggi fondamentali, tutto è possibile: si potrà cercare di 
aumentare o di diminuire l’intensità dei contrasti armoniosi, mettendo fianco a fianco, 
al posto dell’armonia evidente, per esempio i due colori antagonisti rosso e verde, il 
verde e il viola; oppure mescolando questi colori – si otterrebbe con il verde e il viola un 
grigio bluastro. La mescolanza di questi due colori secondari formerà sempre un grigio 
tendente verso il colore primario intermedio. Così anche per l’arancione e il verde, che 
formeranno un grigio giallastro. L’armonia, la disarmonia e la monotonia sono le tre 
impressioni sensibili che l’artista deve padroneggiare unendole con abilità. È 
significativo che lo stesso lavoro possa essere intrapreso a partire dai suoni, secondo 
Runge, come testimoniano i Dialoghi sull’analogia tra colori e suoni. 
Soffermiamoci, per concludere con Runge, su alcuni elementi ermeneutici 
direttamente legati a queste considerazioni della versione del 1808 del Mattino (Der 
Kleine Morgen), opera di cui esistono, oltre alle due versioni dipinte (con Der Grosse 
Morgen del 1809), numerosi disegni preparatori, che questi brevi capoversi non 
potranno di certo esaurire in tutta la loro ricchezza.3 Questa tela va considerata come 
un paesaggio, nel senso proposto dall’artista, ovvero una composizione inerente all’era 
del protestantesimo declinante – congiuntura in cui il genere nuovo del paesaggio 
doveva sbocciare pienamente, prima di morire con tutto il destino umano, poiché non è 
possibile nessun altro genere. 
È l’alba, primo momento di un ciclo di quattro momenti della giornata, insieme al 
giorno, alla sera e alla notte. Runge cerca di pensare il ciclo della vita al tempo stesso 
umana e cosmica, l’alternanza conflittuale del più piccolo e del più grande, ma anche del 
tempo e dell’eternità, ripresa all’interno di ogni quadro. Sorgendo dalla terra, il giglio 
prende lo slancio verso il cielo e lo raggiunge, non solo nella cornice ma anche nell’asse 
centrale della rappresentazione stessa, poiché il suo calice sboccia in aria, accogliendo 
sei bambini – il calice è un “luogo” molto frequentato all’epoca del romanticismo 
tedesco (basti pensare a Heinrich von Ofterdingen). Il giglio rappresenta la luce, nella 
mente del poeta, ossia l’amore celeste. Le incisioni della Sera utilizzano la rosa per 
indicare l’amore terrestre, e quelle della Notte il papavero, fiore della soavità e del 
sonno. Nell’incisione su rame in preparazione al Mattino (1803), alcune rose cadevano 
dal calice di quattro gigli secondari e raggiungevano la terra. Ma nell’opera ultimata, 
                                                           
3 Si possono leggere con profitto le belle analisi di tutte le versioni preparatorie e dell’opera stessa nel 
volume collettivo realizzato in occasione della retrospettiva “Runge” ad Amburgo e a Monaco nel 2010-
2011 (cfr. Bertsch e al 2011: 158-177). 
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queste rose, o almeno i loro petali, sono graziosamente lanciate da un bambino verso 
l’altro, sulla metà del quadro, e i due ragazzi che vegliano sul neonato al centro hanno 
dei petali di rosa nelle mani. Il rosso simboleggia al tempo stesso l’amore terrestre e 
l’aurora. È anche quello di Cristo, di Dio fatto carne, rappresentato dai due gigli rossi in 
ogni lato della cornice, logicamente nel mezzo, tra il giallo notturno in basso – quello 
dello Spirito Santo che squarcia la notte – e il blu celeste in alto, quello del Padre 
eternamente distante. I tre colori primari, assimilati ciascuno a una figura della Trinità, 
dominano dunque il quadro; lo incorniciano in senso proprio, non senza introdursi 
nella rappresentazione stessa. I bambini sembrano così giocare con i colori, sembrano 
essere al tempo stesso capaci di svilupparsi in essi e di manipolarli, di appropiarsi 
completamente di questo mezzo attraverso il quale si esprime solo la pura luce divina, 
quella che dopo il peccato originale non è più visibile come tale. 
Nell’incisione preparatoria comparivano già tre bambini sopra il calice. Li si ritrova 
nel quadro finale, dove sono rappresentati solo attraverso i loro volti: tre volti infantili 
simboleggiano di nuovo la Trinità, si girano verso Venere, la stella del mattino, che 
sembra già guardare anche il neonato, che è il Cristo, disteso sull’erba nell’asse della 
stella. In altre parole, le differenze si attenuano nella divinità: il Padre, il Figlio e lo 
Spirito Santo sono intercambiabili, sono – si oserebbe dire per ricordare Schelling – 
indifferenti, proprio come la riunione dei tre colori primari, qui armoniosamente messi 
in relazione, al punto che non vi è pressoché alcuna disarmonia nel quadro. 
La Vergine, identificata con l’Aurora o con la Venere, ispirata dalla Venere Medici e 
costantemente raffinata dall’artista nel corso degli anni 1801-1808, guarda verso l’alto, il 
viso leggermente girato a sinistra. Tiene le sue ciocche di capelli tra le mani: 
armoniosamente avvolte intorno a suo corpo, costituiscono in qualche modo la radice 
del calice centrale. È aerea, ma terrestre, persino vegetale (una dualità che affonda le sue 
radici in un testo di Böhme intitolato proprio Aurora), mentre il neonato, quasi floreale, 
è al tempo stesso esclusivamente terrestre e interamente aperto, accogliente, rispetto 
alla luce celeste. La postura della Vergine accentua la verticalità del quadro, mentre il 
suo allontanamento dà l’impressione di una profondità spaziale, senza dubbio 
compensata dalla sua andatura. In effetti, identificata alla luce dell’aurora, la Venere 
pare avvicinarsi al primo piano (in una progressione mediatizzata dalle coppie di 
bambini o “geni” in primo e in secondo piano, e dagli angeli sullo sfondo), e 
simultaneamente la luce gialla che emana rompe, o se non altro relativizza, la distanza 
inerente al blu celeste. 
Angeli, geni e neonato formano un cerchio intorno all’aurora. Si tratta più 
precisamente di una sfera, poiché il cerchio ha una profondità. Tutto il paesaggio 
sembra stranamente circolare, benché Runge abbia abbandonato infine l’orizzonte 
sferico della terra, sommariamente tracciato in un disegno preparatorio. Il verde del 
paesaggio si alterna armoniosamente grazie ai suoi toni violacei con il livello degli strati 
nuvolosi dello sfondo. Già ingiallito al centro dalla luce, questo verde non potrebbe 
essere l’antagonista in senso forte del viola pallido delle nuvole, come sarebbe per lui il 
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rosso, ma la gradazione del viola pallido, quasi uscito dal mezzo del paesaggio, genera in 
fondo un’impressione di armonia leggermente incline alla monotonia, che risale poi 
verso l’armonia. Infatti il giallo, colore antagonista del viola, si sostituisce dolcemente al 
blu violaceo nel momento in cui ci si solleva nell’aria, prima di cedere il posto ad un blu 
schietto sul culmine. Non c’è alcun verde per mediatizzare il passaggio dal giallo al blu, 
a questo livello, né grigio per assorbire le loro individualità, ma il biancore del calice e 
degli angeli, smorza una giuntura che non è meno contrastata della prima. Perché tale 
scelta? Questa strategia permette senza dubbio a Runge, ispirato ancora una volta dalla 
Naturphilosophie, di opporre chiaramente la trasparenza celeste all’opacità tellurica. Il 
colore, qui, cerca di attenuare gli oggetti sollevati e di appesantire i corpi. Ma ciò non 
vale che per l’immagine principale, non per la cornice, dove l’opacità è preservata 
persino in alto, negli angeli in adorazione, sorretti a loro volta da calici bianchi, poi rossi 
e verdi, due colori complementari. Lo schiarimento progressivo del quadro, dal basso 
all’alto, mima lo schiarimento progressivo dell’immagine centrale, ma questo 
schiarimento prosegue nell’opacità a livello della cornice, diventando invece 
trasparente nell’immagine centrale. Il contrasto tra i due è notevole. L’uso di un giallo 
molto chiaro permette certamente di separare due tipi di schiarimento, il bianco opaco 
della cornice e il bianco slavato della rappresentazione, sicuramente come l’uso molto 
leggero del grigio, inesistente nella rappresentazione ma leggermente presente nella 
cornice superiore, sui petali bianchi dell’ultimo giglio. In tal modo, l’opposizione tra il 
reale e l’ideale è presente all’interno dell’immagine centrale, ma anche tra questa e la 
cornice, poiché quest’ultima è il corrispondente reale dell’illuminazione cosmica ideale 
e trasparente.  
 
5. Friedrich: l’apertura dell’enigma 
 
Non è di certo esagerato affermare che, in una certa misura, Runge si è tenuto a 
distanza dalle tre tendenze maggiori dell’epoca, menzionate nella famosa sentenza del 
frammento 216 dell’Athenäum, ovvero la Rivoluzione francese, la Wissenschaftslehre di 
Fichte e il Wilhelm Meister di Goethe. Se gli stimoli filosofici e letterari (Fichte e 
Goethe) sono più o meno rimpiazzati dalla filosofia di Schelling, dalla mistica di 
Böhme, dal Franz Sternbald di Tieck e dalle Effusioni di Wackenroder e Tieck, nessuno 
stimolo, e dunque nessun vacillamento, dell’ordine dell’evento storico viene a 
rimpiazzare la Rivoluzione francese, a proposito della quale Peter Betthausen può dire a 
ragione che non è stata “coscientemente vissuta” (Betthausen 2008: 6) dall’artista, il 
quale aveva dodici anni nel 1789. La nuova storia dell’arte occidentale proposta da 
Runge mostra che egli non è certo indifferente alla storicità; ciononostante la chiusura 
di questa storia colpisce, ed è legata alla ricerca di una presentazione mistica 
dell’assoluto, in quanto l’allegoria non accetta nessun resto, nessuno scarto, nulla che 
possa sfuggire alla codifica. Di conseguenza, poiché deve farsi interamente portatrice di 
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senso, l’opera d’arte non lascia più nessuno spazio all’inatteso, alla contingenza della 
storia di là da venire. 
Pur rompendo con l’arte neoclassica, Runge rappresenta però una sola “tendenza” – 
nel senso romantico del termine – del romanticismo dell’epoca, ovvero un divenire, un 
frammento, costituito di segni da interpretare. È noto, infatti, che per Friedrich Schlegel 
la grande tendenza dell’epoca della Rivoluzione, del postkantismo e del romanzo di 
formazione è di presentarsi riflessivamente come un’epoca di tendenze (cfr. Thouard 
2000: 46) – si tratta ovviamente di una mise en abyme –, o per dirlo con il lessico di 
Novalis, di pulsioni (Triebe) creative ben differenziate, senza dubbio notevolmente 
potenti ma frammentarie e sempre da interpretare. L’allegoria rungiana è a nostro 
avviso una tendenza del romanticismo: si sradica dapprima dalla mimèsis neoclassica – 
quella dello “scarto tra imitante e imitato” (Wat 2012: 27) come scrive Pierre Wat –, 
tenta in seguito di ritrovare tramite o nell’immagine l’unità perduta, sacrificata 
dall’Illuminismo, attraverso una valorizzazione inedita del paesaggio, e s’inscrive 
deliberatamente in un momento di una storia mondiale che essa stessa descrive. Vi è 
qui un modo di pensare l’autonomia, la stessa promossa ovunque dalla Frühromantik. 
Eppure l’allegoria rungiana contiene chiaramente in sé una sovracodifica che oltrepassa 
in modo cosciente, per così dire, il potere critico della sua epoca, della quale è anche un 
sintomo, ossia proprio una tendenza. In un certo senso, l’opera troppo autonoma di un 
Runge, desiderosa di non ricorrere a nessun simbolismo precostituito dalla storia, si 
trasforma nella consacrazione del rapporto mistico e privato di una soggettività con 
l’assoluto, dove la storia in quanto tale non trova più posto, se non altro nella misura in 
cui la semantica è fissata e l’interpretazione è chiusa in anticipo. È proprio ciò di cui 
Schlegel si lamenta quando mette in evidenza il carattere arbitrario del simbolismo 
rungiano, di cui nessuno capirebbe nulla; e ciò malgrado il didatticismo dell’opera, 
denunciato da Schlegel proprio perché rafforza l’impressione che lo spettatore non 
possa venire a capo di un tale sistema simbolico senza avere a disposizione un manuale 
che ne contenga la spiegazione. La pedagogia del segno non toglie nulla al suo carattere 
arbitrario e, alla fine, rivolto appena verso gli altri. Senza condividere delle conclusioni 
tanto estreme, Peter Betthausen centra perfettamente il problema: la difficile 
intelligibilità delle Fasi, spiega, proviene dal fatto che Runge sopravvaluta “le possibilità 
comunicative dell’opera d’arte e la comprensione dello spettatore. In fin dei conti, solo 
l’artista comprese la sua arte – o Dio, che per Runge significa la stessa cosa” 
(Betthausen 2008: 6). L’artista non si è di certo mai preso per Dio, al contrario, nella 
sua concezione, lavora esclusivamente al servizio del divino e non degli altri uomini. 
Ecco una scelta, quella dell’astorico, che non è condivisa da tutti i pittori romantici. 
Caspar David Friedrich, infatti, esprime un’altra tendenza, sulla quale vale la pena di 
fermarsi brevemente per concludere questo articolo, al fine di mettere in evidenza le 
molteplici tendenze della pittura romantica. Si insiste talvolta sull’aspetto più anti-
rungiano della sua pittura, persino iperbolizzandolo, ovvero sull’idea di una rottura, di 
una frattura tra l’uomo e il mondo, mantenuta nonostante la volontà di una 
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riconciliazione. O più semplicemente, l’idea di un’alterità radicale della natura, la cui 
lingua adamica nascosta nelle sue pieghe non potrebbe essere riprodotta da nessuna 
tela, almeno non più di quanto questa potrebbe riappropriarsi della lingua della scienza 
naturale. Quando Goethe propone a Friedrich, nel 1816, di fare degli studi sulle nuvole 
al fine di corroborare o di mettere in prospettiva i lavori meteorologici di Luke Howard, 
Friedrich declina l’invito, com’è noto, non a causa del rifiuto delle scienze naturali, ma 
perché “l’occhio dello spirito”, quello a cui oppone “l’occhio del corpo”, è estraneo 
all’idea di una corrispondenza stretta e intangibile tra l’ordine del mondo e l’ordine 
delle parole. L’occhio dello spirito avrebbe, invece, la possibilità di scendere al di qua 
delle classificazioni della lingua scientifica per veder brillare l’ “origine” stessa della tela? 
Non più dell’altro. Altrimenti saremmo rimasti nell’incomunicabilità pura e semplice. 
In tal caso, l’origine sarebbe l’ordine cosmico, inaccessibile non soltanto alla lingua 
volgare ma anche alla lingua scientifica, e accessibile alla pura interiorità dello spirito. 
Ma non si tratta di questo. Il problema resta quello del mondo naturale e della sua 
conoscenza, ovvero della sua comprensione, della sua esposizione e dunque del rapporto 
all’altro. Tuttavia, il mondo naturale è veramente enigmatico, in Friedrich, e lo è fino in 
fondo. Tanto che, come sottolinea giustamente Pierre Wat, Friedrich “preferisce la 
celebrazione dell’illimitato, dell’indeterminato, di tutto ciò di cui non possiamo 
appropriarci nell’ambito del paesaggio” (Wat 2012: 35). Senza dubbio, quest’ultima 
formulazione è la più giusta. In quanto, accontentandosi di sottolineare l’isolamento 
dell’uomo nel mondo, si tralascia il fatto che il mondo di Friedrich – al contrario del 
mondo di Runge – non è trasparente a se stesso, non essendo altro che la fusione delle 
prospettive che si possono avere. Ma proprio tale opacità è vicina all’uomo… L’enigma, 
questo Rätsel onnipresente nei racconti romantici, da Tieck e Novalis ai fratelli Grimm, 
resta proprio la questione centrale, quella a cui si deve continuamente fare riferimento 
nel romanticismo. La preservazione dell’enigma, in Friedrich, è anche la condizione 
della possibilità della sua trasmissione allo spettatore, ovvero della trasmissione di un 
incitamento ad interpretare il senso dell’opera. Ha a che fare con l’indeterminatezza e 
con l’inappropriato o il non-appropriabile. 
 
6. Il non-appropriabile: l’infinito o il punto di vista dell’altro 
 
Il non-appropriabile, ovvero ciò che in una molteplicità senza forma si sottrae ad 
ogni assimilazione “immediata” tramite l’immaginazione formatrice, si presenta in 
Friedrich come un costante richiamo al punto di vista dell’altro, a dispetto del proprio 
punto di vista finito e limitato. Non tanto il grande Altro, il terzo occhio – come 
vorrebbe la corrente interpretativa di Friedrich “visionario mistico” – quanto l’occhio 
finito dell’altro o degli altri, che non possono appropriarsi del tutto nemmeno loro, ma 
che possono appropriarsi delle parti, d’altre parti. Come richiesto dal clima della 
Naturphilosophie, questo altro può anche non essere umano, a nostro avviso, benché 
l’umano sia sempre chiamato in causa dalla tela. Per questo, delle parti della natura 
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sembrano talvolta opporre i loro “punti di vista” nella tela. Il paesaggio sembra offrirsi 
spontaneamente come nido di prospettive, come se “selezionasse”, così come il pittore 
e lo spettatore, la vista che ai suoi occhi valeva di più. L’esperienza kantiana del sublime, 
ricordata tra l’altro da Pierre Wat nella sua formulazione, il sentimento sublime 
dell’illimitato e del senza-forma, è ovviamente un’esperienza soggettiva, in cui il 
soggetto si accorge, tramite l’intermediario dello spettacolo della natura, di una sorta di 
frattura tra sé e sé, ossia tra le sue facoltà finite d’apprensione degli oggetti e le sue 
esigenze razionali. Se questa non-coincidenza con se stesso non è affrancata al di fuori 
di sé dallo spettacolo della natura, è perché in una certa misura la natura si sottrae a tali 
esigenze, che sopporta, favorisce e promuove, ma fuori da se stessa, nella soggettività. 
Questo significa che la sperimentazione pittorica dell’indeterminato nella natura, 
garante di quest’alterità rigettata e persino negletta da Runge, dove tutto riceve una 
determinazione – sia pure trascendente all’umano attraverso cui transita –, è 
esclusivamente al servizio della conoscenza di sé da parte del soggetto? Per quanto ci 
riguarda, no. Non soltanto in Kant, per il quale l’esperienza della teleologia ci riporta 
verso la natura (nella seconda parte della Critica della facoltà di giudizio), ma soprattutto 
in Friedrich, per il quale l’indeterminazione del paesaggio esige sistematicamente una 
dimenticanza di sé, una cancellazione della propria prospettiva relativa al luogo stesso 
in cui viene mostrata, o addirittura esacerbata, disoggettivando così il paesaggio. Infatti, 
la presa di coscienza da parte dello spettatore, o da parte del personaggio nella tela, della 
sua posizione finita nel paesaggio lo porta a riconoscere il tutto indeterminato e per 
sempre non-appropriabile delle prospettive altre “all’infinito” e lo conduce a perdersi 
nel mondo. L’arte di Friedrich è un’autocritica. 
Disseminando nei suoi paesaggi grandiosi delle tracce o delle figure umane, più o 
meno discrete o più o meno imponenti, ma sempre umili, e spesso presentate di 
schiena, Friedrich non si limita a fare dell’esteriorità – come troppo spesso si crede – il 
supporto che permette al soggetto di immergersi in sé, di trovare in sé, e soltanto in 
quest’interiorità, il senso del mondo (un mondo in quanto tale inaccessibile e di 
conseguenza accessorio). Al contrario, il congedo dato da Friedrich all’arte figurativa 
non è ai nostri occhi motivato unilateralmente da un luteranismo intransigente e 
colpevolizzante, come ritiene la tradizione interpretativa alla quale appartiene Werner 
Hofmann. In un caso come nell’altro, non si riesce a capire da dove venga la profondità 
dei quadri di Friedrich. Se l’esperienza dell’indeterminato è anche l’esperienza del non-
appropriabile, è perché essa è innestata sul simbolo, e perché quest’ultimo, 
contrariamente al suo uso rungiano, è l’auto-istituzione, la presentazione “bruta” 
dell’enigma della relazione con l’alterità nel suo carattere infinito, non misurabile, 
ovvero del rapporto dell’io con la natura e, attraverso di essa, con la storia, che oramai si 
può raggiungere solo a partire dalla natura e non viceversa. Le tracce di un’umanità 
storica, in effetti, sono sempre più o meno nascoste nella natura, come se fossero parti 
integranti di una natura pronta a dimenticare più che a ricordarsi. Ad ogni modo, il 
simbolo ricorda la pluralità delle prospettive e l’intensità delle relazioni vissute dagli 
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spettatori molteplici della natura, che costituiscono insieme la natura e che vi 
partecipano.  
Il simbolismo di Friedrich è di natura riflessiva (come deve essere il simbolo in 
generale nella tradizione goethiana): lo spettatore dei quadri di Friedrich osserva 
l’apparenza interrogarsi e mostrarsi come centro di prospettive multiple e 
incommensurabili ma sempre collegate le une alle altre (a proposito del 
“prospettivismo” di Friedrich, cfr. Frank 2004). In effetti il visibile, ovvero l’immagine, è 
la sua stessa forma che emerge da molteplici prospettive. Il punto di vista privilegiato 
dalla tela pare trarre la sua forza dal fatto d’apparire solo come un punto di vista, finito, 
limitato, addirittura “desolato”, altrettanto desolato quanto il paesaggio. L’incrocio di 
sentimenti di spavento e di grandezza, di desolazione e di potenza, suscitato alla vista 
delle tele di Friedrich, è legato di certo all’impressione di una frattura irremissibile tra 
l’uomo e il suo mondo, alla vigilia della Rivoluzione industriale in Germania, ma anche 
all’impressione di uno sfocato costante di prospettive irriducibili le une alle altre – uno 
sfocato del tutto inedito nella storia, tanto più che è connaturato all’immobilità dei 
personaggi. La prospettiva è sempre quella dello spettatore, ossia contemporaneamente 
dei personaggi e, riflessivamente, degli spettatori del quadro di Friedrich, ma anche 
degli elementi molteplici della tela stessa, in quanto il paesaggio non è nient’altro che il 
lievito di tutte queste visioni sul mondo, che sono anche delle visioni del mondo.  
Una composizione come Der Watzmann (1824-25), con la quale si rasenta già l’arte 
astratta, soffoca in un primo momento il punto di vista dello spettatore, sovvertendo la 
coerenza della sua rappresentazione della montagna bavarese, in quanto il quadro, in 
realtà, combina diverse prospettive del massiccio tanto più incompatibili – ma forse 
non incompossibili – giacché il punto di vista del pittore è enigmatico, dal momento 
che il suo cavalletto sembra situarsi in aria. Inoltre, in via del tutto eccezionale, in questa 
tela non c’è nessun personaggio per ricordare la necessità di un punto di vista coerente, 
che sia sensato almeno per qualcuno. Grande appassionato di escursioni nella natura, 
Friedrich però non le dipingeva mai all’esterno: lasciava l’occhio del suo spirito 
riappropriarsi, nel suo atelier oscuro, di ciò che l’occhio del suo corpo aveva visto – o 
non visto, nel caso del massiccio bavarese, a cui il pittore non si era mai avvicinato. 
Spezzato, il Watzmann dipinto da Friedrich dà l’impressione di ballare sulle onde e di 
non appartenere a nessuno, nemmeno a se stesso. Il paesaggio sembra mostrare di per 
se stesso l’inutilità della frattura neoclassica e oggettivante tra l’imitante e l’imitato: il 
paesaggio imita se stesso molto male e non è il depositario di nessuna oggettività 
assoluta; non è la sua proprietà. Ecco perché la montagna sembra proporre una forma 
di non corrispondenza tra uno sfondo ben ritagliato e un primo piano confuso, 
sballottato, diagonale, che rende disordinato l’insieme della rappresentazione. Il 
sovvertimento del punto di vista dello spettatore non porta Friedrich a rinunciare 
all’idea di punto di vista in quanto tale. Tuttavia, tale punto di vista è ricondotto 
volontariamente all’ambivalenza del punto di vista in generale, ovvero alla 
determinazione della scelta, della selezione di una visione possibile, che lascerà 
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necessariamente nell’ombra infinite determinazioni proposte dalla natura stessa. Il 
Watzmann di Friedrich obbliga “spontaneamente” lo spettatore a scegliere tra 
un’apprensione dei suoi molteplici dettagli in primo piano e un’apprensione globale di 
tutto il massiccio. L’una e l’altra sono impossibili contemporaneamente, e per alcuni 
aspetti la seconda non è mai possibile a causa della prima. Non si potrebbe andare oltre 
nella destabilizzazione delle acquisizioni dell’arte neoclassica. È una procedura 
frequente in Friedrich: come scriveva Werner Hofmann, “il nostro sguardo non scivola, 
salta verso lo sfondo” (Hofmann 2000: 21). 
Lo spettatore di Friedrich è spesso stupefatto davanti al paesaggio (per esempio in 
Donna nel sole del mattino, 1818), che riscopre dopo essersi narcisisticamente dato la 
priorità nel corso dei secoli, ed è ricondotto al suo punto di vista sulla natura, ovvero 
alla sua capacità di accogliere l’enigma di ciò che gli si offre come spettacolo illimitato. 
Si può parlare d’enigma, e pertanto d’interpretazione, proprio perché ciò che si offre ha 
soltanto i contorni che lo sguardo gli vorrà dare, sguardo che si ritrova smarrito nel 
mezzo delle determinazioni molteplici. L’enigma è l’incontro infrangibile di ogni 
spettatore appassionato alla verità con la prospettiva dell’altro, rivelato dalla riflessione 
della sua prospettiva. Friedrich è apparso allo sguardo del severo e patetico Ramdohr 
come l’assassino della prospettiva classica e di tutte le regole dell’armonia – come 
nell’Altare di Tetschen (1807-08) che simboleggia, stando a quanto dice, il fallimento 
del pittore nella scelta di un punto di vista. Questo famoso episodio della storia dell’arte 
mostra la difficoltà che si può provare davanti a quel che ci appare al contrario come la 
totale apertura delle prospettive, legata alla riflessione dell’apparenza su se stessa e al 
recupero sovversivo delle regole della composizione storica (opposizione dell’ombra e 
della luce, verticalità del formato, ecc.) in favore del genere del paesaggio, senza il 
contenuto del genere storico. Infatti, come tutte le tele di Friedrich, l’Altare è in realtà 
un invito ad andare in fondo alla riflessione dell’apparenza su se stessa. Spesso colmo di 
foschia – uno degli operatori simbolici più importanti del pittore -, il paesaggio di 
Friedrich suscita un desiderio di decifrazione di un senso che non aspetta in alcun 
retromondo. Offrendo la loro opacità allo sguardo, i molteplici “veli” che ricoprono i 
paesaggi di Friedrich, come la foschia, le nuvole, la neve o l’oscurità, non sono degli 
ostacoli alla comprensione di una significazione in sé luminosa, ma degli operatori di 
comprensione dell’apparenza in quanto tale, nel senso che invitano dovunque a 
interpretare ciò che si vede a partire dalla propria scelta, dalla propria visione selettiva, 
come contributo all’esperienza universale della visione, che è forse il vero nome del Dio 
di Friedrich. Non si deve perciò confondere la foschia con un qualsiasi trompe-l’œil caro 
al Rinasciamento e ai suoi giochi prospettivistici. Non si tratta più di meditare il punto 
di vista dello spettatore a riguardo di un dato “oggettivo”, dell’esterno; si tratta di 
riflettere le condizioni di possibilità di un’interpretazione del senso di ciò che si offre al 
tempo stesso all’esterno e all’interno in quanto apertura sull’alterità. Nella misura in cui 
il senso di questo paesaggio è ricondotto alle sue diverse interpretazioni, queste partono 
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sempre dal vissuto dello spettatore, che si riflette e rinvia agli innumerevoli spettatori, 
dentro e fuori dalla tela. 
La perdita del carattere “oggettivo” della pittura di paesaggio romantica è stata 
potentemente identificata da Kleist, nel suo commento spesso citato del Monaco in riva 
al mare. Dopo aver ritrovato il gioco d’identificazione dello spettatore al di fuori della 
tela con lo spettatore dentro la tela (il monaco), Kleist, colpito dall’indistinzione dei 
piani, ossia dall’assimilazione della cornice in quanto tale con il primo piano, ha 
l’impressione che gli siano state “tagliate le palpebre” (Kleist 1981: 87). Come fa notare 
Pierre Wat, è un modo di dire che i marcatori della separazione tra il soggetto e 
l’oggetto, l’attore e lo spettatore, il primo piano e lo sfondo, ma anche tra l’uomo e la 
natura, sono soppressi: “Le palpebre, che, come la finestra, si aprono e si chiudono, 
erano l’ultima garanzia di una distanza, di una “oggettività” ancora possibile, di una 
separazione tra vita e rappresentazione” (Wat 2012: 144). Kleist è portato ad 
identificarsi al monaco, e si rapporta alla tela come il monaco si rapporta alla duna nella 
tela. Ma al tempo stesso, non può farlo completamente: vi è incontro tra prospettive più 
che unità. Quest’esperienza è insieme grandiosa e apocalittica per lo scrittore 
romantico: al contrario dell’estetica rungiana, il simbolo non codifica un’esperienza 
passata e persa; esso è bensì l’incontro della natura (in questo caso la distesa 
immensamente vuota) e della libertà (l’impegno in una visione determinata) tramite 
l’intermediario dell’arte, e più precisamente di un’arte votata a non poter ultimare 
quest’incontro. Se il simbolo di Friedrich realizza la loro identità abolendo in apparenza 
la frattura tra un punto di vista “esterno” e un punto di vista “interno” alla tela, esso non 
fallisce tuttavia davanti al punto di vista in generale, come ritiene Ramdohr. Il monaco in 
riva al mare è un’esperienza dell’ “Aperto”: lo spettatore riflette la sua posizione e 
interpreta la sua esperienza di visione nella tela. La tela, infatti, è una continuazione 
della natura – poiché non esiste una cornice o, in linguaggio fenomenologico, un 
“supporto d’immagine” – allo stesso modo in cui la natura “cresce” nell’arte. La natura 
si offre dunque al nostro sguardo come una riflessione sull’atto di vedere e di essere 
visti/e e, di conseguenza, riflettendosi, lo spettatore si riconosce in quanto parte 
integrante di un tutto che aveva ritenuto esclusivamente scisso. Aveva creduto di poter 
dominare la natura con il suo sguardo, ma non può farlo: è la natura stessa che lo invita 
a guardare e a immaginarsi come un punto in una tela, una monade a contatto con tutte 
le altre monadi. Il tutto conserva nonostante ciò le sue rotture, e Kleist ne è 
consapevole, tanto più che, come afferma in parte lamentandosene, si resta 
tragicamente al di fuori del luogo stesso in cui si crede di esser dentro. Se per Friedrich, 
al contrario di Runge, non vi è fusione tra l’arte e la natura, vi è sicuramente un pensiero 
del tutto e dell’unità, che non camuffa la scissione ma che, riflettendola, la oltrepassa.  
Diventano così più evidenti la vicinanza e contemporaneamente la distanza tra 
Runge e Friedrich. Entrambi condividono la rievocazione di uno scarto oggettivo tra la 
natura e la libertà, e l’esigenza di ritrovare la loro identità attraverso il simbolo; l’uno e 
l’altro credono che il divino sia ovunque e che per questa ragione tutto possa di diritto 
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diventare oggetto di una rappresentazione, senza gerarchie. A differenza di Runge, 
tuttavia, in Friedrich, se la natura si riflette nella tela attraverso l’intermediario dello 
spettatore libero, e se questo si riflette a sua volta nella natura, tale riflessione dà un 
luogo all’identità solo sottraendole il godimento dell’assoluto, e promuovendo al suo 
posto l’interpretazione libera e aperta di ciò che si offre allo sguardo al di fuori dei limiti 
neoclassici.4 Come fece notare Albert Béguin, 
 
l’arte di Friedrich non si smarrisce in tali allegorie, in cui altri pittori romantici, come Runge, misero 
troppe intenzioni letterarie. Il simbolo, in Friedrich, è meno esplicito; i suoi paesaggi impongono 
una fuga dello spirito al di là da quanto vedono gli occhi. L’autunno e l’inverno sono le sue stagioni 
preferite, grandi voli d’uccelli accrescono l’impressione di solitudine e, spesso, di desolazione. Ma, 
nello stesso tempo, egli si dedica a render manifesta la costituzione geologica delle rocce, a fermare 
i fenomeni o le illusioni della luce diffusa nella bruma. All’isolamento, all’angoscia dell’essere 
umano nella sua piccolezza, corrisponde la vita d’una natura in perenne metamorfosi, attraverso i 
secoli dell’evoluzione tellurica come attraverso i minuti della giornata e gli incessanti cangiamenti 
di luminosità (Béguin 1939: 125; trad. 1967: 180). 
 
Per certi aspetti, la sensazione d’Apocalisse dipinta da Kleist davanti al Monaco è 
rigorosamente contraria alla sensazione di pienezza e di ritrovamento che si prova 
davanti al Mattino. L’Apocalisse, infatti, risiede nel fatto che per lo spettatore non c’è 
ormai nessun codice da possedere per meditare sull’unità problematica dell’imitante e 
dell’imitato: c’è solo l’apertura ermeneutica, ovvero l’enigma di ciò che si offre a partire 
dal mio vissuto interiore; come e in quanto punti di vista, tutti questi punti di vista 
partecipano all’unità ma rimangono indeterminati, non unificabili e sempre inquietanti. 
Se l’arte è un gioco, “è un gioco serio” (Friedrich 2006: 43), scrive Friedrich a Runge – 
con un’espressione che la dice lunga sulla sua estetica, tormentata e sofferta. 
Di conseguenza, la “tragedia del paesaggio” di Friedrich, secondo la famosa formula 
di David d’Angers, si definisce non tanto tramite la sua capacità di farci sentire “dietro la 
natura più semplice, la meno pittoresca, il dio nascosto” (Wat 2012: 181), come fa Wat, 
ma semplicemente tramite la vera, inedita ma inquietante autonomia del simbolo. Di 
certo, il divino è ovunque, e persino in un granello di sabbia, afferma Friedrich. Ma il 
divino non concede alcuna chiave, non dice nulla di più di quel che noi stessi possiamo 
dire, o di quel che possa dire il granello di sabbia introducendosi nella visione. Meglio 
ancora: il divino mostra la mortalità delle sue parti, in quanto solo il tutto resta 
immortale. La natura è dunque portatrice della sua finitezza, sottomessa a dei cicli che si 
sottraggono ad ogni controllo. Tutte le parti, tutte le visioni singolarizzate – e la materia 
stessa ne è colma – sono spettatori e attori della loro significazione, e questa si trova 
soltanto nell’incrocio degli sguardi o delle partecipazioni alla visione universale: quella 
di Kleist al di fuori della tela, identica e al tempo stesso incompatibile con quella del 
                                                           
4 Può d’altronde stupire il fatto che Pierre Wat non sottolinei praticamente nessuna differenza tra i 
progetti di Runge e di Friedrich, assimilati in modo puro e semplice. 
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monaco nella tela. L’arte non è altro che il linguaggio della sensibilità ed è in ciò 
identica alla natura con la quale si pone in continuazione grazie all’intermediario 
riflessivo del simbolo. Dietro tale apertura del simbolo vi è un silenzio tragico del divino 
e un’inquietudine. Il divino, che è il tutto, non rivela le sue priorità. Il pittore le mostra 
al suo posto, così come lo spettatore stesso: solo alcune parti del tutto, delle 
determinazioni singolari, devono essere selezionate come punti di vista. In Friedrich, 
per esempio, la storia umana è sistematicamente relativizzata in favore della natura, o 
assorbita dalla natura. Ciò accade nel Cimitero sotto la neve (1826-27), un cimitero reso 
anonimo dalla neve e nel quale è impossibile leggere i nomi sulle lapidi. Oppure nella 
barca naufragata nel Il mare di ghiacco (Il Naufragio della speranza) (1823-24), in cui si 
vede soltanto un pezzo dello scafo adagiato sullo sfondo: il fracasso delle lastre dei 
ghiacci che si urtano in primo piano ha più valore dell’avventura umana. Se non altro, fa 
valere di riflesso gli eventi umani che vuole contenere. Come nel caso delle numerose 
rovine che abitano e sono parte integrante della natura di Friedrich, e in particolare nel 
caso delle rovine delle chiese: la vera spiritualità è interiore, e l’istituzione umana è 
inghiottita dal paesaggio. 
Ma si tratta di valori divini? Nulla permette di affermarlo, in quanto né gli eventi 
umani né gli eventi naturali sono correlati ad una significazione divina fissa, che 
bisognerebbe decifrare. Il divino, è lo spirito che anima il tutto, e il tutto è l’insieme 
delle prospettive che si possono avere sulla natura, ovvero anche l’insieme delle 
prospettive, delle visioni mortali e finite, che la natura può avere di sé. Ma le parti che 
emergono dal tutto sono l’oggetto di una scelta, di una selezione, legata all’incontro 
continuamente rinnovato del pittore, dello spettatore e degli elementi stessi del 
paesaggio. Soltanto la prospettiva vale. Essa mostra una parte e rende le altre parti (cioè, 
in definitiva, il tutto) non appropriabili, le rinvia alla loro indeterminazione e riconosce 
la portata spirituale di questa illimitatezza. La storia umana in particolare non è più 
interamente appropriabile da parte dell’uomo: lo spettatore non può più farla 
interamente sua. Questa storia fa parte della natura e del suo linguaggio sensibile, e alla 
natura non preme di rendere la storia umana visibile, perché ha sempre la tendenza a 
privilegiare l’opacità. È questa una delle scelte estetiche più decisive e più determinanti 
di Friedrich. L’importante, tuttavia, non risiede soltanto nel ritaglio di una prospettiva 
alla quale viene conferito un valore singolare, ma, come si è visto, nell’instabilità delle 
prospettive, addirittura nella loro inadeguatezza, e nella loro apertura 
sull’indeterminato, sulle prospettive che non contengono, e che non potremmo 
cogliere perché ci oltrepassano. Era dunque prevedibile che nel Monaco, così come in 
molte altre tele, la natura non fosse esplicitamente più appropriabile della storia umana, 
poiché i suoi contorni escono dalla cornice, o piuttosto perché non c’è cornice, e perché 
l’apertura raggiunge una radicalità mai vista prima, rispetto alla quale ogni punto di vista 
dello spettatore al di fuori della tela è la continuazione “in piccolo”. In quanto, dipinti di 
schiena, i personaggi nella tela sono sempre in una posizione meditativa e interrogativa: 
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sono il prolungamento della domanda della natura stessa e non offrono nessuna 
risposta definitiva all’enigma della visione. 
Tale meditazione sull’indeterminato, al quale si giunge tramite la riflessione 
dell’apparenza sul punto di vista particolare e determinato, si svolge nell’interiorità di 
Friedrich, dei suoi personaggi e degli spettatori della tela. La critica ha avuto ragione di 
sottolinearlo, ed è stata in ciò aiutata dalle indicazioni trasparenti dello stesso artista, 
secondo cui il pittore deve dipingere ciò che vede all’interno di sé. Come scrive Laure 
Cahen-Maurel commentando Friedrich, 
 
Il solo modo appropriato di contemplare delle opere d’arte è di dedicare tutta la propria anima ad 
un’opera alla volta, in un luogo chiuso, una sorta di nuovo santuario, dove ciò che piace senza 
concetto, ed in particolare senza il concetto normativo della percezione, è dell’ordine del 
sentimento: sarà giudicata bella l’opera che saprà mettere l’anima del suo spettatore in uno stato 
fatto per comprendere ciò che essa rivela di sublime, per riprendere le parole di David d’Angers. Il 
suo atelier di Dresda era, per Friedrich, questo santuario spirituale (Cahen-Maurel 201: 25). 
 
Quest’interiorità non è mai una negazione dell’esteriorità – si è già insistito su 
questo punto -, ma va intesa al contrario come un’intensificazione del reale attraverso la 
via del sogno e del sentimento. La tela partecipa alla ricerca d’unità, alla volontà di 
raggiungere la totalità perduta per accoglierla e per poi fondervisi. Di conseguenza, si 
sbaglierebbe a ritrovare soltanto dell’entusiasmo – del resto ben reale – nella dinamica 
di Friedrich del tutto e delle parti. In quanto, nello spirito della sensibilità romantica, la 
nostalgia ha un ruolo pari all’entusiasmo. È chiaro: solo la parte è mortale, e la sublime 
aspirazione all’indeterminato si urta contro l’incompatibilità perpetua delle parti. Ogni 
tela sottolinea o ricorda un urto, una rottura, persino una separazione, tra l’illimitato e il 
limitato. Il limitato non richiama gioiosamente l’illimitato, ma se ne preoccupa, e si 
prende il tempo di meditare tutto quello che gli sfugge – questo tempo che, agli occhi 
del pittore, l’uomo moderno, l’uomo ansioso di non lasciarsi sfuggire niente, non si 
concede più. L’immobilità dei corpi, secondo Friedrich, è dunque la conseguenza 
necessaria dell’aspirazione all’infinito. Questa meditazione immobile non è un passo 
indietro rispetto al paesaggio, ma manifesta il pieno investimento di quest’ultimo. Qui 
si trova l’entusiasmo: ogni tela intensifica il paesaggio e riflette attivamente la finitezza 
delle sue parti per mostrare al meglio l’assenza della totalità indeterminata verso la 
quale tutto il paesaggio è per così dire teso. 
 
7. Il Monaco in riva al mare 
 
La peculiarità del Monaco in riva al mare è di funzionare in un certo qual modo in 
senso inverso rispetto al processo di riflessione della parte, benché l’obiettivo del 
pittore sia lo stesso, come fa notare Laure Cahen-Maurel, che distingue nei suoi scritti 
quattro modi di produzione del sublime: instaurare una tensione dialettica tra l’assenza 
e la presenza attraverso l’opacizzazione del paesaggio, favorire la presa di coscienza 
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dell’infinito nonostante la forma finita e ben delimitata, proiettare lo spettatore verso 
l’infinito favorendo l’impressione d’illimitatezza e d’assenza delle parti, intensificare la 
sensibilità dello spettatore tramite l’effetto di drammatizzazione provocato 
dall’interruzione del movimento della natura o delle figure che la popolano. Il Monaco 
appartiene ovviamente alla terza modalità. Friedrich vi oppone, alla limitazione del 
formato tangibile della tela, “un effetto di scala adatto ad esaltare lo spazio” (Cahen-
Maurel 2011: 36). Il pittore capovolge in questo caso una strategia che impiega altrove: 
quella della finestra, come in Donna alla finestra (1822) o La terrazza del giardino 
(1806-11), o ancora in Veduta dalla finestra dell’atelier nelle sue due versioni (1805-06). 
Ricordando la separazione delle parti, i quadri “a finestra” dividono lo spazio e 
sottolineano la differenza dell’interno e dell’esterno. Lo spettatore di La terrazza del 
giardino, come la donna in Donna alla finestra, fanno parte dell’esterno pur senza 
esservi. Il Monaco sembra invece immergere lo spettatore nel grande Fuori: se il 
paesaggio ci strappa le palpebre, come credeva Kleist, a maggior ragione non ha 
finestre. In Contemplando una collezione di dipinti, Friedrich nota a proposito di un 
quadro sconosciuto: 
 
Questo quadro è grande e tuttavia lo si vorrebbe sempre più grande; in quanto la sublimità 
conferita al motivo è sentita in modo prodigioso ed esige un dispiegamento sempre più grande 
nello spazio. Desiderarlo più grande, è sempre un elogio per il quadro (Friedrich 2011: 73). 
 
Eppure attenzione: questo quadro “è grande; e tuttavia la grandezza manca a questo 
quadro” (Friedrich 2011: 73), precisa poco più in alto. La grandezza è uno dei criteri 
del sublime, ma non può confondersi con il carattere semplicemente misurabile della 
dimensione. Benché un quadro, opera d’arte finita, abbia sempre una dimensione, tutto 
nella tela deve invitare ad oltrepassare la misura in generale, ed elevare lo spettatore 
dall’impressione del “grande” a quella della “grandezza”. Tale grandezza deve inoltre 
essere provata in prima persona, insiste ovunque Friedrich, criticando ora quelli che 
conoscono il bello ma non lo provano (cfr. Friedrich 2011: 98), ora quelli che 
dimenticano che “un quadro non deve essere inventato, ma sentito” (Friedrich 2011: 
64).5 Se il Gemüt romantico (cuore, anima, senso intimo) non è soltanto sinonimo di 
un’immersione in sé dimentica del mondo, ma va compreso al contrario come a 
contatto con la materia e connesso a delle parti del mondo – per rapportarsi meglio 
all’infinito o all’assoluto – è perché, arricchiti della propria interiorità, bisogna ritornare 
dal sogno e dagli affetti verso il mondo infinito. La tela, sottolineiamolo, non si limita a 
piangere l’unità perduta, ma intensifica il reale, come riconosce Friedrich: “Concedo 
molto volentieri che in alcuni casi l’artista debba far vedere più di quel che ha visto in 
realtà, in modo tale che la sua pittura dia piena soddisfazione, ma la notte non deve mai 
                                                           
5 Si legge anche: “Vuoi sapere cos’è la bellezza? Interroga i signori esteti. Ciò può esserti utile per il 
tavolino del tè. Ma davanti al cavalletto, devi sentire cos’è il bello” (Friedrich 2011: 66). 
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tramutarsi in giorno” (Friedrich 2011: 101). In altri termini, non si può dipingere in 
modo puro e semplice la propria notte privata, senza altre forme di processo, ma 
bisogna lasciare che questa notte investa il giorno e divenga parte integrante della luce, 
del gioco serio costituito dal potere universale della visione. 
Il Monaco si situa esattamente qui: la sua “grandezza” è legata alla capacità di questa 
composizione di trasportare delicatamente la visione notturna e onirica nel giorno 
senza schiacciarlo, ma aprendolo sull’infinito. Ovvero (poiché nessuna tela potrebbe 
rendere presente l’assoluto), allargando le parti finite (il quadro è di 110 x 171,5 cm), 
intensificando il finito al punto tale che sembri immergersi esso stesso verso l’infinito. La 
notte, che nello spirito di Friedrich è contemporaneamente l’oscurità fisica e l’opacità 
simbolica del sogno o della vita interiore, permette al giorno d’ingrandirsi 
letteralmente, come scrive il pittore ancora una volta: “Quando una regione si ricopre di 
nebbia sembra più grande, più sublime; così come l’apparizione di una giovane donna 
coperta da un velo esalta l’immaginazione e aumenta l’attesa” (Friedrich 2011: 134). La 
linea dell’orizzonte particolarmente bassa permette a un cielo davvero gigantesco di 
occupare i quattro quinti della tela, un cielo giustamente opacizzato da una foschia 
cupa, e gradualmente più chiaro man mano che si procede verso l’alto. Il minuscolo 
cappuccino, in primo piano, è un elemento contemplativo del mare, nel senso del 
genitivo oggettivo in quanto sembra appartenere al mare con il quale condivide il 
colore scuro. L’estensione estrema della tela, la sua desolazione e il suo vuoto, hanno 
come corollario il sentimento di una grande melancolia. Come nota Élisabeth Décultot, 
 
Il quadro traduce un sogno d’ubiquità e d’infinità ottica, il desiderio di uno sguardo al centro del 
mondo, che abbraccerebbe circolarmente la totalità del paesaggio – d’un occhio infinitamente 
largo, decuplicato, universale. Quest’irruzione dell’infinito nella tela è ulteriormente accentuata da 
una nuova gestione dei margini, della periferia del quadro. La prospettiva non è incastonata in un 
decoro di vegetazione o inquadrata al centro del quadro da dei fabbricati (moli di un porto, 
elementi diversi d’architettura) secondo il gusto di Lorrain o di Vernet. L’infinito si estende verso i 
margini, oltre i limiti laterali della cornice. Certo, nella tradizione delle marine, si ritrovano anche 
dei paesaggi aperti su di un vasto orizzonte, ma mai l’immensità stessa, nel suo denudamento 
assoluto, mai fino ad allora il fascino ambiguo per l’infinito o per il vuoto avevano costituito 
esplicitamente proprio il soggetto di una tela. L’occhio entra in questo quadro come in un baratro 
(Décultot 1997: 144-145). 
 
Pertanto, è proprio la prospettiva ad essere in discussione in questo sogno notturno 
d’ubiquità prolungato in una penombra inquieta di sapere se la ricerca della totalità o 
dell’infinito ha un senso, e se vale la pena d’inseguirlo. L’espressione utilizzata da 
Décultot, quella di una “irruzione dell’infinito nella tela” è particolarmente adeguata: 
per lo spettatore, si tratta di vivere l’evento di un incontro coinvolgente e imprevisto, 
quello del finito e dell’infinito, il quale non potrebbe fare irruzione nel finito se non vi 
fosse uno scarto tra la parte e il tutto, e se non vi fosse in fin dei conti una ammissione di 
fallimento della parte indissociabile dal suo entusiasmo nel rinviare al tutto. Tanto che 
l’infinito si confonde qui con il vuoto (com’è il caso, pare, nell’Abbazia nel querceto dello 
 FOCUS • Art and Aesthetic Experience 
 
AUGUSTIN DUMONT • La duplicità 
del simbolismo nella pittura romantica tedesca 
 
 
CoSMo   Comparative Studies in Modernism n. 6 (Spring) • 2015 
156 
stesso anno 1809), ovvero il vuoto delle parti, l’assenza pura e semplice. Non è di certo 
evidente agli occhi della tradizione. Se si può guardare questo quadro al contrario, come 
sosteneva Goethe in modo abbastanza ipocrita, ciò si deve al fatto che lo spazio del 
quadro, in modo inedito, smette di dare le chiavi del rapporto delle parti tra di loro. 
La riflessione dello spettatore sulla sua prospettiva e tutta la dimensione autocritica 
della pittura di Friedrich non è annullata, ma iperbolizzata in modo originale. Infatti, 
non disponendo più di nessuna guida tradizionale per penetrare nella profondità del 
quadro (solco di una nave, diagonale, via sinuosa, ecc.), come precisa Décultot, l’occhio 
dello spettatore deve accontentarsi di strati orizzontali che gli sono indifferenti, nel 
senso che non suscitano il conforto della visione, non conducono lo sguardo da parte a 
parte, e permettono l’apprensione globale di una piccola totalità armoniosamente 
composta. Al contrario, Friedrich cerca veramente di rendere possibile un’esperienza 
(kantiana) del sublime tramite il solo mezzo dell’arte, e non dello spettacolo infinito 
della natura esterna, mostrando la precarietà della differenza tra i due spettacoli. 
Ovviamente tale soppressione è impossibile – come d’altronde ha scritto Kleist nel suo 
testo – ma l’importante si trova in questo punto: è possibile, se non altro, destabilizzare 
le capacità d’apprensione della realtà, tramite l’immaginazione dello spettatore, agendo 
in modo particolare su ciò che, inevitabilmente, resta una “parte” separata dall’infinito a 
fronte dello spettacolo di un cielo stellato. Lo spettacolo dell’opera d’arte, in veste di 
prolungamento della natura infinita, è un’intensificazione di essa, perché può provocare 
soltanto con la parte finita (la tela) un disorientamento che la natura può generare solo 
venendo estesa all’infinito, matematicamente (il cielo stellato) o dinamicamente (il 
mare scatenato). 
In ogni caso, in questa tela, a dir poco radicalmente opposta alle regole accademiche 
classiche, si può trovare una forma d’indifferenza sublime della composizione in 
generale rispetto allo spettatore, che non può servirsi di nessun accessorio per sostenere 
la sua visione, né di un evento narrativo per temporalizzarla o socializzarla. L’evento – il 
solo evento – è quello della brutale irruzione dell’infinito in ciò che, pur essendo ancora 
finito, non ha tuttavia delle parti in senso proprio, delle “differenze” in questo senso 
preciso. Questa volta non si tratta né dell’indifferenza schellinghiana né 
dell’indifferenza rungiana: si tratta di un’impressione di vuoto, più nerastra che grigia, 
che indica l’assoluto mostrando semplicemente il suo infinito allontanamento, la sua 
presenza ben al di là dei limiti laterali della cornice. L’indifferenza è, in questo caso, 
quella della relativizzazione della prospettiva dello spettatore. La sua relativizzazione 
non significa il suo annientamento e, come sottolinea Décultot, la presenza minuscola 
del cappuccino è in realtà cruciale per dare un senso, nonostante tutto, a questa 
prospettiva disorientata: egli è l’operatore principale della riflessività del quadro. Solo 
elemento verticale del quadro – con il quale condivide la larghezza secondo la regola 
d’oro o “divina proporzione” (Hofmann 2000: 57) -, il monaco si contrappone alle 
linee orizzontali e costituisce di conseguenza il solo elemento capace di riflettere, di 
meditare, di prendere coscienza dell’immensità e di sentire anche l’inadeguatezza della 
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sua posizione finita e vulnerabile in confronto all’orizzontalità infinita del mondo. Pur 
non potendone conoscere nulla, poiché non vi è nulla che si possa conoscere, 
raccontare o persino identificare – non ha volto – la sua situazione, così come la sua 
posizione, polarizzano l’interpretazione: 
 
È innanzitutto grazie alla sua funzione “ermeneutica” all’interno del quadro che questo personaggio 
si distingue dalle Rückenfiguren precedenti. Attraverso di lui, il paesaggio diventa riflessivo. In un 
movimento specificatamente romantico di ritorno su di sé e di mise en abîme, attira lo sguardo sul 
proprio funzionamento, rinvia alla sua genesi, porta in sé la traccia della sua elaborazione e fa di essa 
il suo argomento principale, il suo oggetto. Gli interpreti moderni hanno offerto interpretazioni 
molteplici e divergenti di questa Rückenfigur: traduce un raccoglimento religioso e fiducioso di 
fronte all’altare della natura o al contrario la ricerca disperata di Dio nell’universo? Raffigura una 
fusione possibile con la natura o, invece, l’isolamento tragico dell’uomo di fronte all’infinito? 
Queste domande sembrano sfociare in una polemica senza fine, del tutto indecidibile se si resta su 
questo livello d’analisi. Per abbandonare le aporie di questo dibattito, si deve notare che 
l’ambivalenza dell’interpretazione è inscritta nella struttura stessa dell’opera: il personaggio è visto 
di schiena, nel senso che la sua fisionomia – sede della “espressione” secondo le teorie estetiche 
classiche – ci resta sconosciuta, deliberatamente dissimulata. Tramite quest’occultazione calcolata 
del volto e del suo senso, Friedrich sembra mettere tra parentesi i sentimenti individuali del 
personaggio per attirare la nostra attenzione sul solo luogo incontestabile che lo unisce al 
paesaggio: lo sguardo. È la genesi stessa del paesaggio, la sua elaborazione tramite uno sguardo, che, 
grazie all’intermediario del monaco, si trovano situati al cuore dell’opera. Il paesaggio di Friedrich si 
mostra risolutamente come un meta-paesaggio. Se, come ha mostrato A. W. Schlegel in Dipinti, la 
riflessività, la mise en abîme della visione è inerente alla struttura stessa della pittura, un importante 
cambiamento è stato incontestabilmente messo in atto da Friedrich: il paesaggio, sicuramente 
riflessivo per natura, fa oramai di questa riflessività il suo soggetto principale. Il centro di gravità 
dell’opera si è spostato. In questo senso, tale paesaggio rappresenta una forma estremamente 
sofisticata di questa “scuola della visione” di cui parlava Louise in Dipinti. Più d’ogni altro genere, ci 
“insegna a vedere” (Décultot 1997: 146-147). 
 
Insegnare a vedere significa invitare a penetrare il senso enigmatico di ciò che si 
offre, un senso pienamente aperto, aperto all’infinito. Siamo qui il più lontano possibile 
da Runge, benché la volontà di destabilizzare le regole neoclassiche sia identica. La 
solitudine dell’uomo, perso nell’infinito del mondo, chiede analogicamente di essere 
interpretata all’infinito. Anche se modesta o insignificante, la posizione verticale 
dell’uomo è in fondo una contraddizione delle linee orizzontali, una contraddizione 
momentanea, che, in Le bianche scogliere di Rügen (versione del 1818), interamente 
verticali, bisognerà attenuare appoggiandosi a una radice, sedendosi sull’erba o 
distendendosi a pancia in giù. La posizione dell’uomo è sistematicamente interrogativa 
grazie alla sua capacità di spostare le linee del paesaggio. Così, 
 
come l’infinito spaziale della natura si sottrae continuamente all’agrimensore che cerca di misurarla 
– ossia di conoscerla –, allo stesso modo la tela di Friedrich si sottrae continuamente 
all’elucidazione. Il pittore ha trasformato un infinito spaziale in un infinito di senso. Mentre la 
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natura reale si apre ad un incommensurabile geografico, l’opera di Friedrich si apre ad un infinito 
ermeneutico (Décultot 1997: 152). 
 
La profondità spaziale diviene profondità semantica. L’enigma si presenta dunque 
come un’opacità continua e prolungata dell’esperienza sensibile alle prese con 
l’aspirazione all’infinito, esperienza che va interpretata, facendone continuamente 
respirare i significati irrigiditi. Friedrich esprime così un’altra “tendenza” dell’estetica 
romantica: niente è prestabilito, ma l’attore del senso, che è lo spettatore, deve fare una 
scelta, proprio come le figure nelle tele; deve impegnarsi per una parte o per un’altra 
della totalità e darle senso, privilegiando dei punti di vista singolari, in quanto, anche se 
vi aspira, è consapevole del fatto che non esiste nessun punto di vista assoluto. Ogni 
personaggio di Le bianche scogliere di Rügen mette dunque in valore la propria 
prospettiva, persino l’uomo disteso di pancia. Quest’ultimo guarda nel baratro 
immenso senza tener conto del tutto o dell’ “insieme”, che pare interessare solo il suo 
vicino. Ci si può addirittura chiedere se rivolga il suo sguardo, affascinato, su una parte 
della parte, per così dire: un filo d’erba, o una radice, che cresce sull’orlo del baratro o 
che spunta perpendicolarmente alla parete, indicatogli forse dalla donna in rosso. Il 
carattere sublime dell’apertura sul vuoto si accrescerebbe dunque della punta d’ironia 
romantica tramite la presenza, in se stessa sorprendente, del dettaglio inatteso. Anche il 
filo d’erba, come ogni singola visione del mondo o sul mondo, ha un profumo di 
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FERRAN ADRIÀ, JÈSSICA JAQUES1 
FOR AN APPLIED 








Applied philosophy considers as a single generative matrix the discursive praxis and 
its validation in a real object. It resignifies traditional metaphysics by blending it almost 
inextricably with a real praxis. It combines with and draws from artistic, ethical, 
educational, psychological, religious, ethnic, political, legal, economic, sociological, 
activistic, linguistic, ecological or scientific practices. Now is the turn of gastronomy: in 
recent times, this field stopped being a mere practice to become a discursive generator 
of new ways of thinking. In the wake of Jean Antelme Brillat-Savarin (cf. 1826) and 
Filippo Tomasso Marinetti (cf. 1930), contemporary cuisine is beginning its theoretical 
journey and, because of its strong bond with reality, this journey falls within the scope 
of applied philosophy (cf. Allhoff & Monroe 2007; Curtin & Heldke 1992; Jaques 
2014; Kaplan 2012; Korsmeyer 1999 & 2001; Onfray 1995; Telfer 1996).  
Ferran Adrià was, unknowingly to himself, a philosopher at the stoves. He closed his 
restaurant, elBulli (<http://www.elbulli.com/home.php?lang=en>), six months a year 
to devote himself to creation, despite the economic risks entailed. He wasn’t aware of 
being a philosopher until British artist Richard Hamilton blurted out that his cooking 
was a language. Not a propositional, but a global language. Since then, knowledge and 
flavour were a single word in his head, without even knowing of their etymological link 
(sapere, sapor -oris). Adrià began to wonder about the conditions of possibility of 
gastronomy. He closed elBulli in July 2011 (after twenty-five years as a creative entity) 
to focus during seven years on reflection. In fact, the whole history of elBulli can be 
divided in cycles of seven years. He understood Hegel, Brillat-Savarin’s contemporary, 
                                                           
1 This article is, strictly speaking, the result of a series of interviews between Jèssica Jaques – Professor 
of Aesthetics and Art Theory at the Philosophy Department of Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona – 
and Ferran Adrià. In a broader sense, it responds to four years of networking within the territory of 
philosophy applied to gastronomy, with special emphasis on applied aesthetics. This article would not 
have been possible without the support of the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad to the research 
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without even knowing who the German philosopher was; understanding was a crucial 
prelude to being creative once again. He didn’t know Kant either, but shared with the 
philosopher of Königsberg the idea that the fundamental category of aesthetics is 
disinterestedness, and also a philosophy of talent. Gastronomy has nothing to do with 
nutrition, but with the pleasure of thought, just as any creative painting or poem. Adrià 
started feeding thought, 2 by replacing the creative intentions of dishes by theoretical 
explorations labelled Food for Thought (cf. Hamilton & Todolí 2009), Eating 
Knowledge, Feeding Minds, Feeding Creativity or Creative Inquiry.3  
He closed elBulli to open a new elBulli, which will be named elBulli1846 and located 
on the site of the previous restaurant (Cala Montjoi, Roses, Catalonia). The name 
refers to 1846, the number of dishes created in elBulli over the years of its existence. It is 
intended to be two things: 1) A showcase of the creative biography of elBulli (past, 
present, future); 2) An incubator of post-institutional creativity, dedicated to culinary 
creativity beyond restaurant and shaped by the austere standards of philosophy. To 
achieve this goal, Adrià opened in July 2014 (just three years after closing elBulli), in 
Barcelona, elBulliLab, a sort of kitchen of ideas, more of a metalab than a medialab. A 
metalab dedicated to gastronomic metalanguage that will offer a large space dedicated 
to exhibitions on creative process. The team’s sole obsession: to decode the culinary 
process (creative, reproductive and experiential). Its passion: applied philosophy, 
understood by Adrià as “the process of understanding things in general – not limited to 
specific foci – with a commitment to reality”. Its vocation: creativity, education, 
research and innovation – all inseparable terms in this new adventure. Its underlying 
commitment: democratising knowledge to stimulate creation and innovation. Adrià 
and elBulli’s team innovated in gastronomy from a small cove on the Catalan coast; 
today, they innovate and revolutionise philosophy from Barcelona, by using 
propaedeutics, metaphysics, taxonomy and methodology to decode gastronomy as part 
of a remarkable project: Sapiens. A multidisciplinary team of fifty persons work on the 
project. Six of them are trained in philosophy, accompanied by three professors, all 
related to the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona4. When the innovative philosophical 
                                                           
2 This was the title of the postgraduate course that started the collaboration between Ferran Adrià and 
the Philosophy Department of the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. It lasted from February to May 
2011 in La Pedrera building, Barcelona. See 
http://www.feedingthought.es/feedingthought/Presentacion.html. 
3 See for example “Ferran Adrià Feeds the Hungry Mind; The Former ElBulli Chef Is Now Serving Up 
Creative Inquiry”, The New York Times, January 2, 2015.  
4 Students: Yaiza Bocos, Júlia de Luis, Pol Lucas, Abigaïl Monells, Diego Rey and Pilar Talavera; 
professors: David Casacuberta, Jèssica Jaques and Gerard Vilar. All are members of eBullició (literally, 
boiling in Catalan), a multidisciplinary collective of forty people dedicated to the gustatory aesthetics. 
Moreover, Jèssica Jaques and Gerard Vilar teach gustatory aesthetics – an unprecedented subject in the 
international academic landscape – in the Bachelor curriculum of Philosophy in the Universitat 
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contents that emerged from elBulliLab start flourishing in elBulli1846, the latter won’t 
be preparing mere dishes, but something similar to what Kant designated as aesthetic 
ideas: ideas that trigger reflection, collect knowledge and disrupt it with imagination; 
and eventually, provoke dialogues that will generate new knowledge, waiting to be 
disrupted, once again. Following the tradition of applied aesthetics, elBulli1846 will 
cook philosophy. Kant published his Critique of the Power of Judgment in 1790 against 
the backdrop of the French Revolution. The cooking of elBulli was revolutionary; but 
what is being cooked in elBulliLab and will be cooked in elBulli1846 paves the way for 
gastronomy 2.0. 
 
1. Sapiens, BulliPedia, Seaurching 
 
What is elBullilab creating now? Its creative project is starting to offer three results: 
Sapiens, BulliPedia and Seaurching. These are three projects whose prospective design 
require a long period of intense work. The three point to the last creative stage of 
applied philosophy: the dishes of elBulli1846. The second gastronomic revolution of 
Adrià is a philosophical one. Its driving force is the desire to create dishes that are 
different from the previous stage; they will be philosophical dishes that embody seven 
years of reflection. They won’t be designed by Adrià himself but by the creative team in 
residence. Adrià is longing to move from the vanguard to the rear-guard of creativity, 
something like a thesis advisor in the applied philosophy for elBulli1846 dishes. 
Meanwhile, new business ventures will allow the elBulliLab team to start exercising its 
applied philosophy.  
ElBulli had been cooking ideas long enough to understand that creativity depends 
on concepts. This can be seen both in the restaurant’s fascinating the catalogue 
raisonné (http://www.elbulli.com/catalogo/catalogo/index.php?lang=en) as in one of 
its most successful icons: the creative pyramid, which masterfully introduces to the 
restaurant’s philosophy of creativity and that, in retrospect, can be seen as the first 
embryonic form of the maps designed in elBulliLab. The creative pyramid shares a 
surprising resemblance with Plato’s “Allegory of the line” (Republic VI) in its four parts: 
1) Plato’s eikasia becomes repetition in elBulli; 2) pistis becomes variation; 3) dianoia 
(where the imagination played a role) becomes the unusual association of what already 
exists; and 4) noesis is what elBulli and elBulliLab call concept. And for Adrià, the concept 
is “the gateway to the possibility of new creative results”.  
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But how to conduct a conceptual inquiry into the gastronomic process, in all of its 
phases and, more specifically, how to inquire into culinary creativity? The key 
methodology for conducting this investigation is called Sapiens. It took nine months of 
intense reflection to elaborate – a pregnancy, a kind of platonic birth with Adrià as the 
Socratic midwife. In fact, it’s the first slowly-cooked creative result of elBullilab. Adrià is 
obsessed with methods, although he knows them to be a temporary tool (like Cartesian 
provisional morality, but with a pinch of humour and improvisation) to generate 
creative disruptions. elBulliLab developed the 7 Ws method, which summarises Sapiens 
and consists of seven philosophical questions adapted to the digital world: 1) What? 
(The ontological question); 2) How? 3) Why? (gnoseological questions); 4) Who? 
5) Whom? (The poietic and experiential questions); 6) When, 7) Where? (circumstantial 
questions). According to Adrià, these seven questions have changed the way the team 
works: they transformed their first conceptual drafts into elaborate taxonomies, maps, 
definitions and treatments applied to gastronomy; the whole process took the shape of 
a presentation that translates Aby Warburg’s Atlas (much admired by Adrià) in the 
digital world and relaxes the stiffness of Linnaean taxonomy. These seven questions will 
shape the content of BulliPedia, a platform dedicated to gastronomic knowledge, a 
constant work-in-progress that will adopt various formats (online encyclopedia, 
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applications, paper books, e-books, exhibitions, workshops, interviews and 
conferences). 
Voltaire wrote the entry for “goût” (http://artflsrv02.uchicago.edu/cgi-
bin/philologic/getobject.pl?c.6:1331:1.encyclopedie0513.7683367) of the 
Encyclopédie of Diderot and D’Alembert in 1757 claiming the non-metaphorical use of 
taste, i.e. “the tongue and palate” as a faculty of discernment and reflection. BulliPedia 
takes up this tradition and defines itself as a propaedeutic, metaphysical, taxonomic and 
methodological project. It tries to provide this first encyclopedia with the agility 
required by social networks, but applies the same rigor as the Enclyclopédie, with whose 
enlightened spirit BulliPedia has much in common: it strives to retain the knowledge in 
times of threatening excess.  
For this reason, it will be controlled by two procedures. First of all, by experts who 
will follow the most stringent norms of academic publishing. In this sense, it won’t be a 
“Wikipedia of gastronomy”. Secondly, it will have its own immune system against 
excess, called Seaurching. Recalling the days when elBulli created its own vocabulary 
(the exquisite morphing), Adrià proposes a cured anti-search engine against excess. Its 
morphology and its logo are the result of the blending of two words: sea urchin – a 
common animal in Cala Montjoi – and searching (today, specifically online). Searching 
the Internet is often overwhelming and superficial because of the excess of results. 
Seaurching will offer a consequential navigation system, regulated by experts that will act 
as the editorial board of a trusted specialised magazine. Just like in the old days, when 
we would buy our trusted specialised magazine but with today’s informative 
possibilities. The preferred example of elBulliLab: white asparagus. An Internet search 
gives 6.260.000 hits. Browsing them wisely is virtually impossible. Seaurching will 
provide an effective, immediate or paused reading, according to the user’s 
requirements, by ensuring the correct linkage of all the gastronomic knowledge. The 
logo of Seaurching has thorns: indeed, aimless searching can be thorny; besides, paideia 
and philosophy require efforts. 
Investigating gastronomy in the pure Socratic style is what all this is about. If 
possible, with interviews. Something similar to what Plato did in his dialogues. Adrià 
says that dialogical philosophy is the “hard drive” of his current creativity. He has 
clearly understood that, in philosophy, questions are far more important than answers, 
and, recognising himself both in Socrates and Rancière, he is quite surprised that 
contemporary creative practices haven’t examined themselves from this angle. His 
questions range from: “What is a fruit?” to “How do I create?” or “How do I eat?” with a 
very contemporary trend towards the creative experiential process of the diner, whom 
he links to relational aesthetics. The diner is a cook just as much, or even more, than the 
cook himself. Just like audience in art is the principal actor of the creative process, 
according to relational aesthetics. 
Sapiens is a questioning method of high philosophical rigour that forgives neither 
silences nor distractions. Every moment of the creative, reproductive, offering, 
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experiential, distributive and marketing process of gastronomy involves Sapiens. For 
Adrià, this methods affects all creative projects. On two different levels: synchronic and 
diachronic, with a special emphasis, in his case, on the history of gastronomy. One 
claim: patience. Sapiens is now an internal method of elBulliLab, the results of which 
will be revealed in 2018, seven years after closing elBulli, as a tribute to the bicentenary 
of Brillat-Savarin’s The Physiology of Taste (1826), the first and almost only 
philosophical treatise on gastronomy, much admired by Adrià. The chef-philosopher 
faces an immense challenge: he wishes to respond to Savarin with a work that will most 
certainly be called The New Physiology of Taste, which will decode all the processes 
involved in gastronomy and realise Savarin’s dream of compiling “[…] la connaissance 
raisonnée de tout ce qui a rapport à l’homme, en tant qu’il se nourrit.” (1826: 
Méditation III).  
What for? To create again and above all: to help creating again according to a 
contemporary paradigm shift. The temporality of philosophy and paideia is slow, even 
though our time is fleeting, precarious and full of excesses (crf. Vilar 2015). Adrià and 
the team of elBulliLab undertake the philosophical crusade of patience and reflection. 
They want a calm paideia, which returns to its origins and defends itself against the 
excess of information. And even from the institution, in this case, the restaurant, which 
may well be obsolete in its contemporary uses. Question: how were gastronomic 
creative processes before the introduction of restaurants, what new significance could 
they convey in contemporary times? elBulliLab now claims the originality of a return to 
origins. As claimed by Cézanne and put into practice by Picasso. That is precisely why 
the archives of elBulli, huge and obsessively organised, are still feeding those of 
elBullilab. Derrida’s archive fever (mal d’archive) binds both, just as deconstruction of 




If we had to choose only one word for Adrià’s current project, it would be this one: 
revolution. Restaurants emerged after the French Revolution. But now, the issues have 
become post-institutional and of philosophical nature. How can we recover the 
knowledge and flavour of the origins? How can we recover traces of an ephemeral, 
undocumented creative process? How can we be original by going back to the origins? 
Was the restaurant really a democratising process? Or was it a drift of capitalism and 
patrimony, just like museums or zoos, which emerged at the same moment as 
restaurants? What does gastronomy, beyond the restaurant, mean today, in the age of 
ICTs and social networks? Bizarre dating designations are starting to be used for all of 
these questions: the era before restaurants is labelled b.R. (before restaurants); the era 
with restaurants, a.R. (after restaurants). And one might add: 2018 p.R. (post 
restaurants) for the era beyond restaurants. 
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The French Revolution called for “égalité, liberté et fraternité”. This could be 
elBulliLab’s motto as well. In elBulliLab, égalité means that anyone can be creative (in 
the purest style of Beuys: “Jedermann ist ein Kunstler”). Willingness, time, passion, 
motivation and commitment in sharing are the only necessary ingredients for 
elBulliLab’s team, just like in elBulli’s kitchen. The premise is that we are all equal in our 
inequalities and that we all have talent – and talent can be educated. Moreover, the 
digital world offers us today almost equal opportunities. Liberté for elBulliLab means 
that in order to create, one needs self-awareness of freedom, and to defend it against all 
odds. Fraternité provides radical generosity. One can only be creative by being 
generous, as was elBulli when it disclosed the secrets of the Chef. In elBulli, Adrià wasn’t 
the Chef of a team; rather, there was a team of chefs – without capital C – a system of 
organisation rarely used in avant-garde kitchens, where a disciplined team of cooks 
works on the reproductive process under the control of a single, changing leadership. In 
elBulliLab, Adrià comes in and out of projects and entrusts its rotating members with 
“items” i.e. micro-projects with an immediate resolution. These are no longer items of 
revolutionary cuisine but items of philosophy that is, governed by conceptual logic that 
is analytical, dialogic, synthetic and ultimately, revolutionary. 
The results prior to the work of elBulliLab were shown in the exhibition Auditing the 
creative process (<http://espacio.fundaciontelefonica.com/ferran-adria>). The story of 
the birth of the creative miracle named elBulli (a reflection of applied philosophy 
analogue to the reflection on “the Greek miracle of the birth of philosophy”) was 
presented to visitors who could slowly examine and understand the map of the creative 
process and the amp of gastronomic reproductive process, and could also understand 
that the secret to long-lasting creativity is understanding a posteriori – in a Hegelian 
manner –one’s own process and the application of a strict audit on innovation. 
Becoming aware that one can be extremely creative without being innovative and that 
innovation is an area for the construction of the public sphere. Finally, the question is 
“What am I providing?”, “How can I make a living from it, and how can I share it so that 
others are able to make a living from it?” Adrià is unaffected by criticism against late 
capitalism, that sees innovation as the supreme value (in fact, an anti-value, cf. Rauning, 
Ray & Wuggenig, 2011). White-collar Robespierres tried sharpening the guillotines, 
especially in the art world.5 But gastronomy has changed many lives in some under-
developed countries and now represents a fraction of their GDP. In Peru, for example, 
tens of thousands of underprivileged youth are studying cuisine, developing business 
ventures in otherwise very poor economic environments (cf. Perú sabe < 
http://www.perusabe.com.pe/el-documental/gaston-acurio>). Adrià understands 
                                                           
5 As could be seen, for example, in some critics of Documenta XII in Kassel, regarding the fact that 
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paideia as a project for innovation. If we would read Werner Jaeger (cf. 1937-1944) in 
contemporary terms, we would certainly agree: paideia is a commitment to social return 
and the construction of the public sphere, through collective projects. In other words: a 
commitment to generosity. I would like to add: a commitment to professionalization. 
It would seem that world of art is giving ground to gastronomy: it has finally 
accepted that gastronomy is at the heart of processes of particular importance in 
current debates, not only regarding education but also about artistic research and how 
to adapt creativity to the post-institutional era (post-museum, post-restaurant). 
Meanwhile, elBulliLab will investigate the artified dimension of gastronomy, 
fundamentally through performances of its own creation. According to Adrià, it’s time 
to move from the paradigm of design (which he knows well) to the paradigm of art. 
elBulliLab will become, among other things, an exhibition centre for artistic research.  
 
3. Paideia, philosophy and the ‘Creativity, research, innovation’ 
triad 
 
In the times of elBulli, Adrià didn’t think about the issue of paideia because he linked 
it to repetition and he was convinced that “creating is not copying (reproducing or 
repeating)”. But he discovered that repetition has a charm of its own, perhaps because 
of his fascination with Japan: mantras, repetitions, mimesis, rituals, scenographies... all 
of these share a common ground with paideia. elBulliLab repeats documents over and 
over, with variations and versions of variable authorship. Just like a pianist who wakes 
up at dawn (Adrià wakes at 5 a.m. to “study”, just like Kant) to practice scales, 
arpeggios, variations, before, eventually, improvising creatively. It is a choral and 
polyphonic device, not devoid of dissonances, which end up, after discussion, being 
praised. 
Adrià thinks that teaching creativity is teaching research and innovation. From his 
perspective, paideic process evolves through new questions and contributions that 
improve the existing conditions or understanding of the public sphere. It would seem 
that this is what any research processes asks for – not only in science and technology, 
but also in art, design and philosophy.6 Always based on the understanding that 
uncertainty and a certain dose of precariousness and vulnerability in the approach to 
work are implicitly contained in the very concept of research. One might add: following 
the tradition of Hellenistic sceptical philosophy, according to which we know where we 
come from but not exactly where we are going. Furthermore, he questions everything 
constantly under the motto “we must learn everything from the origins”. The paideic 
nature of elBulliLab focuses on the relation between creativity, research and innovation. 
The team is fully aware of setting out from home, packed lightly and not knowing 
                                                           
6 See, for instance Niedderer Reilly 2010: 20. 
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anything about their final destination. In any event, their first intellectual wanderings 
produced Aristotelian and Kantian distinctions, such as: the distinction between 
creativity as faculty or capacity (the Aristotelian dynamis) and the creative result 
(enérgeia). The first would involve creative talent and imagination, while the second 
would relate to originality, and its potential drifts towards innovation. The team also 
obeys to the main rule of validation of the criterion of taste according to Hume i.e. the 
comparison of creative results, as a procedure to review the established knowledge, 
especially in the canon of the history of cooking.  
Following Kant and according to Ferran Adrià, creativity without research and 
innovation would be blind, research without innovation would be fruitless, and 
innovation without the other two, non-existent. What is the <creativity-research-
innovation> triad’s commitment with paideia? elBulliLab will take the issue beyond the 
university, perhaps because the university is forgetting revolution and how to lead social 
processes, and also because it has, at least in humanities, a certain reluctance to engage 
in business ventures; something that, on contrary, was embedded in elBulli’s DNA and 
that fuels its contemporary drift – especially when taking into account the convivial 
creative bond that can unite between people in the business world.  
 
4. For an Applied Philosophy of Gastronomy 
 
Adrià and the team of elBulliLab are cooking ideas to create once again and help 
others to create. They understood and assumed up to its last consequences what 
philosophy is and what working philosophically means. With two goals: 1) promote a 
philosophy of gastronomy that reconfigures and hence revolutionises the work of 
Brillat-Savarin for the 21st century; 2) claim the usefulness, efficiency and effectiveness 
of philosophy in its broadest sense. The fact that a corporate, paideic, poietic and poetic 
adventure, such as elBulliLab, undertakes these two objectives opens new, 
unprecedented avenues in the field of applied philosophy. Returning to the origins, 
once again: the Socratic–Platonic paideia and the inherent paideia of Greek theatre 
were also forms of applied philosophy. It’s very interesting to read Plato’s Symposium, 
this paideic, metatheatrical and philosophical text, in elBullilab. 2,400 years later, 
elBulliLab and elBulli1846 are creating new philosophical banquets. And the territory of 
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JÈSSICA JAQUES 
THE MAIN ISSUES 








This article presents the main issues on gustatory aesthetics, a field which appeared 
recently in the academic programs. As shown in the first part, gustatory aesthetics is 
about the non-metaphorical use of taste. The second part is dedicated to issues that 
define this discipline at the present time: its involvement with gustatory practices; the 
creation of a radically expanding space for disinterestedness, creativity, freedom and 
imagination; the artified strategies for gustatory embodied meanings; the radical 
demand for narrative; the development of research in a medialab spirit. The article ends 
with the consideration of this new field as a privileged ground for revolutionizing old 
academic syllabuses.1 
 
1. Gustatory Aesthetics: A Discourse on the Non-Metaphorical 
Use of Taste 
 
Gustatory aesthetics is the aesthetic discourse dedicated to the non-metaphorical 
use of the notion of taste. I rightly say “notion” and not “term” because the English 
language, in order to point to this non-metaphorical use, replaces the term taste with 
gustatory, changing the noun for an adjective. This adjective differs from gustative, as 
the latter was originally used for medical purposes.    
The term gustatory originates in the Latin term gustare, coined in the period of 
empiricist philosophy towards the end of the seventeenth century. The term gustative 
was adopted at the beginning of the same century, whereas taste has been traced in 
English from the end of thirteenth century. Taste is etymologically linked to the French 
term toucher and to the English word touch. The adoption of gustatory was probably 
driven by a desire to stress the physicality of the term, thus explaining its adjectivized 
                                                           
1 This article was made possible thanks to the support of the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad to 
the research project FFI2012-32614: Aesthetic Experience and Artistic Research: Cognitive Production in 
Contemporary Art. In it, I develop some of the ideas I propose in Jaques 2014.  
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form. However, this adjective has only become a part of the aesthetic vocabulary and 
aesthetic arguments very recently. This is the case despite the fact that Voltaire had 
already pointed out the distinction and correlation between the non-metaphorical and 
the metaphorical use of taste in 1757, when he drafted the entry for goût in Diderot and 
D’Alembert’s Encyclopédie: 
 
This sense [some lines later termed ‘sensual taste’ (goût sensuel)], this capacity for discriminating 
between different foods, has given rise, in all known languages, to the metaphorical word ‘taste’ 
[some lines later termed ‘intellectual taste’ (goût intellectuel)] to designate the discernment of 
beauty and flaws in all the arts. It discriminates as quickly as the tongue and the palate, and like 
physical taste it anticipates reflection (D’Alembert and Diderot, 2003). 
 
Both kinds of taste were considered capacities of discernment that anticipate 
reflection; both were bound by “a great resemblance”, as Hume stated in Of the 
Standard of Taste (Hume 2001), written in the same year as Voltaire’s entry on taste. 
The recognition of this resemblance enhanced the metaphorical use of “intellectual 
taste” as well as the awareness of the enormous cognitive potential underlying “sensual 
taste”, implicitly suggesting the coincidence between the etymology of saveur (flavor; in 
latin: sapor -oris, coming from the substantive of sapere) and that of savoir (to know; 
also stemming from sapere).  
These proposals had to overcome Kant’s philosophical disappointments with the 
non-metaphorical use of taste in his Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790), and had 
to wait for their democratization. In the first decades of the nineteenth century, 
gustatory taste was democratized in restaurants as artistic taste was democratized in 
museums and salons. It was during that time that it found its own discourse. In 1826, 
French gastronomist Jean–Anthelme Brillat-Savarin published in Paris Physiologie du 
Goût, ou méditations de gastronomie transcendante (The Physiology of Taste, or 
Meditations on Transcendental Gastronomy). With the inclusion of the adjective 
transcendante (wrongly translated as “transcendental”) in his title, Brillat-Savarin was 
pointing at his antagonist; “meditations on transcendental gastronomy” were to give 
rise to gustatory taste as a reflective faculty in response to Kant’s arguments. But Brillat-
Savarin’s physiological and philosophical efforts did not immediately bear fruit. 
Gustatory aesthetics had to wait over a century and a half, until Carolyn Korsmeyer’s 
Making Sense of Taste: Taste, Food and Philosophy (1999), to achieve philosophical and 
academic stature. Korsmeyer’s work opened an inquiry to establish a vocabulary and 
proper arguments for gustatory aesthetics in the search of a kind of reason, of a way of 
worldmaking that, following Michel Onfray, can be termed as the gourmand reason (la 
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raison gourmande);2 I prefer to call it the gustatory reason. Gustatory reason should be 
understood as a kind of understanding of the world that depends on our aesthetic 
relation to food and gastronomy and poses new challenges to the old term taste. 
Nowadays gustatory aesthetics is a flourishing academic field established in 
academia in the ensemble called Food Studies (emerging in the 1990s), which hosts 
food-related studies generally stemming from Anthropology, Cultural Studies, Design, 
Fine Arts, History, History of Art, Philosophy, Chemistry, Food Science Departments 
or the courses belonging to Culinary Schools, like the Università degli Studi di Scienze 
Gastronomiche (in Bra, Piemonte)3 or the course Science & Cooking in Harvard’s 
School of Engineering and Applied Sciences.4 
Gustatory aesthetics can be included in Philosophy of Food which, apart from the 
strictly gustatory aspects, involves ethical concerns related to nourishment and 
sustenance as well as scarcity and provision; it addresses hunger and eating disorders, 
vegetarianism, dietary choices and their cultural frameworks, conviviality and 
community; it is also concerned with food and cooking as a new and powerful 
institution that includes firms, tourism, technology, science, and art. Usually, the 
keystone of philosophy of food is to focus on food and gastronomy as symbolic forms5 
in a way similar to how arts and sciences have been considered, following the tradition 
of Ernst Cassirer, Erwin Panofsky, Fritz Saxl, Aby Warburg, and Nelson Goodman. 
In 2013-2014, gustatory aesthetics was introduced for the first time in an 
Undergraduate and Master Degree title within the European Higher Education Area.6 
Professor Gerard Vilar and I imparted the subject in the Universitat Autònoma de 
Barcelona, and now it is part of the syllabus of the Department of Philosophy and one 
of the focuses of our research.  
The main issues which gustatory aesthetics supplies us with, are the renovation of 
terminology and argumentation in traditional aesthetics. The leitmotiv which founds 
and allows this renovation is that, in my view, we are living in gustatory times: gustatory 
practices, especially gastronomic ones, pervade the everyday and more surprisingly, the 
academies and the art centers, but also the street, the television, ICTs and festivals, 
communities developing either new profiles (like food tech tribes) or those that have 
                                                           
2 See Onfray 1995. The following texts have also designed the statement of gustatory aesthetics: 
Gigante 2005; Graw et al. 2009; Jaques and Vilar 2012; Kuehn 2005. The main text of gustatory 
aesthetics is Korsmeyer 1999. I will refer latter to it. See also Korsmeyer 2001. 
3 http://www.unisg.it, accessed April 20, 2015.  
4 http://www.seas.harvard.edu/cooking, accessed April 20, 2015.  
5 See for example Douglas 1982. See also Allhoff and Monroe 2007; Curtin and Heldke 1998; Hamilton 
and Todolí 2009; Kaplan 2012; Telfer 1996. 
6 See http://www.uab.cat/guiesdocents/2014-15/g100281t2500246a2014-15iCAT.pdf and 
http://eina.cat/en/postgraus/master-oficial-eees-master-universitari-de-recerca-en-art-i-disseny, 
accessed April 20, 2015. 
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been around forever but have developed new communicative possibilities and tools 
(like the slow food movement);7 gustatory practices even generate new professions, such 
as food designer.8  
 
2. Main Issues on Gustatory Aesthetics  
 
2.1 The Involvement with Gustatory Practices  
 
Gustatory aesthetics is to food and gastronomy what aesthetics is to the arts, and I 
could also say that gustatory aesthetics has a deeper involvement with aesthetic 
practices than traditional aesthetics does. Four practices are in close relationship to 
gustatory argumentation, and they can be called gustatory practices for the sake of 
argument. They emerged successively and can be termed food art,9 edible art, research 
cooking, and revolutionary cooking. Food art and edible art deal with the artistic status 
of food and the use of food as an artistic medium, whereas research and revolutionary 
cooking have to do with gustatory practices that are in close relationship with the arts 
but keep some degree of autonomy. 
Despite having been identified only recently, food art has existed since the 
beginning of civilization. The term characterizes those artistic practices whose principal 
material and symbolic referent is food, including its processes of production and rituals 
of consumption. Food art deals either with the representation of food (as for example in 
some ancient Egyptian paintings or Dutch still lifes) or with food as a medium; Gordon 
Matta-Clark, Daniel Spoerri, Allen Ruppersberg, Antoni Miralda,10 and Jana Starbak, 
are the most representative contemporary artists of food art. Many others – from Paul 
McCarthy to Marina Abramovich, Wim Delvoye, and Carsten Höller – have worked on 
this topic with certain regularity, and others have done so occasionally, as is the case of 
Marta Rosler and Hannah Collins. Going beyond these already canonical projects, one 
can find today fascinating collaborative ones, usually coming from what has been called 
foodtech art.11 These kinds of projects are normally activistic and anti-disciplinary, and 
are generally performed by a community of creative people coming from different 
places: artists trying to go beyond art, biologists trying to go beyond biology, 
environmentalists, cooks and curators trying to overcome their usual work. 
                                                           
7 http://www.slowfood.com/, accessed April 20, 2015.  
8 https://foodforfuture.wordpress.com/tag/, accessed April 20, 2015.  
9 See Hozhey et al. 2009.  
10 Miralda’s project in Barcelona Foodcultura can be considered nowadays the main center of the 
meeting between food and contemporary art, http://www.foodcultura.org/en/portfolio/, accessed on 
April 20, 2015. See also the center La Cuisine. Centre d’Art et Design from the French village 
Nègrépelisse http://www.la-cuisine.fr/, accessed April 20, 2015.  
11 See Dolejsová 2014. 
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Edible art, which emerged in the 1960s, is a specialization within food art. As the 
term indicates, it is a kind of art that can be eaten and not just contemplated. This is the 
case, for example, with some of Joseph Beuys’, Antoni Miralda’s, Lili Fischer’s or Rikrit 
Tiravanija’s performances,12 with Christine Bernhard’s installations, Michel Blazy’s 
sculptures, and John Bock’s videos. What should more seriously be called edible art is, 
however, that which has been or is produced in some restaurants or collaborative edible 
tech art projects where the procedures and appearances of the meals are artified, which 
means that they are given the productive, receptive, and institutional or anti-
institutional procedures of works of art. One can consider here the peculiar and artified 
experience of food which was developed in Gordon Matta-Clark’s Food restaurant 
(NY), or in Antoni Miralda’s and Montse Guillen’s International (NY), or in Daniel 
Spoerri’s Spoerri (Düsserldorf). Among collaborative anti-institutional projects (as 
Matta-Clark’s was), one can refer for example to the vegan food-hacking project 
HotKarot & OpenSauce.13 
Research cooking can be defined as a twenty-first century practice that inherits all 
the creative impulse and innovation of twentieth-century avant-garde cooking, from 
nouvelle cuisine to the so-called molecular cooking and techno-emotional cooking. 
The term research cooking is analogue to the contemporary debates about artistic 
research and points to the increasing intersection between cooking and arts and 
between creativity and research.  
Research cooking has seven distinctive features:  
1. Self-awareness as a symbolic form i.e. as a physical place for thought and 
knowledge, in the same way as a picture is a physical place for reflection;  
2. Emphasis on the receptive moment (community of diners) as a continuation of 
the creative process;  
3. Development of mutual influences between creativity and research;  
4. Appropriation of certain ways of artistic, scientific, and technological research, 
due to the assumption of eventual collapses of creativity in cooking;  
5. Consideration of sophisticated technology as a privileged means but not as an 
end-in-itself;  
6. Tendency to artification: increasing awareness of sharing artistic beliefs. Thus, 
research cooking understands itself as a mode of communication similar to art, 
including ways of reference such as imitation, expression, quotation, metaphor, and 
even humour and paradox;  
7. Networking among chefs or cooks and with other professionals (scientists, 
designers, artists, philosophers) in a medialab spirit.  
                                                           
12 See Tiravanija 2010. 
13 http://www.hotkarot.cz, accessed April 20, 2015.  
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When research cooking achieves a paradigm shift, it can also be formulated as 
revolutionary cooking. In this case, three features should be added:  
8. Involvement in the narrative of its own history and creative process, by revisiting 
and inquiring archives, recipes, and critics in order to point out the essentials moments 
of the paradigm shift;  
9. Expansion beyond the restaurant as an institution to reach the public sphere, with 
books, catalogues, conferences, and, especially, through the internet and social 
networks, a feature that can be designated as post-institutional expansion;  
10. Assertive social engagement.  
Some of the pioneer chefs in research cooking and, in some cases, in revolutionary 
cooking are: Gastón Acurio (Astrid & Gastón, Peru), Ferran Adrià (elBulli & 
elBulliFoundation, Catalunya), Andoni Aduriz (Mugaritz, Spain), the team of Biko 
restaurant (Mexico), Heston Blumenthal (The Fat Duck, England), Massimo Bottura 
(Osteria Francescana, Italy), Grant Achatz (Alinea, Chicago), Michel and Sébastien Bras 
(Bras, France), René Redzepi (Noma, Denmark), Joan Roca (El Celler de Can Roca, 
Catalunya), and Seiji Yamamoto (Nihonryori RyuGin, Japan). In the field of 
collaborative projects, one can find clear examples of research cooking, for example, in 
the Center of Genomic Gastronomy.14  
Food art, edible art, research cooking, and revolutionary cooking are currently 
topics of deep interest to artistic institutions in an effort to explore new fields of 
artiness. One of the main events of this inquiry was the participation in 2007 of the 
restaurant elBulli in Documenta XII, in Kassel, as Pavilion G. This pavilion was 664 
miles away from elBulli’s location in Roses. The four gustatory practices are also topics 
of deep interest to “artivistic” curiatorial projects, like Amanda McDonald Crowley’s 
ArtTechFood.15  
 
2.2. A Radically Expanding Place for Disinterestedness, Creativity, Freedom 
and Imagination 
 
Disinterestedness has been since the “First Moment” of Kant’s Critique of the Power 
of Judgment the key concept in the qualitative definition of beauty and of the faculty to 
discern it, that is, metaphorical taste. Gustatory aesthetics refers to it as a key concept. 
But, how to be disinterested towards an aesthetic object that also serves nourishing 
functions?16 Obviously, this is a burning subject in times of precariousness and of 
economic crisis, opening the way to initiatives such as Go Halfsies17 or to an utmost 
                                                           
14 http://genomicgastronomy.com/work/dinners/artmeatflesh-3, accessed April 20, 2015.  
15 http://www.scoop.it/t/arttechfood, accessed April 20, 2015.  
16 See Sweeney 2012. 
17 http://gohalfsies.com/, accessed April 20, 2015.  
 PERCORSI 
 
JÈSSICA JAQUES • The Main Issue 
on Gustatory Aesthetics 
 
 
CoSMo   Comparative Studies in Modernism n. 6 (Spring) • 2015 
179 
willingness to maintain the quality of what we eat and also of the non-metaphoric taste 
in a survival economy.18 At the same time, we should not doubt that this search for 
pleasure or for certain types of exercitation of non-metaphorical sense of taste – either 
in the cucina della Nonna or in everyday food, in avant-garde restaurants, activist 
performances, music and gastronomy festivals or wherever – is a product of Western 
opulence and of certain Eastern opulences as well (Japan, China), and it is currently 
expanding to economically emerging territories (Peru, Mexico, Vietnam, India); most 
definitely, in territories where culinary creativity can be carried out beyond the 
imperative of strict survival.  
Cuisine is usually the chosen term to point to all gustatory practices that expand in 
both directions from the everyday to research cooking and revolutionary cooking, with 
the common peculiarity of being elaborated beyond merely alimentary needs. In this 
concern, cuisine reveals itself as a radical field in which the aesthetic discourse can 
generate arguments that defend disinterestedness as the main attitude for a proper 
exercise of taste (Gigante, 2005), whether metaphorical or non-metaphorical. The 
same gap between nourishment and cuisine exists, in Kantian terms, between necessity 
and freedom in regards to disinterestedness. Thus, in Kant’s argumentation, freedom is 
the state of mind of disinterestedness, of creativity beyond vital urgencies, and of 
imagination. As a matter of fact, the free play between imagination and understanding 
announced by Kant is, in spite of his own conceptions, more genuine in cuisine than 
anywhere else, as pointed out by futurists in their manifest La cucina futurista (1930, 
from Filippo Tommaso Marinetti and Luigi Columbo, aka Fillia) and as carried out by 
the same authors in the Taverna del Santopalato (Milan, 1930).  
In short: dealing essentially with gustatory appreciative faculties –taste, touch, and 
smell; and all the three together in a synaesthesic confluence which is the ensemble 
called flavour–, cuisine allows to exercise a kind of imagination that emancipates itself 
from (viewed) images and emphasizes the etymology of Einbildungskraft (the German 
word for imagination), which connotes construction, upbringing, and culture.  
 
2.3. Gustatory Embodied Meanings. Some Artified Strategies 
 
Carolyn Korsmeyer’s Making Sense of Taste: Taste, Food and Philosophy (1999) 
explores, especially in its third chapter: “The Meaning of Taste and the Taste of 
Meaning,” the philosophical challenge of what it means to build meaning without the 
hegemony of vision and from what in occidental tradition has been considered as 
“lower senses.” 
Certainly, although tongue and palate are speech organs, the philosophical 
tradition, bound in different degrees by Neo-Platonism, anti-hedonism, and 
                                                           
18 http://flavourcrusader.com/blog/, accessed April 20, 2015.  
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intellectualism, has detached them from logos and has redefined the senses they entail: 
taste, smell, and touch, as “lower (cognitive) senses,” which are opposed to the 
“higher,” primarily sight and, secondarily, hearing.19 Divergently, gustatory aesthetics 
argues for the convergence of taste, smell, and touch in the synaesthetic faculty of 
discernment that is the gustatory taste, which is a synonym of the capacity of flavour. 
This faculty aims to reformulate the old correlations between subjectivity and 
objectivity as well as between memory and imagination in aesthetic judgments in a 
refreshing way, in order to go beyond the saying “De gustibus non est disputandum.”  
On one hand, gustatory taste refers not only to subjectivity but to the inner sense. 
Thus, the main organs of gustatory taste: tongue, palate, and olfactory sense, are not on 
our face but in our insides; as such, they are perceived as part of our inner body. The 
object of taste has to be violently masticated and gulped, thus becoming an embodied 
otherness from what it initially was and turning into a component of our inner selves. 
How ought we to give sense to this embodied otherness, which becomes our very flesh 
in a bluntly physical way? In other words, how to entail Danto’s challenge in gustatory 
terms? 
Echoing contemporary philosophy and the performative turn in contemporary art,20 
gustatory aesthetics precisely focuses on physicality and centrality of the body in a very 
radical way. More like an argumentative procedure rather than an ontological one, 
gustatory aesthetics considers the embodied meaning of gustatory practices usually 
from their possibility of artification. Considering gustatory practices as artified practices 
means to consider them as if they were art even though still keeping some degree of 
autonomy in regards to art.  
Some issues in this artified narrative which seem to gradually confirm themselves 
are the following: 
1. Aesthetic practices which have a higher tendency to be ordinarily designated as 
"universal language" in the common use of the expression ("language" understood here 
as a non-propositional system of symbolic communication) appear to be those that 
skilfully entangle rituality and everyday life: music, dance and cooking. Of the three, the 
latter is the only one which makes all the senses intervene (including thermoception), 
and most specially the synaesthesia, which, because of its physiological nature, brings 
forward the old baumgartian pretension of sensible logics. Thus, cooking embodies 
meaning according to this peculiar “universality”.  
2. Everyday Aesthetics,21 and the Aesthetic of Performative Turn, as well as the 
philosophical dignity granted to that which is ephemeral – not only from art in the 60s 
(it's been more than half a century!) but also, looking back, to the origin of aesthetic 
                                                           
19 See Brady 2012.  
20 See Fischer–Lichte 2008.  
21 On this topic, see Saito 2007. 
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practices – allows us to consider gustatory practices as candidates of a contemporary 
adaptation of the total work of art and at the same time opens the way to its 
demythologizing: (in a hungerless community) we are all cooks, we are all eaters, and 
anybody can generate, by means of gustatory practices, an experience of meaning and 
sense that involves all senses, as required by Gesamtkunstwerke.  
3. If we are all cooks and eaters, gustatory practices are a good place for aesthetic 
democratization and novel distributions of the sensible, thus generating what has been 
called new social stomachs.22 These new social stomachs generate embodied meanings 
from the emancipation of sensuality (following a Feuerbachianan discourse) and of the 
auratic dimension of certain artistic practices. This has been become very common with 
the aforementioned Foodtech tribes as well as with Food networking.  
In brief, gustatory embodied meanings have to do with the centrality of the body 
and the physicality of the object, in terms of touch, smell, sight, hearing, taste, 
thermoception and synaesthesia, within a community of production and a community 
of reception. These embodied meanings are found beyond survival and nourishment, 
and differ especially by means of the institutional or anti-institutional frameworks in 
which they are developed. Let’s take three examples of how to embody meaning in 
gustatory practices: one from domestic cooking, another from research – revolutionary 
cooking, and the third from activist cooking.  
While preparing Belgian endive soup on certain family celebrations, my parents 
(who are Flemish) often say that despite being a sophisticated course, it is a soup, and it 
can be recognized as such at first sight. It turns out that in this context, the symbolic 
value that is reconstructed in my family every time we sit together and eat that 
particular soup is, indeed, discernible. It is not the same case, however, with elBulli’s 
Piña colada, disappearing candy floss (2004); it does not have an encoded aspect that can 
indicate the nature of the course, and the generation of the symbolic – which has to do 
with childhood memories of fairgrounds as well as with the first alcoholic drinks out in 
bars during adolescence; that is, with a fusion of two moments of “initiation” from an 
early age and later— in this way is a much more free way of embodying meaning. As a 
matter of fact, elBulli’s Piña colada is presented to us as a symbol that challenges the 
familiar modes of meaning, the ordinary intelligibility of things in the world. Thus, it 
does what art does; it offers us an alternative way of seeing, forcing us to reflect and 
revolutionize habits and ways of sharing beliefs.  
At the same time, embodied meanings in activist practices also make us reflect and 
negotiate, sometimes within a less artified atmosphere. Such is the case, for example, 
with Conflict Kitchen23 proposals dedicated to gastronomic culture from territories 
                                                           
22 See Dolejsová 2014. 
23 http://conflictkitchen.org/, accessed April 20, 2015.  
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which the USA is in conflict with. If we visit the issue dedicated to Cuba,24 embodied 
meanings are to be interpreted toward the end of the Castro era and in the uncertainty 
of what is yet to come.  
 
2.4. Gustatory Practices’ Radical Demand of Narrative 
 
Gustatory practices demand an auto-narrative in order to establish a continuous 
relationship with the narrative put forward by gustatory aesthetics, which is very 
different in nature to what is generally established by philosophy of art, on the one 
hand, and theory and history of art on the other. Let’s take artistic avant-gardes as an 
example. It could be said that the first texts that establish a narrative were manifestos, a 
literary genre within theory of art. They were followed by a series of critical, historical 
and theoretical discourses initiated by Greenberg and that have continued until today. 
Once the avant-gardes had come to an end, philosophy of art started an attempt to 
establish a conceptual explanation of what had happened from a historical and 
systematic point of view. A paradigmatic example of this is Rossalind Krauss’ The 
Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths, 1985. 
In such a way, the relationship between artistic events and their philosophical 
narrative tends to be, indeed, of Hegelian character: philosophy of art narrates what has 
already become. This is not the case, however, of the relationship between gustatory 
aesthetics and the practices it makes reference to. It does not only show a simultaneous 
relationship, but also one of intimate collaboration. Indeed, gustatory practices have 
extreme demand of self-knowledge. This is the reason not only to elaborate all kinds of 
gustatory manifestos, but also to develop a careful, extensive and systematic revision of 
the history of these practices, of their techniques and of their creative and research 
processes. What is unusual about this situation is that the demand for self-knowledge, 
as well as a holistic and encyclopaedic narrative, arises from the very producers of the 
practices, showing a level of scrutiny whose paragon perhaps should go back to Leon 
Battista Alberti’s De re aedificatoria (1450). It is possible that this requirement has to do 
with the lateness of the avant-garde cuisine, which started out with Nouvelle Cuisine in 
the beginning of the 70s, when the artistic avant-garde had been “overcome” (in 
accordance with Hegelian terminology), and the historical, theoretical and 
philosophical narrative provided the conceptual instruments for its comprehension.  
The two most paradigmatic examples of this situation are: Modernist Cuisine. The 
Art and Science of Cooking (2011), led by the “amateur” chef Nathan Myhrvold, and 
BulliPèdia, led (to some extent) by the “ex-chef” Ferran Adrià. I will focus on the latter, 
as I am currently part of his team.  
                                                           
24 http://conflictkitchen.org/events/conflict-kitchen-in-cuba, accessed April 20, 2015. 
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BulliPèdia25 is an archive-type project that has been hosted by the University of 
Barcelona,26 and it has the double profile of a collaborative and a scholarly project, 
being conceived as a kind of Wikipedia with academic experts for pair review. It 
involves ten matrix issues. The seven first are devoted to cooking, restaurant 
management and gastronomy. The eighth is dedicated to the “History of Cooking”, the 
ninth to “Gustatory Aesthetics, Art and Cooking” and the tenth to the “Creative 
Process”. Gerard Vilar and I have both been designated to take care of the last two 
issues. We have been working on them since January 2013, and we have created a team 
of thirty-four members including undergraduate, Master and PhD students as well as 
professors from different backgrounds who all passionately work on these issues. As 
one can imagine, it is much easier to work on “Aesthetics, Art and Cooking” (the main 
questions that have been here exposed) than on “Creative Process”.  
The aim of the issue “Creative Process” is to develop a device for creativity within 
two spheres: 1. Creativity for cooks, diners, food tribes; 2. Creativity in the general use 
of the term, especially addressed to the arts, design, technology and sciences. We know 
that failure is intrinsic to the latter aim, while creativity may not be cancelled in 
concepts; but the Kantian inquiry about the conditions of possibility in creativity still 
makes sense, and we work with the hypothesis that most of the creative professionals 
and academics feel that they have something “which they are willing to share” and 
which has to do with Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblances. From this point of 
view, we can say that BulliPèdia has the vocation to find the way to networking, 
netfeeling and netsharing about creativity, innovation and research.  
 
2.5. Gustatory Research in a Medialab Spirit 
 
As established in the previous sections, research in gustatory aesthetics is carried out 
in very peculiar terms which revolve around recently handled relations between the 
internal and external, the intimate and communicable, physicality and meaning, the 
ephemeral and the everyday. It could be said that these peculiar relations are also in 
need of peculiar ways and methods of research, which are no longer “interdisciplinary” 
(a term used in the nineties) nor “transdisciplinary” (the prototypical term of the 
beginning of the twenty-first century), but are rather “antidisciplinary,” a methodology 
characterized by contemporary medialabs. It should be said that these are becoming 
neuralgic creative centres of academic institutions, and furthermore, they are turning 
into extremely crucial nodes for the interaction between knowledge, research, 
creativity, innovation and their involvement with public sphere. Along these lines, the 
                                                           
25 http://www.bullipedia.com, accessed April 20, 2015. 
26 http://www.ub.edu/campusalimentacio/es/recerca_bullipedia.html, accessed April 20, 2015.  
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MIT’s medialab, which is involved in the BulliPedia project, is presented in its webpage 
this way:  
 
Actively promoting a unique, antidisciplinary culture, the MIT Media Lab goes beyond known 
boundaries and disciplines, encouraging the most unconventional mixing and matching of 
seemingly disparate research areas. […] The Lab is committed to looking beyond the obvious to 
ask the questions not yet asked–questions whose answers could radically improve the way people 
live, learn, express themselves, work, and play. 
 
Anybody could allege that this has always been the spirit of philosophy. And she or 
he would be right. Philosophy is by nature undisciplined, in the sense that we have here 
pointed out. As a matter of fact, Jacques Rancière, in an article written in 2006, 
describes indiscipline as the transgression of the boundaries of a particular discipline to 
estrange it beyond its own frontiers and especially to stress the very concept of 
discipline as well as the political and aesthetic constrictions that it implies. Thus, 
indiscipline means in Rancière’s text not only to go beyond disciplines but also to make 
discourses free enough to become “weapons in a battle” able to “burst war in the 
scene.”27  
As I said in the beginning of my intervention, we are probably living in gustatory 
times, which are, in my view, times to fight against the rigid core of academic 
institutions. And gustatory aesthetics is a way to do it. We are therefore waiting to see to 
which imminent changes the university will surrender, through the use of ICTs, new 
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MATILDE CARRASCO BARRANCO 
NEUTRALIZATION AND AESTHETICS 








I read Gerard Vilar’s Desartización. Paradojas del arte sin fin soon after it was 
published in 2010. Since then I have come back to it both for my teaching and research 
work because it deals with a wide range of issues, some of them very relevant for 
understanding contemporary art and the reactions which it provokes, and so it is a very 
helpful book for reflecting on the role of art in our society. That role would be none 
other that a significant, privileged way of thinking about the world; art would constitute 
a critical and dissonant voice, although it has shown itself as radically plural and 
apparently messy. This would be in fact a very good thing since artistic pluralism 
represents “a sort of polytheist view”; a sane counterweight to the unifying and totalized 
point of view aspired to from science and technology, and also from the normative 
culture of law and morals. It will be “an antidote against any pretension of eliminating 
the disagreement and the sovereignty of the individual” (Vilar 2005: 172). Therefore, it 
represents a democratic guarantee, because the polyphony that emerges from pluralism 
would help to strengthen the procedures of social democracy, threatened in many ways.  
For some time now then Vilar has been defending this view of contemporary art and 
continues here again with moderate optimism because he is well aware of the many 
problems and challenges which contemporary art faces. These are the “paradoxes” of 
contemporary art, as he names them, and are the central questions addressed by Vilar in 
this book. He shows as paradoxical the processes of de-aestheticization and de-
artification and therefore of the de-definition that pushed art to constant and on-going 
re-definition. He shows as paradoxical too the role of art when it aims to enter life 
taking the risk of becoming indistinct to it, and so stopping being art, because it is art 
and not life. He shows the paradox of art that many claim to have ended or be dead in 
the age when art seems to be doing better for itself, if we think about the great demand 
for art from museums, centres and foundations that, along with a powerful network of 
galleries, support and encourage artistic production as well as its social presence, not to 
mention art’s market prices. Finally, he shows as paradoxical the situation of art when 
producing a critical and even subversive discourse, aiming to have an impact on reality, 
this vanishes in a short time and soon gets lost, becomes impotent, or is neutralized, 
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immersed in a vast and open cultural world, ruled by the powerful production and 
distribution mechanisms of the market. With this diagnosis, Vilar is not joining the 
pessimism of those apocalyptic views that proclaim the death of art, nor the nostalgia of 
old hierarchies and functions ascribed to art. It doesn’t mean either that he celebrates 
complete relativism, that of the “everything goes” which makes art looks like as a sort of 
discourse that is not rational nor reasonable. Art is facing a lot of problems and 
difficulties in the world of today but it is there where art must play its role, with its own 
reasons, re-defining and adapting itself to it, without utopias or false hopes, but a 
significant critical role after all; a role which philosophy is obliged to address.  
That said, I will focus my comments on the last paradoxical phenomenon, namely, 
that of the neutralization of the critical and disturbing power of artworks which is 
particularly worrying for Vilar as he describes it as “the ghost that goes right through the 
world of contemporary art…transfiguring Art into art”1. Neutralization would also 
connect the other paradoxes in some way since the de-artification and de-
aestheticization of art have historically much to do with the avant-gardist purpose of 
bringing art back to life and transforming art from a reign of beauty and aesthetic 
contemplation into a powerful instrument that helps to transform society; this so-called 
political art, turned into a commodity, or exhibited in artistic institutions, would be 
then the main victim of neutralization. Consequently, the analysis of neutralization 
should help us to understand the origins and the possible solutions of these tensions 
and paradoxes with which Vilar offers an accurate diagnosis of some of the most 
important challenges faced by contemporary art.  
 
I. Postmodernism and the aestheticization of the anti-aesthetic 
art 
 
Vilar admits that in fact neutralization would be the fate of contemporary art. From 
the very moment that it is created, he says, “the phenomenon of commercialization, 
reification, triteness, trivialization and the several varieties of weakening make very 
difficult nowadays, paradoxically, to produce political, critical and subversive art” (Vilar 
2010: 170). And he is right that this is a paradox for contemporary art, because much of 
contemporary art claims subversion and political commitment as its goals even being 
aware of the difficulties of having a real political and social effect. For this reason Yves 
Michaud argues that a weak politicization, or even a “mere facade” of politicization, is 
one of the features that constitutes the ethnography of contemporary art.2 The perfect 
integration of current artistic practices in the cultural, social and economic network 
would turn them politically inoffensive. Marc Jimenez also characterizes contemporary 
                                                           
1 Vilar 2010: 167. My translations into English of all the quotations of this book. 
2 Michaud 2007: 43. My translations into English of the quotations. 
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art as “institutionalized art” that should be differentiated from the wider category of 
“the art of today”.3 Both French philosophers also see contemporary art as the art that 
has generalized and so trivialized the use of the procedures of Duchamp’s ready-mades 
turning them into the most current artistic practice. If modern art broke up with 
traditional artistic values, academic canons, and the bourgeois conventions with which 
the avant-garde wished to bring art back to life, contemporary art changed the meaning 
of transgression, and subversion became and end in itself (Jimenez 2010: 22). Natalie 
Heinich defines contemporary art as a kind of “experience of the limits” that tries to 
push any boundaries or cross any limit (Heinich 1998a and 1998b), but the 
accumulation of “subversive” works of art will certainly make it difficult to see which 
limits exactly are transgressed. Since subversion became the necessary condition of 
artworks, subversion became, by jurisprudence, the norm and that normality would 
neutralize it. According to Michaud and Jimenez, with total freedom, artists would have 
abolished the boundary between art and life not only making artistic fraud easier, but 
also promoting the triumph of the aesthetics. Anything can be turned into art and so 
become aestheticized. This not only means that suddenly we are able to appreciate 
aesthetic qualities, even if they are not beauty or other qualities traditionally associated 
with good taste, but also that the context of reception has been manipulated and is 
somehow inappropriate. In particular, aestheticization points to the distance between 
reality and representation, it makes the object or issue in question a matter of 
contemplation and therefore it is a way of to trivialize and weaken any subject. This 
process of aestheticization that neutralizes art would satisfy nonetheless the demands of 
the market and the society of consumerism and spectacle. This is also the view of Hal 
Foster and Donald Kuspit, the two authors who along with Adorno are analyzed by 
Vilar when addressing the issue.  
In spite of the differences of their proposals and the context in which they are 
framed, according to Vilar, Kuspit would share with Adorno the pessimistic diagnoses 
of the end of art in the age of the commercialization of culture to which both will 
oppose a normative concept of art and the moralism of a romantic notion that links art 
to redemption. From a theory based on psychoanalysis, Kuspit attacks contemporary 
art, officially identified with the postmodern everything goes, due to its lack of 
commitment with an interpretation and understanding of the present time and its null 
aesthetic power, which he proposes to compensate with a return to painting.4 I think 
that Vilar would agree with much of Kuspit’s demands, but he clearly rejects that part of 
Kuspit’s view that would go against artistic pluralism. Vilar defends artistic autonomy 
understood as the capacity of art for ongoing re-definition and re-invention as the best 
way of fighting the forces of neutralization, aestheticization and weakening (Vilar 2010: 
                                                           
3 Jimenez 2010: 23, 37. My translations into English of the quotations. 
4 Vilar focuses his analysis on Donald Kuspit’s The End of Art (Kuspit 2004). 
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295-296). For Vilar, neither is art obliged to change the world; it is also autonomous in 
this way (Vilar 2010: 296). However, he would not deny the right of artists to try to 
make a difference offering a critical view on reality since he states that art allows us to 
think about the world, in its plurality and complexity, and then change it too to a certain 
extent. From this perspective, Vilar’s proposal will be closer to Foster’s strategy of 
resistance.  
After the acclaimed failure of the avant-garde project, the neo-avantgarde that 
institutionalizes avant-garde as art, would deny the authentic avant-gardist intentions of 
trangression and social change (Bürger 1987). But avant-garde would not be dead, 
although its principles of transgression and social liberation are dated. The authentic 
lesson of the avant-garde, Foster argues, was to show the historical nature of any art, 
contemporary art included, and now, due to the changes, both in the institution and 
life, and particularly immersed in a non-revolutionary ethos, artistic criticism has to 
change, acting in a more subtle and strategically punctual way.5 The strategy now must 
be to deconstruct our environment of cultural meanings and so re-evaluate, re-codify in 
order to re-interpret and re-direct our mechanisms of symbolization. Vilar would 
support this as part of his defence of pluralism through which art has expanded its 
modes of symbolization and so its chances of offering a new look on reality, altering and 
subverting the ordinary way of viewing things. Once again, the autonomy of art leads to 
the independence that allows the questioning of the automatisms of ordinary language 
and perception, and that will make art become more than autonomous, sovereign. 
Artistic sovereignty means for Vilar the irreducibility of art to the normal rules of 
communication and representation of reality. To say that art is sovereign is to admit 
that it cannot be domesticated in this sense and to recognize its possibilities of offering 
a heterodoxical experience (Vilar 2010) However, for Foster, this task would have been 
the job of what he helped to label “anti-aesthetic” art.  
 
“Anti-aesthetic” … signals that the very notion of the aesthetic, its network of ideas, is in question 
here: the idea that aesthetic experience exists apart, without “purpose”, all but beyond history, or 
that art can now effect a world at once (inter)subjective, concrete and universal – a symbolic 
totality. Like “postmodernism”, then, “anti-aesthetic” marks a cultural position on the present: are 
categories afforded by the aesthetic still valid?[......] More locally, “anti-aesthetic” also signals a 
practice, cross-disciplinary in nature, that is sensitive to cultural forms engaged in a politic (e.g., 
feminist art) or rooted in a vernacular– that is, to forms that deny the idea of a privileged aesthetic 
realm (Foster 1983).  
 
This famous quotation illustrates how its critical character and its political 
intentions defined the postmodern anti-aesthetic in opposition to the aesthetic, which 
                                                           
5 Foster 2001: 30. This view connects with the doubts that Foster also has about the mediatic 
inefficiency of shock and scandal when they are not anymore “strategies against conventional thought”, 
but they have become “conventional thought”. See Foster 1998. 
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it would alienate from political action. The postmodern then left behind not only the 
avant-garde and its utopian project of emancipation but mainly, and as the concept 
itself points to, modernism and aesthetic theory of artistic value, which lacked ethical 
and political content and it was so seen as ethically and politically regressive. It was 
argued that aesthetic modernism blocked the critical analysis of artworks, sustained 
cultural elitism, traditional authority and the market and therefore it became the main 
target for the attacks of the postmodern (Costello, Willsdon 2008: 8). From the 1970s, 
the rejection of the aesthetic, which was even claimed had nothing to do with art, was 
the tune sang by the prevailing artistic practice and theory which nevertheless, and as it 
has been pointed out earlier referring to Michaud and Jimenez, gained substantial 
institutional power and constituted the norm in contemporary art discourse for 
decades. No wonder then that, as Vilar also concludes, Foster acknowledges that the 
strategies of resistance do not always work and they end up subsumed and 
institutionalized under the discourse of art or fashion, ready to feed the market. Thus, 
the anti-aesthetic ends up politically neutralized or, paradoxically, aestheticized, and 
Foster would also join the pessimism of a tragic philosophy of history that Adorno or 
Kuspit sustain and that Vilar is not happy with. In spite of the difficulties, he is still 
confident in the power of resistance of an endless art capable of exercising its autonomy 
and offering what the great artists, and contemporary great artists, always achieve 
indeed, that is: they “have made us see what we haven’t seen before, or they have shed 
new light on that which we knew little about, and so they have extended the possibilities 
of our experience” (Vilar 2010: 189). As I would like to argue, the success of his 
proposal wouldn’t rely just upon the virtues of pluralism and artistic freedom, but also 
on the rediscovery and return to the aesthetic dimension of art. 
 
II. Aesthetics and the transformative power of art 
 
Sure enough, although the voice of the anti-aesthetic can still be (strongly) heard, 
we can confirm both a rediscovery of aesthetics and even a return to beauty.6 
Particularly, as Michael Kelly notes, from the 1990s aesthetics and beauty are receiving 
more attention in art practice and especially in art theory, where their alleged end was 
more prominent, and real. In fact, Kelly argues, aesthetics has not just been 
rediscovered but regenerated “because rediscovery may sound like restoration of the 
status quo ante” and this is not the case since the aesthetic has been subjected to severe 
                                                           
6 Many important works have been published on the matter, among them: Scarry 1999; Zangwill 2001; 
Danto 2003; Elkins 2006; Nehamas 2007; Hickey 2009. 
 LETTURE  
 
MATILDE CARRASCO BARRANCO • Neutralization 
and Aesthetics in Contemporary Art  
 
 
CoSMo   Comparative Studies in Modernism n. 6 (Spring) • 2015 
194 
critiques that sometimes are justified (Kelly 2009). Thus, restoring aesthetics means 
rethinking the nature and range of the aesthetic and its relationship to art.7 
As a strand of modern art and culture, the critique of the aesthetic reaches back to 
the beginning of the twentieth century, to what Arthur Danto has labelled the 
“intractable avant-garde” and from the beginning has shown political intentions. The 
intractable avant-garde dethroned beauty, earlier prime for the definition of art, due to 
its traditional moral weight as source of pleasure and consolation, and so the abuse of 
beauty became a device for dissociating the artists from the society they held in 
contempt, turning “beautifiers” into “collaborationists” (Danto 2003: 118). It was 
generally believed that beauty inevitably leads to deception, trivialization or escapism, 
and this “kalliphobia” extended to aesthetics in general. The so common identification 
of beauty with pleasure and aesthetic value provoked that the stigma of beauty 
extended to the aesthetic in general as if it were a sort of incompatibility between 
paying attention to aesthetic qualities and treating seriously certain socio-economical 
issues. As recalled earlier, the modernist tradition of art for art sake helped to do the job 
and later postmodern avant-garde took on the role of social criticism assuming the 
moral and political responsibility of producing “anti-aesthetic” artworks. But the move 
didn’t delete aesthetics in art nor render it irrelevant to its meaning and value. However, 
it substituted beauty, or any other pleasant features, with ugliness, obscenity, 
outrageousness or disgust, better representatives of contemporary art but aesthetic 
qualities after all. This is how aesthetics has survived into the era of artistic pluralism, 
the postmodern era that Danto has called “The End of Art”; the era of radical openness 
and transgression in which everything is possible as art is also the era when pluralism 
extends to aesthetics itself.8 
Then, the new accounts of the aesthetic have insisted on the aesthetic dimension of 
art as ineliminable and always relevant even for those stronger forms of conceptualism 
which claim aesthetics as secondary for art at best.9 But the thing is that even those 
most politically committed artists would have never disregarded the importance of the 
aesthetic dimension of the artworks. As Harrison and Wood say about the “committed” 
art of the 1970s in which the task of the critical artist was to stop the flux of 
representations that we inhabit, diagnose and show their mechanisms: “work of this 
kind clearly operates with a different sense of the task of art than aesthetic 
contemplation, which is not to say that compositional devices are not knowingly 
deployed as means to the end in question” (Harrison, Wood 1993: 170-256). Similarly, 
in “the return of the art of engagement” that Costello and Willsdon describe as a 
tendency in the most recent art, “the aesthetic as such is no longer at issue…[since] a 
                                                           
7 This restoration would have been made on different basis and with different goals. I explore and 
confront some of the most recent and relevant ones in Carrasco-Barranco 2014. 
8 “If everything is possible as art, everything is possible as aesthetics as well” (Danto 2004: 24-35).  
9 See for instance, Costello 2008 and Costello 2013. 
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range of aesthetic strategies are mobilised in order to investigate how regimes of 
representation operate” (Costello, Willsdon 2008: 12). However, aesthetics here is not 
seen as embellishment, something superficial and false, somehow inessential or 
epiphenomenal that trivializes whatever it is about, but as a matter of rhetoric 
understood as an intentional activity that constitutes the meaning of artworks.10 Artistic 
creation of aesthetic appearances, which display unique interpretations of the world, 
engage the mind and not just the senses and they don’t mean to abandon the viewers to 
their mere contemplation, but lead them to grasp the thought of the work. 
Besides, aesthetics has not only been seen as important to artistic meaning but also 
to art’s relevance or significance. The different aesthetic modes connect feelings with 
the thoughts that animate works of art, helping to explain why art is important in 
human life. For this reason, Danto, who nevertheless remained reluctant to accept 
aesthetic properties as a necessary condition for art, admitted that aesthetics might 
itself explain why we have art in the first place. The account of the aesthetic as a matter 
of rhetoric encompasses both the cognitive and the affective dimensions of the 
aesthetic in our engagement with art. The aesthetic affords our feelings to be enlisted 
toward what art is about and, certainly, this can make art dangerous because its 
methods are open to the representation of dangerous things. Going back to Plato, 
rhetoric –Danto said– aimed at the modification of attitude and belief, and that can 
never be innocent, and it’s real, because minds are so (Danto 1992: 192, 194). But 
artists do not always falsify their works’ subject and so lie to us. After all, things are that 
way (beautiful, charismatic, insipid or loathsome), and the artist would be causing the 
viewer to feel an appropriate emotion about them. At the end of the day, as he 
admitted, “the power of art is the power of rhetoric” (Danto 1992: 194) which can turn 
art dangerous indeed but it would not detract from its actual effectiveness. Therefore, 
far from seeing it as trivializing art’s content, aesthetics has much to do with what Danto 
thinks is “art’s transformative power”, namely, the “effect that art has on those who 
encounter it” (Danto 2003: 131). Of course, it is difficult to say how many people, 
individually or collectively, have been actually transformed by art, but anyway this 
impact that can make us change our view of things and even makes us quite different 
persons would not be enough to satisfy the goals of much of contemporary political art 
which aims to enter the stream of life in a much more direct way.  
Following Danto again, we can say that contemporary art has significantly changed 
our way to think about art. As a means of advancing social and political agendas, the 
purpose of art is calling us to action. Politically committed art demands from the 
viewers not just that they look at what the artists do but help them to change the world. 
This way of thinking about art belongs to the spirit of the intractable avant-garde and its 
                                                           
10 Costello, Willsdon 2008: 13. The conception of aesthetics as a matter of rhetoric has being developed 
by the last Danto, that is, from the publication of The Abuse of Beauty. 
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long legacy but, it has been said, inevitably faces the challenge of neutralization. As 
mentioned earlier, the first strategy for preserving critical power in order to move to 
action is de-aestheticising artworks in the sense of abandoning traditional aesthetic 
qualities. As a mode of resisting commodification and looking for an impact on society 
art becomes to a great extent indistinguishable from life and this has been reflected in 
the following discussions on art’s definition since the 1960s. However, when there was 
no need to produce beautiful art, other aesthetic qualities were employed to disconcert, 
shock, disturb, and enrage in order to change things. Nonetheless if the intended effects 
never took place it is probably because art is not supposed to play the role of 
transforming the world in such direct ways. I think then that, so understood, de-
aestheticization should not be blamed for the neutralization of art’s critical power, that 
is, it shouldn’t be blamed for its paradoxical aestheticization, but a much deeper way of 
de-artification should.  
Following Adorno’s words, de-artification causes the “neutralization of art 
transformed into a cultural good that is consumed without the perception of the 
aesthetic content that forces us to go beyond it”.11 De-artification means that art has 
become something different, not because it has lost its traditional aesthetic appearance, 
but because it doesn’t work as art any more. As a result of the new way of thinking 
about art as objects of knowledge that call for action, our attitude towards artworks has 
changed too. Nowadays, Danto says, when visiting museums, two options seem open, 
on one hand, we could try to appreciate the objects in their own right, noting their 
formal features, but, on the other hand, we mostly relate to artworks as if they were 
mere cultural products, documents or means to knowledge of a culture (Danto 2003: 
105, 125-126). This has to do with the disconnection of aesthetics from the 
professionalized body of discourses of art, and it is thus particularly the case of 
contemporary art, including those works which shocked and disturbed the most at the 
time of their creation, although the model of art as a cultural product has extended to 
the museums of the art of the past as well, and so nowadays artworks enter life through 
the tourist cultural package, the gift shops, publicity and fashion. Art becomes not much 
more different from life indeed, and the transformative power of art gets lost. To sum 
up, Danto’s reticence against making aesthetic a condition for art have then to do with 
the fact that many artworks, having little aesthetic value, are artworks nonetheless and 
could even be prominent in the history of art and have a secure place in our museums. 
This status must be explained by something else, so Danto would rightly understand 
that aesthetic and artistic values are different things. But following Danto’s own 
arguments, artworks with very little aesthetic value would be powerless, almost 
pointless, a serious problem particularly for political art. For this reason I think that 
                                                           
11 Quoted by Vilar 2010: 174. 
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Danto’s criticism of current artistic policies leads to a vindication of the (regenerated) 
aesthetic. 
On the other hand, when Vilar declares that contemporary art seems condemned to 
neutralization, he claims that this wouldn’t be an inevitable destiny. He states that in 
fact the works of Goya, Picasso, Otto Dix, Dennis Hopper or Francis Bacon resist the 
passing time and preserve fresh their power and critical strength, although he wonders 
why (Vilar 2010: 169). The answer might be that we are ready to encounter and value 
those works not as means to learn about a culture, but differently. If, as Danto says, 
artistic excellence is connected with what art is supposed to do, when dealing with 
contemporary political art then one should judge a work’s artistic excellence by its 
effectiveness, that is, by its actual success in making people change and change the 
world (Danto 2003: 107-108). Not being the case, contemporary political art would 
certainly face a tragic fate. But maybe we should stop thinking about art as a means to 
learn about our society in order to change it. As Vilar argues, art is mostly interpretation 
and he is right when he states that those who want to transform the world without 
interpreting it are wrong, because instead of art we have blind activism (Vilar 2010: 
296). However, as Danto suggests too, we should value art primarily according to what 
Hegel called its “highest vocation”, that is, as a form of expression and self-knowledge of 
our own deep reality. And this is what Vilar also vindicates: art seen as “a privileged 
mode of thinking about the world” (Vilar 2010: 295). Great artworks, including great 
contemporary artworks, are excellent in this way and that too is what should match 
people’s expectations. But art is as an aesthetic way of thought, which has explored and 
will continue exploring multiple practices, probably an endless list of mechanisms 
where thoughts are presented to human sensibility. Hegel felt though that art was 
inferior to philosophy as it was dependent upon having to put its content into some 
sensory medium or other, and so proclaimed the end of art. However, for Danto, the 
end of art just welcome artistic and aesthetic pluralism since art would not have been 
superseded by philosophy or any other manner of thought. In fact, given the way we 
are, Hegel’s end of art would mean the end of a certain sort of humanity (Danto 2003: 
122). Thus, when in our societies the forces that lead to neutralization of art are always 
present as a real threat, the defence of artistic autonomy by Vilar is also correct. Art’s 
autonomy makes it different from life and affords a sort of reflection on reality, which 
maybe can help to change it too. But the fact that we often don’t act consequently even 
to the actual changes produced in our views by an artwork doesn’t refute its artistic 
value, neither its ethical nor political value. The aesthetic component is nonetheless 
what mainly differentiates art from philosophy, what connects artistic meaning to its 
transformative power explaining the important role that art plays in our life and so, 
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